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Grand résumé 
Les lois de protection d'emploi ont été instaurées dans le but d 'améliorer la situation 
des employés permanents. La question centrale de cette thèse est la suivante : Ces lois 
sont-elles toujours bénéfiques, ont-elles des impacts non anticipés sur les travailleurs et 
comment se comparent-elles à d' autres institutions du marché du travail telles l'assu-
rance chômage et les programmes de partage du temps de travai l ? Dans les trois volets 
suivants, les effets non pécuniaires des lois de protection d'emploi sur le bien-être des 
travailleurs et de leur famille sont étudiés à partir de trois angles distincts en utili sant 
une approche principalement empirique. 
Dans le premier volet, l ' impact des licenciements et de la réduction des heures 
de travail sur la consommation des ménages est estimé par score de propension. Une 
approche structurelle est ensuite proposée où le revenu est modélisé comme un proces-
sus de Markov, afin d ' apprécier l ' impact de ces chocs sur le bien-être des travailleurs et 
d' entrevoir l'efficacité de diverses réformes de l 'assurance-chômage et des programmes 
de partage du temps de travail. Le second volet étudie la possibilité que les coûts d'ajus-
tement de la main-d'œuvre, et spécialement les lois de protection d 'emploi, incitent les 
entreprises à modifier les heures de travail ou l'intensité du travail au lieu de recourir 
aux embauches et aux li cenciements. Enfin, le troisième volet 1 explore les effets de la 
protection d'emploi sur le stress et le bien-être des employés. Si la protection d'em-
ploi augmente la sécurité des travailleurs en équilibre partiel en réduisant leur risque 
de licenciement, elle pourrait aussi avoir des impacts négatifs indirects. Par exemple, 
lorsque la procédure de congédiement d 'un travailleur est coûteuse ou incertaine, une 
entreprise peut chercher à la contourner en augmentant la pression sur le travailleur, 
en le surveillant plus étroitement ou, dans les cas extrêmes, en l ' intimidant pour qu ' il 
quitte de lui-même. 
Près de 80% des personnes en emploi sont salariées dans les pays industrialisés . 
Pour les entreprises qui les emploient, les embauches et les licenciements constituent 
une marge d 'ajustement essentielle aux conditions du marché. Mais un licenciement 
provoque souvent une perte de revenu à court et à long terme chez le travailleur, en 
plus d'en trainer des conséquences psychologiques et émotionnelles. Ainsi, les contrats 
de travail ne sont pas signés fréquemment, mais ils ont d ' importantes conséquences 
matérielles et humaines sur les travailleurs durant l ' emploi et après une séparation. 
Des recherches récentes suggèrent même que les aspects non pécuniaires du travail 
ont une importance comparable et même supérieure à celle du revenu sur le bien-être 
des travailleurs. Par exemple, Helliwell et Huang (2010) montrent que le climat de 
travail , particulièrement la confiance accordée aux cadres, est très fortement associé à 
leur satisfaction générale, autant qu'une importante hausse du revenu. De même, un 
licenciement a un impact négatif sur leur bonheur beaucoup plus grand que ne peut 
1. Ce volet est écrit avec Étienne Wasmer. 
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l ' expliquer la simple perte de revenu d'emploi (Helliwell et Huang, 2004). 
L'impact sur la consommation des pertes d'emploi, des 
licenciements et des pertes d'heures de travail 
Un des thèmes importants abordés dans cette thèse est le compromis pour les tra-
vailleurs entre sécurité d' emploi et régularité des heures de travail. Ainsi, le premier 
volet explore les conséquences de ce compromis du point de vue de la consommation et 
du bien-être des ménages. À ce jour, aucune étude n'a comparé l'impact sur la consom-
mation des ménage de divers types de licenciement et des pertes d 'heures de travail 
liées à la conjoncture économique. 2 Les données utilisées pour ce volet proviennent 
du Current Population Survey (CPS) des États-Unis. Ce sondage, avec son supplément 
sur la sécurité alimentaire, est le seul qui détaille avec suffisamment de précision la 
situation des répondants sur le marché du travail, y compris les changements d'heures 
de travail. Chaque ménage est sondé mensuellement au cours de deux années consécu-
tives pendant la même période de quatre mois, ce qui procure deux observations sur les 
dépenses alimentaires et au maximum huit observations sur le marché du travail. Bien 
que le CPS ne soit pas conçu comme une enquête longitudinale, des identifiants per-
mettent de lier les individus et les ménages entre chaque vague. On peut ainsi utiliser les 
données en première différence, contrôlant ainsi pour les caractéristiques individuelles 
invariables inobservées. 
Les données 
Le supplément sur la sécurité alimentaire est inséré dans le CPS chaque décembre 
depuis 2001. La définition exacte des dépenses est : dépenses alimentaires totales au 
supermarché, boucher, kiosques de nourriture, pâtissier, restaurants, restauration ra-
pide, cafétérias, machines distributrices, etc. Les dépenses alimentaires ne sont pas les 
dépenses totales, mais plusieurs études soulignent que l 'élasticité des dépenses alimen-
taires peut être une très bonne approximation de l'élasticité des dépenses totales (Ger-
vais et Klein (2010) (Tableau 4)) . En outre, plusieurs autres articles importants de la 
littérature sur la consommation utilisent aussi cette variable. 
Les situations sur le marché du travail considérées seront les suivantes : 
employé : employé à temps plein ; 
- licenciement6m : mise à pied avec retour au travail possible dans les six mois ; 
2. Plusieurs études ont estimé l'impact de divers types de pertes d'emploi sur la consommation et 
elles trouvent un impact entre -6.4% et -27%. La démarche qui se rapproche le plus de celle utilisée ici 
est celle de Browning et Crossley (200l a) . Grâce à une base de données canadienne sur des travailleurs 
licenciés, les auteurs estiment par score de propension que l'impact d' un licenciement permanent, par 
rapport à un licenciement avec une date de retour connue, est de -6.4%. 
xv 
- licenciementyappel : mise à pied avec date de retour connue; 
- pertes d'heures : l'employé travaille normalement à temps plein, mais a travaillé 
moins de 35 heures la semaine dernière en raison de manque de travail 1 du 
contexte économique. 
Un modèle plus général considérera également un plus large éventail de circonstances, 
telles qu'un licenciement sans espoir de rappel, un découragement suivi d'une sor-
tie du marché du travail, le travail en temps supplémentaire, une perte d'emploi après 
fermeture ou déménagement d'entreprise, une perte d'emploi avec ou sans assurance 
chômage et une perte d'assurance santé à la suite d'une perte d'emploi. Enfin, l'élasti-
cité de la consommation relativement au revenu annuel, au revenu hebdomadaire et au 
salaire sera aussi calculée. 
Le modèle empirique 
Le modèle linéaire de base estimé est le suivant : 
1'1ln ( dépensesi) = f3o + f3I Lic.6mi + f32LicTappeli + f33Pertes d'heuresi + ycontrôlesi + Ei 
où 1'1ln ( dépensesi) est le logarythme du changement annuel des dépenses hebdo-
madaires de nourriture du travailleur i. L'échantillon est constitué des travailleurs em-
ployés à temps plein il y a un an et présentement employés dans des circonstances 
similaires ou dans une des situations telles que Licenciement6mi' Licenciementyappeli 
ou Pertes d 'heuresi. 
Les résultats montrent que les travailleurs subissant un licenciement prolongé (Lic.6m) 
réduisent leur consommation de 13.9%, en comparaison avec ceux qui demeurent em-
ployés. La différence est négligeable dans le cas des licenciements avec date de retour 
connue ou pour les pertes d'heures de travail dues aux conditions économiques. 
Pour aller au-delà de cette formulation linéaire du modèle, une approche basée sur 
l'appariement par score de propension (propensity score matching) (Rosenbaum et Ru-
bin (1982)) est employée. Cette méthode a l'avantage d'assurer que les travailleurs 
comparés sont similaires quant à leurs caractéristiques observables. Comme Licenciement6m, 
Licenciementyappel et Pertes d'heures représentent de multiples 'traitements ' mutuel-
lement exclusifs, la procédure suivie s'inspire de Lechner (2002). La propension de 
subir chaque 'traitement' est estimée par régression logistique multinomiale. L' appa-
riement est effectué par distance Mahalanobis et d'autres métriques sont employées 
pour tester la robustesse des résultats. 
Les résultats, présentés dans le tableau 0.1, sont très similaires au modèle linéaire. 
L'impact sur les dépenses hebdomadaires d'un licenciement avec retour dans les six 
mois est de -13.7% (ligne 1). La différence entre un Licenciement6m et des pertes 
d'heures est aussi significative (ligne 4). 
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L'analyse est également élargie à un plus grand nombre de circonstances, à des 
sous-groupes de travailleurs et à des sous-ensembles de dépenses alimentaires. Les 
résultats principaux sont présentés dans le tableau 0.2. Les travailleurs qui réduisent 
le plus leur consommation sont ceux qui sont découragés ( -35.4%). La réaction des 
travailleurs au chômage après un licenciement permanent est similaire à celle des tra-
vailleurs en licenciement avec retour dans les six mois. Les travailleurs en temps sup-
plémentaire augmentent leurs dépenses de nourriture de 4.1 % de plus que les autres 
travailleurs. L'effet d'avoir quitté le marché du travail par découragement et l'effet d'un 
licenciement6m sont plus grands pour les ménages à un seul gagne-pain. Sans surprise, 
tous les effets sont plus forts pour les hommes que pour les femmes, étant donné que les 
hommes sont toujours les principaux pourvoyeurs. Enfin, les dépenses sont beaucoup 
moins élastiques dans le cas de la nourriture consommée à la maison que pour celle 
consommée à l'extérieur. 
Grâce au supplément du CPS de janvier sur la mobilité professionnelle et l'ancien-
neté, des informations supplémentaires sur les circonstances des licenciements sont dis-
ponibles pour un sous-échantillon d'observations. Ainsi, quand une perte d'emploi est 
due à une fermeture ou un déménagement de l'employeur, l'impact est de -20.4%. Un 
autre résultat intéressant est que l'impact de la fin des prestations d'assurance chômage 
sur les dépenses alimentaires est de -39.7%, une magnitude difficilement explicable 
sans la présence de fortes contraintes à l'emprunt pour de nombreux chômeurs. 
Enfin, l'élasticité des dépenses de consommation est estimée à 4% dans le cas d' un 
changement du revenu hebdomadaire, à 7.9% pour un changement de salaire et à 6.5% 
pour un changement du revenu familial annuel. Ces chiffres sont en accord avec la 
littérature. 
Un modèle structurel 
Depuis les travaux de Friedman, un des objectifs de la littérature empirique a été de 
vérifier si les ménages réussissent effectivement à lisser leur consommation au cours de 
fluctuations temporaires de revenu, et s' il s s'ajustent complètement aux chocs perma-
nents. Un résultat récurrent est que la consommation s'ajuste souvent trop aux chocs 
transitoires et ne s'ajuste pas suffisamment aux chocs permanents (voir Jappelli et Pista-
feri (2010) pour un résumé de cette littérature). Plusieurs hypothèses ont été proposées 
pour expliquer ces résultats, suggérant des altérations possibles aux fonctions objec-
tifs des travailleurs. L'approche structurelle utilisée ici consiste plutôt à modéliser un 
sous-ensemble de chocs bien définis liés au marché du travail. 3 
3. Cette approche s'inspire de Dynarski et Gruber (1997) qui considèrent séparément les chocs dus 
aux changements d'heures , vus comme temporaires, et les chocs dus aux changements de salaires, consi-
dérés comme permanents. 
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XIX 
Conformément à la section, le revenu des travailleurs est modélisé comme un pro-
cessus de Markov alternant entre cinq états :employé, en pertes d'heures de travail, en 
licenciement avec date de retour connue, en licenciement avec retour espéré dans les 
six mois et licencié de façon permanente. Les flux entre états sont calculés à 1' aide des 
données du CPS. Les travailleurs gagnent leur plein salaire quand ils sont au travail, 
en obtiennent une partie quand ils sont en pertes d'heures et touchent de l'assurance 
chômage s'ils sont sans emploi. Les pertes d'heures et licenciements entraînent aussi 
une probabilité qu'un travailleur change d'employeur et subisse une perte de salaire 
permanente. 
Un travailleur entre dans la population active à 20, prend sa retraite à 60 ans et meurt 
avec certitude à 75 ans sans intention de laisser d'héritage. Son utilité à chaque période 
1- v 
est de type CRRA : u (Cr) = ~'-v où v = 2, ce qui est standard dans la littérature. Il fait 
face à une contrainte de crédit et ne peut dépenser plus de 5% de son revenu en intérêt 
sur ses dettes . 
Le salaire moyen des travailleurs augmente annuellement en fonction de l'âge. Le 
taux d'intérêt annuel est de 5%, indépendamment du niveau d' actifs. Le taux d'infla-
tion est de 2.55 % et le taux d'escompte annuel est de ~ = .95. Le modèle est résolu 
numériquement et l'unité de temps est un mois. 
La résolution du modèle permet de simuler les réponses d' un groupe représenta-
tif de travailleurs, composé à 37.41 % de ménages à un seul revenu et de 62.59% de 
ménages à revenus multiples. 
Le modèle reproduit bien la réaction des ménages calculée à partir des données 
réelles, tel que présenté dans le tableau 0.3. Dans les données simulées des colonnes 
1 et 3, les ménages réagissent à des pertes d'emploi en réduisant leurs dépenses de 
19%. Cette réaction est supérieure à celle obtenue dans l'échantillon total (col. 4 et 6), 
mais très près de celle liée à une perte d'emploi due à une fermeture ou à un démé-
nagement d'entreprise (col. 7). L'effet d'un licenciement6m pour l'échantillon simulé 
est légèrement plus faible que pour l'échantillon complet. En revanche, l'effet d'un 
licenciementrappel est un peu plus grand pour l'échantillon simulé. L'effet simulé des 
pertes d'heures est négatif, mais très faible. 
xx 
TABLE 0.3: Simulation du modèle 
Var dep. : Mog Simulation Échantillon completb 
dépenses en nourr. 2 3 4 5 6c 
Licenciementperm. -0.190 -0.148 -0.190 -0.158*** -0.136** -0.161 *** 
ou Perte d' emploi a (0.037) (0.051 ) (0.037) 
[.390] [.829] [.434] 
Licenciement6m -0.137 -0. 119 -0.137 -0.151 *** -0.141 *** -0.148*** 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
[.759] [.618] [.802] 
Licenciementrappel -0.098 -0.082 -0.098 -0.077 -0.071 -0.079 
(0.057) (0.055) (0.056) 
[.722] [.846] [.743] 
Pertes d' heures -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 0.013 0.013 0.013 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
[.191] [.191] [.2 10] 
Mois depuis la -0.012 -0.005 
perte d'emploi (0.008) 
[.411] 
ret. Licenciementperm. 0.130 0.094** 
(0.037) 
[. 336] 
ret. Licenciement6m 0.107 0.043 
(0.057) 
[.271] 
ret.Licenciementrappel 0.083 0.011 
(0.056) 
[.1 99] 
ret. Perte d 'heures 0.012 0.008 
(0.027) 
[.888] 
Contrôles y y y 
Observations 65 040 65 040 69 795 
R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 
7 ---1 
Pr > F ( f3 = f3 · ) [.5 14] [.514] [.581] 
Éca.J1s-types entre parenthèses, e.t. = *** p<O.O 1, ** p<0.05 , * p<O. l . 
"Dans l'échantillon total, cette variable est Layoffperm: au chômage après une perte d 'emploi, à la recherche d ' un nouvel emploi . 
Dans l'échanti llon du Supplément sur la mobi lité professionnelle et l'ancienneté, cette variable est: perte d'emploi après une 
fermeture ou un déménagement de l' employeur. 
hL' échantillon inclut les travailleurs qui , l'an dernier, étaient employés à temps plein pour le secteur privé ou public dans un seul 
emploi et qui, la semaine dernière, étaient employés dans des conditions similaires , ont travaillé moins de 35 heures par manque de 
trava il ou autre raison économique, étaient au chômage après un licenciement, après une perte d 'emploi ou hors de la vie active et 
découragé. 
"Inclut également les travailleurs du secteur privé ou public employés à temps plein dans un seul emploi la semaine 
passée et qui étaient , l'an dernier, employés dans des conditions sirrillaires, travaill aient moins de 35 heures par 
manque de travail lié au contexte économique, étaient en licenc iement ou avaient perdu leur emploi de faço n 
permanente. 
Mobil. 
7 
-0.203*** 
(0.052) 
[.8 18] 
-0.128 
(0.078) 
[.913] 
-0.093 
(0.084) 
[.953] 
-0.013 
(0.031) 
[.846] 
y 
24 388 
0 .0 16 
[.996] 
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Le modèle permet également d'approximer l'impact de réformes de l'assurance-
emploi sur la consommation. Les résultats indiquent que ces réformes auraient un im-
pact léger sur la consommation des ménages, mais un effet très faible sur leur bien-être. 
En somme, les résultats des différentes sections sont cohérents et suggèrent forte-
ment que les licenciements à long terme ont des répercussions importantes alors que 
les pertes temporaires d'heures de travail sont sans conséquences. Les programmes de 
partage du temps de travail, encore peu utilisés, surtout en Amérique du Nord, seraient 
donc envisageables pour aider les firmes à s'ajuster aux fluctuations temporaires du 
cycle économique tout en minimisant l'incertitude ressentie par leurs employés. 
La protection d'emploi et la variabilité des heures de 
travail 
Dans le second volet, on s'interroge sur l'existence, pour les firmes et leurs tra-
vailleurs, d'un compromis entre stabilité des heures de travail et stabilité d'emploi. 
En effet, les embauches et les licenciements ne sont pas la seule marge d'ajustement 
du travail pour les firmes . Les cadres peuvent aussi ajuster la production en modifiant 
les horaires de travail ou l'intensité du travail. La protection d'emploi pourrait donc 
favoriser le recours à des horaires plus instables et à plus de travail supplémentaire, 
entraînant ainsi des conséquences physiques et mentales sur la santé, tel que rapporté 
dans une méta-analyse récente sur l'impact du temps supplémentaire sur la santé. 4 
Un modèle théorique 
Au moyen d'un modèle dans lequel une firme choisit entre les travailleurs et les 
heures de travail, on peut montrer que, peu importe le processus d'ajustement des prix 
ou la forme des coûts d'ajustement de l'emploi, dès qu'une firme ne peut ajuster parfai-
tement sa main d'œuvre, elle compensera en ajustant les heures de travail. Les profits 
de l'entreprise sont 
II= py (nh) - nw (h) 
où p est le prix de vente, y (y' > 0, y" < 0) est la production, n est le nombre de 
travailleurs, h est le nombre d'heures par travailleur et w (h) (w (0) > 0, w' > 0, w" > 0) 
est le salaire par travailleur. Le salaire est convexe et dérivable deux fois en tout point, 
ce qui est justifié en annexe. 
Après un changement de prix, la firme devrait ajuster sa main d'oeuvre. Mais si 
on suppose qu'elle n'opère qu'une fraction (1- a) < 1 de son ajustement optimal du 
4. Les impacts incluent une moins bonne santé, plus de blessures, plus de maladies et une plus grande 
mortalité.(Caruso et al., 2004) 
X Xli 
nombre de travailleurs, on peut démontrer qu'elle compensera en ajustant les heures de 
travail : 
dh 
dp 
ay' (nh) > 0 
w" ( h) - py" ( nh) n 
Pour illustrer ce mécanisme dynamiquement, et contrairement à la littérature anté-
rieure 5, le modèle postule un prix de vente qui varie entre deux valeurs, tel que proposé 
par Bertola (1990). Ainsi, le prix varie entre un prix haut : pet un prix bas p_, suivant 
un processus de Markov. Il y a une probabilité q que le prix change de p à p_ et une 
probabilité q_ qu'il change de p_ à p. Le taux d'intérêt est r. Suivant un changement de 
prix, la façon dont la firme ajustera sa main d'oeuvre dépend de la forme des coûts 
d'ajustement. Le cas où l'ajustement est instantanné est exploré en détail en appendice. 
La figure 2.1 illustre Je cas d' un coût de licencement linéaire Cf par travailleur et 
aucun coût d 'embauche. Comme l'ajustement est instantanné, la figure 2.1 présente les 
deux choix optimaux de main d'oeuvre net !J:., d'heures par travailleur h et !J:., et de 
production y (nli) et y (nh) en fonction du coût d'ajustement Cf. Le cas d'une firme qui 
ne peut ajuster les heures par travailleur est présenté en pointillés et le cas d' une firme 
qui peut ajuster à la fois le nombre de travailleurs et les heures est présenté en lignes 
pleines. 
Les résultats généraux peuvent être résumés ainsi. Les coûts de licenciement aug-
mentent la variation des heures de travail et diminuent la variation du nombre d ' em-
ployés et de la production de l'entreprise. La probabilité des chocs et le taux d'intérêt 
réduisent les embauches et les licenciements et augmentent la variation des heures. De 
plus, ils amplifient l' impact des coûts d'ajustement. 
Une extension du modèle illustre également la situation où un minimum d'heures 
par travailleur est imposé à la firme. Quand cette limite est contraignante pour la firme, 
elle a pour effet d'augmenter les heures moyennes et de réduire le nombre de tra-
vailleurs employés. 
Deux prédictions sont dérivées du modèle : 1. le coût d' ajustement du travail aug-
mente la variabilité des heures, surtout dans les secteurs avec un haut taux de licencie-
ment ; 2. une hausse temporaire de la demande de travail accroît les heures de travail, 
surtout dans un contexte où l'ajustement du travail est coûteux. Ces prédictions servent 
de stratégie d'identification dans la section empirique. 
Section empirique 
La section empirique exploite des microdonnées sur le temps supplémentaire payé 
tirées de l'Enquête sur la population active du Canada. Comme dans le premier vo-
let, la variable de protection d' emploi varie entre les provinces. Ces préavis ont deux 
5. Nickell (1978) et Chen et Funke (2004) 
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FIG URE 0.1: Travailleurs, heures par travailleur et production en fonction des coûts de 
licenciement c f• avec des heures fixes ou flexibles. 
sous-composantes : les préavis de licenciement individuels qui augmentent en fonction 
de l'ancienneté d'un travailleur et les préavis supplémentaires en cas de licenciement 
collectif, proportionnels à la taille du licenciement. 
Pour contrer le risque d'endogénéité entre la législation d'une province et la propen-
sion des travailleurs de cette province à travailler en temps supplémentaire, des effets 
provinces sont inclus comme contrôles. Puisque les législations ne varient pas au cours 
du temps, l'identification est basée sur l ' impact hétérogène qu 'elles ont sur des sous-
groupes d'observations. La première stratégie d'identification consiste à interagir les 
préavis de licenciement avec le taux de licenciement spécifique à chaque secteur d ' ac-
tivité. Comme les firmes ayant un besoin naturel plus grand de licencier des travailleurs 
seront plus affectées par les licenciements, elles devraient avoir davantage recours aux 
heures supplémentaires pour éviter un maximum de licenciements. Dans l'esprit d'une 
différence en différences, le groupe traité est constitué des travailleurs des secteurs à 
hauts taux de licenciement et le groupe contrôle, des travailleurs des secteurs à bas taux 
de licenciement. Le modèle estimé, en termes de variable latente, est 
,81Préavis ind.p x Taux de Lic. 5 + ,82Préavis Coll.pf x Taux de Lic. 5 
Temps sup.1,p,s = + ,83Préavis Coll.pf + Y1 Taux d'emploips + rzDev. Emploipst 
+If> contrôles ind.i + EFp + EE't + EFs + Uip 
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où Temps sup.t,p,s est la propension à travailler en temps supplémentaire payé pour 
l'individu ide la province p employé dans le secteur s. Préavis ind.p est le niveau moyen 
de préavis individuel de la province p, pondéré par le taux de licenciement par niveau 
d'ancienneté, Préavis ColLpf est la période de préavis pour les licenciements collectifs 
de la province p d'un nombre de travailleur f, Taux de lic.s est le taux de licenciement 
du secteurs, Taux d'emploips est le taux d'emploi moyen de la province pet le secteur 
s, Dev. Emploi. pst est la déviation trimestrielle du taux d'emploi au temps t du secteurs 
de la province p par rapport à sa moyenne au cours de la période, contrôles indi est un 
vecteur de contrôles individuels. EFp, EFt and EFs sont des effets fixes province, temps 
(11 effets années et 12 effets mois) et secteur. Le terme d'erreur est Uip = Vp + êi, où 
Vp est un terme d'erreur qui peut être corrélé au sein de la province et êi est un terme 
d'erreur individuel de l'individu i. 
Dans la seconde stratégie d'identification, les préavis de licenciement sont inter-
agis avec la déviation du taux d'emploi. Cette approche prend avantage du fait que la 
demande de temps supplémentaire ne sera pas uniforme au cours du temps, mais sera 
proportionnelle à la demande de travail, et ce lien devrait être amplifié par la protection 
d'emploi. 
Enfin, la dernière stratégie exploite le fait que les préavis collectifs sont proportion-
nels au nombre de travailleurs licenciés. Ainsi, une firme ne sera pas affectée par un 
préavis qui s'applique au licenciement d' un nombre de travailleurs plus grand que son 
nombre total d'employés. 
L'estimation se fait d'abord directement par pro bit sur l'ensemble des microdon-
nées. Mais, pour s'assurer d'obtenir des écarts-types non biaisés et faciliter l'interpré-
tation des coefficients, des estimés en deux étapes par la méthode de distance minimale 
sont utilisés. La propension de travailler en temps supplémentaire est d'abord estimée 
par modèle de probabilité linéaire. 
Le tableau 2.1 montre les estimés probit initiaux. Les résultats confirment en géné-
ral le lien entre la protection d'emploi individuelle et la variabilité des heures de travail. 
La colonne 2 présente la première stratégie d'identification où les préavis de licencie-
ments sont interagis avec les taux de licenciement sectoriels. Le coefficient pour les 
préavis individuelsp x taux de licenciements est très significatif, mais le coefficient de 
préavis collectifpf x taux de licenciements ne l' est pas. Ainsi, les préavis individuels de 
licenciement ont un impact positif et statistiquement significatif sur le temps supplé-
mentaire à travers leur interaction avec les taux de licenciement. 
Les estimés par méthode de distance minimale confirment ces résultats probit. Ils 
permettent également de calculer que l'impact de premier ordre des préavis sur lestra-
vailleurs de secteurs à haut taux de licenciement est positif et significatif. Il est non 
significatif pour les secteurs à bas taux de licenciement, Ces résultats sont conformes 
à l'esprit d'une stratégie différence en différences. Spécifiquement, une semaine sup-
plémentaire de préavis individuel augmente de 34% le nombre de travailleurs en temps 
supplémentaire. 
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TABLE 0.4: Temp supplémentaire payé, probit 
Variable dépendante : Pro bit 
Travaille en temps sup.a Tout Strat. 1 Strat. 2 Coll. Coupe transversale 
1 2 3 4 
Préavis ind./ x Taux de lie./ 32.21 *** 32.35*** 
(8.34) (8.34) 
Préavis coll.p/ x Taux de lic.5 0.42 0.42 
(0.35) (0.35) 
Préavis ind .p x Empl. dev.p51 e 1.03*** 1.07*** 
(0.36) (0.37) 
Préavis co1LpJ XEmpl. dev.pst 0.00 0.00 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Préavis coll.p.f 0.02 0.02 0.01 ** 0.01 ** 
(0.01 ) (0.01 ) (0.00) (0.00) 
Taux d' empl.ps f -0.11 -0.12 0.60 0.59 
(0.47) (0.48) (0.42) (0.43) 
Dev. Emploipst -1.37* 0.69*** -1.47* 0.68*** 
(0.76) (0.17) (0.78) (0.1 7) 
Préavis ind.p 
Contrôles ind.K y y y y 
Effets fixes secteurs y y y y 
Effets fi xes taille de l'entreprise y y y y 
Effets fixes province y y y y 
Effets tempsh y y y y 
Contrôles province; 
Nombre d' observations 4 379 885 4 379 885 4 379 885 4 379 885 
Nombre de groupes 10 10 10 10 
R2 ajusté 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 
Écarts-types robustes entre parenthèses ; *** p< O.O 1, ** p <O.OS , * p< O.l 
0 Variable dichotomique pour le travail en temps supplémentaire 
b Préavis de li cenciement individuel moyen de la province p, pondéré par le taux de licenciement de chaque niveau 
d'ancienneté 
c Taux de licenciement du secteur 
d Préavis de licenciement collectif, spécifique pour chaque taille de firme 
• Déviation trimestriell e du taux d'emploi spécifique à la province et au secteur 
f Taux d"emploi spécifique à la province x secteur, moyenne sur toute la péri ode 
5 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
0.55 
(0.50) 
0.68*** 
(0.18) 
-0.19 
(0.11 ) 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
4 379 885 
10 
0.091 
g Les contrôles incluent l' ancienneté et des effets fi xes pour la tai lle de l'entreprise, J" âge, l' occupation et Je type de contrat. 
" Inclut des effets fixes année et trimestre 
; Inclut un effets fixes pour NE, NB and TN, où la prime pour temps supplémentaire est 1.5 fo is Je salaire minimum. Lncl ut 
également Je nombre standard d' heures régulières dans chaque province, ainsi que le PIB per capita de chaque province. 
Inclut seulement les employés du secteur privé en contrat permanent dans des emplois non saisonniers. Exclut les travai lleurs 
de la construction. 
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La colonne 3 du tableau 2.1 présente la seconde stratégie d'identification. L' inter-
action des préavis individuels avec la variation du taux d'emploi est positive et signifi-
cative, alors que l'interaction des préavis collectifs avec la variation du taux d'emploi 
ne l'est pas. Les estimés subséquents par méthode de distance minimale montrent que 
l'impact d'une variation du taux d'emploi est non significatif dans les provinces à pré-
avis individuels courts, alors qu ' il est positif et significatif dans les provinces avec de 
longs préavis individuels . Dans ces provinces, une augmentation d'un point du taux 
d'emploi augmente le nombre de travailleurs en temps supplémentaire de 1.9%. 
Les autres spécifications sont non significatives ou ne résistent pas aux tests de ro-
bustesse. Des régressions sur des sous-groupes de travailleurs montrent que ces effets 
sont plus importants pour les petites et moyennes entreprises que pour les grandes en-
treprises de plus de 100 employés. De plus, l'effet est aussi important pour les employés 
qui sont membres d'un syndicat que pour les non-membres. 
Ces résultats confirment 1 'influence des préavis individuels sur la probabilité qu 'un 
employé travaille en temps supplémentaire. Plus généralement, ils illustrent la capacité 
des firmes de changer de marge d' ajustement si les licenciements sont coûteux. Pour 
les juridictions à forte protection d'emploi, l'usage accru du travail en temps supplé-
mentaire devrait être un risque additionnel à considérer. Bien sûr, le Canada est une 
économie nord-américaine avec un niveau de protection d'emploi peu élevé par rapport 
à la moyenne de l'OCDE. La même analyse devrait être reproduite dans un contexte où 
la protection est plus stricte, idéalement en utilisant des données provenant directement 
des firmes. 
La protection d'emploi et le stress au travail 
Enfin, le dernier volet étudie plus largement les conséquences des lois de protec-
tion d'emploi sur le moral des travailleurs. Ces lois devraient en principe bénéficier 
aux employés permanents en réduisant leur risque de chômage. Par contre, la littéra-
ture théorique et empirique démontre clairement que cette législation tend également 
à réduire l ' embauche d'employés permanents. Elle n'augmente donc pas le bien-être 
des travailleurs au chômage, en période de probation, en contrat temporaire ou à temps 
partiel. Les lois de protection d'emploi ont également plusieurs impacts secondaires po-
sitifs et négatifs. Ceci étant, la protection d 'emploi n' apporte-t-elle que des avantages 
aux détenteurs d'un contrat permanent? C'est la question abordée par le troisième volet 
de cette thèse. Comme le coût du divorce prolonge parfois de façon excessive les ma-
riages malheureux, il est aussi possible que la protection d'emploi exacerbe le stress et 
les tensions au sein des firmes. Par exemple, dans le cas d'un emploi non rentable, une 
firme peut tenter d'éviter les coûts ou 1' incertitude associés au processus de licencie-
ment en faisant pression sur un travailleur pour qu ' il quitte de lui-même en altérant les 
routines de travail, l'organisation ou les techniques de gestion. Dans des cas extrêmes, 
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les collègues ou les supérieurs peuvent harceler un travailleur, phénomène rapporté par 
une large littérature. L'entreprise peut également le surveiller étroitement afin de trou-
ver une justification pour le licencier pour faute, et éviter ainsi les coûts associés à un 
licenciement pour motifs économiques. La protection d'emploi peut aussi pousser les 
firmes à ajuster le travail en modifiant l'intensité ou les heures plutôt que le nombre 
de travailleurs, tel que montré dans le chapitre 2. Tous ces mécanismes peuvent être 
source de stress pour le travailleur. En équilibre général, comme la protection ralentit 
les embauches et allonge le chômage, la crainte de perdre un emploi peut être source 
de stress, ou pousser un travailleur à demeurer dans un emploi insatisfaisant s'il doute 
de ses capacités de se retrouver un travail. 
Les données 
Ces mécanismes sont illustrés dans un modèle théorique où la firme peut affecter 
la qualité de l'environnement de travail d'un travailleur et le surveiller pour pouvoir 
le licencier pour faute. Toutefois, la contribution principale de ce volet est empirique. 
Pour tester ces mécanismes, sept sondages internationaux récents contenant des infor-
mations sur le stress au travail ont été identifiés : le European Quality of Life Survey 
(EQLS) de 2003 ; le International Social Survey Program (ISSP) de 1997 et 2005 ; les 
sondages Eurobaromètre de 1996 et 2001 et les Enquêtes européennes sur les condi-
tions de travail (European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS)) de 2000-2001 pour 
les candidats EU et 2005. De plus, des données canadiennes, les premières illustrant 
la différence de protection d' emploi existant entre les provinces canadiennes et les se-
condes tirées de l 'Enquête nationale sur la santé de la population (ENSP) du Canada, 
permettent également d'étudier les relations entre la protection d'emploi et le stress. 
Le panel principal utilisé est constitué des enquêtes EWCS 2000-01 et 2005, ainsi 
que de l'enquête Eurobaromètre 1996. La question ayant trait au stress est "Votre tra-
vail affecte-t-il votre santé ? Si oui, comment?", le stress étant une réponse possible. 
Cette variable est donc binaire. La mesure de protection d'emploi de l'OCDE est une 
moyenne pondérée de l'estimation des coûts imposés aux firmes par les composantes 
de la protection d'emploi. Ses trois composantes sont i) protection contre les licencie-
ments individuels, ii) protection contre les licenciements collectifs iii) restrictions de 
l'usage des contrats temporaires. Cette troisième dimension est très importante, car ces 
restrictions obligent les firmes à fournir des contrats permanents avec une protection 
plus grande qu'elles ne l 'auraient souhaité. 
L'approche empirique 
La figure 3.2 montre une forte corrélation positive entre protection d'emploi et 
stress au travail pour les trois sondages du panel principal. Une corrélation similaire 
est présente dans tous les autres sondages étudiés. Bien sûr, une simple corrélation ne 
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peut pas déterminer si la protection d'emploi augmente le stress ou si les travailleurs 
stressés demandent une plus forte protection. 
Des facteurs affectant le stress dans un pays ou une région peuvent également in-
fluencer la volonté de légiférer en matière de protection d'emploi. Pour faire face à ce 
risque d' endogénéité, deux stratégies sont proposées. La première utilise les variations 
de la protection d'emploi au cours du temps. La seconde tire parti du fait que l'impact 
de la protection d'emploi devrait être plus grand pour les entreprises des secteurs d'ac-
tivité nécessitant davantage de licenciements. Cette idée, exploitée dans le chapitre 2, 
a été développée par Rajan et Zingales (1998) en finance et adaptée subséquemment 
pour d'autres secteurs, incluant la macroéconomie du marché du travail. Dans l'esprit 
d'une approche de différence en différences, le groupe de contrôle serait un secteur 
avec une faible protection d'emploi et le secteur traité serait celui avec une forte pro-
tection d'emploi. Bien sûr, les deux stratégies pourront être combinées dans la mesure 
du possible, ce qui équivaut à une triple différence. 
Le modèle économétrique le plus général est : 
Stresssanté;,p,s,t = f31Protectionp,t x Destr. d'emplois+ f32Xc,t + f33Zi+ EFp,t + EFs ,t + EFp,s +Ei,p,s,t 
(1) 
où Stresssanté;,p,s,t est le stress rapporté par l'individu i, dans le pays p, dans le secteur 
set au temps t. Protectionp,t est la protection d'emploi du pays pau temps t, Destr. 
d'emplois est la mesure du taux de destruction d'emploi du secteurs dans lequel l'indi-
vidu travaille. Z; est un vecteur de contrôles pour l'individu i, incluant le sexe et des ef-
fets fixes pour 1' âge, le nombre d'enfant dans le ménage, le nombre total de membres du 
ménage, la taille de l'entreprise, le titre de l'emploi et les heures hebdomadaires. Le mo-
dèle inclut aussi le taux de chômage spécifique au sexe et au groupe d'âge. EFp,t ,EFs,t 
and EFp,s sont des vecteurs d'effets fixes au niveau pays x temps, secteurxtemps et 
temps x secteur, respectivement. Dans les spécifications qui n'incluent pas EFp,t. (table 
0.5, colonne 4 à 6), ces effets fixes sont remplacés par un vecteur Xp ,t de contrôles 
pays x pays, incluant la couverture des négociations salariales, le taux de syndicalisa-
tion, la centralisation salariale, la coordination salariale, l'assurance chômage et le PIB 
per capita. Dans les spécifications sans EFp,t. la protection d'emploi du pays et de l'an-
née est bien sûr ajoutée. Finalement, les résidus ont deux parties : Ei ,p,s,t = /lp + vi, où 
/lp est un effet inobservé du pays et vi est un terme d' erreur idiosyncratique. 
Le stress au travail peut être lié à d'autres institutions du marché du travail. Si ces 
institutions sont corrélées avec la protection d'emploi ou avec le moment des réformes 
de la protection d'emploi, elles pourraient être un facteur confondant. Sans véritable 
expérience naturelle, la meilleure stratégie est de contrôler pour le plus grand nombre 
d'autres institutions avec le vecteur Xp ,t. 
Comme pour le volet 2, l ' estimation de l'impact des variables institutionnelles di-
rectement sur les microdonnées risque de fortement biaiser les écarts-types vers le bas. 
Pour contrer ce risque, un estimé par distance minimum est employé. Le stress moyen 
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FIGURE 0.2: Indice de la protection d' emploi de l 'OCDE et problèmes de santé liés au 
stress au travail 
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du pays x temps x secteur est d'abord estimé par un modèle de probabilité linéaire: 
p (StreSSsant é;,p,s,r 1 p ,s,t ,Zi) = Dp,s,t + /33Zi 
où D c,s ,t est un vecteur d'effets fixes pays x secteur x temps de l'individu i. Ce modèle 
linéaire facilite l'interprétation des effets marginaux, sachant que le coefficient qui nous 
intéresse est un terme d'interaction. Ensuite, on estime 
où chaque cellule est pondérée par le nombre d'observations de chaque pays x secteur x temps. 
Les résidus ont deux parties : up ,s,t = Jlp + Vp ,s,r, où Jlp est un terme d'erreur du pays 
p . L'effet groupe est au niveau du pays pour éviter le risque d' autocorrélation. 
Les résultats principaux 
Les résultats principaux sont présentés dans le tableau 0.5. Ils peuvent être résumés 
ainsi. Les réformes de la protection d' emploi sont positivement et significativement 
associées à une augmentation du stress dans les secteurs à haut taux de destruction 
d'emploi en comparaison aux secteurs à bas taux de destruction d'emploi (à 10% pour 
la colonne 1, à 1% pour la colonne 2). Le colonnes 1 et 2 présentent les principales 
stratégies d' identification : l'interaction de la destruction d' emploi d'un secteur avec la 
protection d'emploi en contrôlant pour des effets pays x temps, pays x secteur et aussi 
pour secteur x temps pour la colonne 1. En retirant les effets pays x secteur, la colonne 
3 mesure l'effet absolu de la protection sur le stress. L' effet est non significatif. La 
colonne 4 confirme l'intuition de la figure 3.2 et montre que les travailleurs les plus 
stressés se trouvent principalement dans les pays où la protection d' emploi est élevée. 
La colonne 6 décompose l'effet total de la protection d'emploi en effet moyen et en effet 
interagi. Cette spécification permet de calculer l'effet absolu de la protection d'emploi. 
Elle montre que l'effet absolu de la protection d'emploi est d' augmenter le stress dans 
les secteurs à haute protection d'emploi, et de diminuer le stress dans les secteurs à 
basse protection d'emploi . 
Ces résultats résistent à l'inclusion de l 'assurance chômage et d'indicateurs d'autres 
institutions comme contrôles. Dans le cas des composantes spécifiques du stress dispo-
nibles au Canada, les conclusions sont moins précises et dépendent du type de protec-
tion d'emploi. Plus que le stress, c'est la qualité des relations de travail qui peut être 
affectée négativement par une forte régulation du travail, surtout dans certains pays 
européens avec forte protection d'emploi. Une protection plus flexible pourrait donc 
améliorer à la fois la fluidité du marché du travail et la qualité des relations industrielles 
dans ces pays. 
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Conclusion 
Cette thèse a porté sur les impacts non pécuniaires des lois de protection d'emploi 
sur le bien-être des travailleurs et des ménages. Plus spécialement, comme la protection 
d'emploi influence la façon dont les firmes ajustent leur main d 'œuvre via les licencie-
ments et la variation des heures de travail, le premier volet s'est penché sur les consé-
quences de ces décisions sur la consommation des travailleurs. Autant l'approche par 
appariement par score de propension que l'approche structurelle suggèrent fortement 
que les licenciements prolongés affectent fortement la consommation des ménages, 
alors que les pertes involontaires d'heures de travail n' ont pas d'impacts majeurs . Le 
second volet s' intéressait à l'impact des lois de protection d' emploi sur la variabilité 
des heures de travail. Cet impact est confirmé au moyen d'un modèle théorique et par 
une analyse empirique qui montre un effet significatif des préavis de licenciements in-
dividuels au Canada. Enfin, le dernier volet a étudié l'effet de la protection d'emploi 
sur le stress des travailleurs. Au sein des pays de l'OCDE, la protection d'emploi aug-
mente le stress des travailleurs dans les secteurs à fort taux de destruction d'emploi par 
rapport aux secteurs à faible taux de destruction d'emploi. 
Cette thèse a de multiples implications au regard des politiques publiques. Les ré-
sultats suggèrent que la protection d' emploi devrait être utilisée avec modération pour 
éviter les conséquences indirectes générant du stress en emploi, ce qui s'ajoute au ra-
lentissement d' embauches de nouveaux employés. Une des conséquences étudiées est 
l ' usage accru des heures supplémentaires, tel que souligné dans le second volet. Dans 
les secteurs en perte de vitesse, où la protection d'emploi risque spécialement de créer 
des frictions et du stress, l 'objectif devrait être de garantir la sécurité du revenu pour 
les salariés plutôt que de protéger des emplois en particulier. Une approche intéressante 
serait la flexisécurité qui combine une faible protection d 'emploi et un soutien aux chô-
meurs au cours de leur recherche d' emploi ou de leur réorientation professionnelle. 
Comme l'économie profite globalement du progrès technologique, il semble naturel 
d' épauler ceux qui en subissent fortement les contrecoups. 
La protection d'emploi peut amplifier la variation des heures de travail. Mais devrait-
on favoriser la sécurité d'emploi ou la stabilité des heures de travail? Du point de vue 
de la consommation des ménages, le volet 1 permet d 'affirmer que la variation des 
heures a beaucoup moins d'impact qu 'une perte d 'emploi . Ces résultats indiquent que 
les programmes de partage du temps de travail pourraient atténuer les conséquences 
des cycles économiques sur les travailleurs . 
Mots clefs : Protection d'emploi, consommation, heures de travail, temps supplé-
mentaire, stress au travail 
Résumé 
Cette thèse en trois volets explore l'impact de la protection d'emploi et 
d'autres institutions du marché du travail sur la consommation, les heures 
de travail et le stress au travail au moyen d'une approche principalement 
empmque. 
Le premier volet examine l'impact des licenciements et des coupures 
involontaires d'heures de travail sur la consommation des ménages à par-
tir des données du Current Population Survey (CPS) des États-Unis et de 
son supplément de décembre sur la sécurité alimentaire. Des estimés par 
appariement par score de propension et régressions linéaires sont utilisés 
pour comparer la réaction des travailleurs aux licenciements et aux pertes 
involontaires d'heures de travail. Les résultats montrent que l'impact d'un 
licenciement avec promesse de rappel au travail dans les six mois est de 
- 13.7%. Il est en revanche non significatif pour les licenciements avec 
date de retour connue ou pour les pertes d'heures. Ces chocs sur le mar-
ché du travail sont modélisés par un processus de Markov. Les données du 
CPS sont utilisées pour calculer les flux entre états et les pertes de comt 
et de long terme associées à chaque choc. Grâce au modèle, on peut si-
muler les réponses de la consommation des ménages aux chocs, comparer 
ces réponses aux données réelles, calculer les pertes de bien-être qu'ils 
entraînent et évaluer 1' impact qu'auraient des réformes à l'assurance chô-
mage. À nouveau, les pertes d'heures ont un impact négligeable comparé 
aux licenciements prolongés. Les réformes de l'assurance emploi offrent 
de modestes bénéfices en termes de stabilisation du revenu. 
Le deuxième volet s'intéresse à l'impact de la protection d'emploi sur 
la variabilité des heures de travail et le temps supplémentaire. Dans un mo-
dèle théorique, une firme choisit le nombre de ses travailleurs et les heures 
de travail en réponse à des variations de la demande et en présence de coûts 
d'ajustement de la main d'œuvre. Ces coûts augmentent la variabilité des 
heures de travail. De plus, si la firme se voit imposer un minimum d'heures 
de travail par travailleur, il en résulte une diminution de 1' emploi moyen 
et une augmentation des heures moyennes de travail. Pour tester ces méca-
nismes empiriquement, deux prédictions sont dérivées du modèle : (i) les 
coûts d'ajustement augmentent la variabilité des heures de travail, spécia-
lement dans les secteurs à haut taux de licenciement; (ii) une augmentation 
temporaire de la demande de travail accroîtra la demande d'heures de tra-
vail, surtout en présence de coûts d'ajustement de la main d'œuvre. Ces 
prédictions sont testées grâce aux différences de préavis de licenciement 
individuels et collectifs existant entre les provinces canadiennes. Chaque 
prédiction est vérifiée pour les préavis individuels. L' impact des préavis 
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individuels sur le temps supplémentaire dans les secteurs à hauts taux de 
licenciement est positif et significatif, mais il est n'est pas statistiquement 
différent de zéro pour le temps supplémentaire dans les secteurs à bas taux 
de licenciement. L'effet du taux d'emploi sur l'utilisation du temps sup-
plémentaire est positif et significatif pour les provinces avec long préavis 
individuels, mais négligeable quand les préavis sont courts. Les préavis 
collectifs n'ont pas d'impact mesurable. 
Finalement, le troisième volet étudie les effets de la protection d' em-
ploi sur le stress au travail et le bien-être des travailleurs. Ces législations 
devraient bénéficier aux travailleurs en réduisant le risque de licenciement. 
Mais il est aussi possible qu ' elles aient des effets pervers. Si licencier un 
travailleur est onéreux, l'entreprise peut chercher à faire pression sur le 
travailleur ou le surveiller dans le but de le licencier pour faute . Une ana-
lyse exhaustive est entreprise afin de vérifier si la protection augmente ou 
diminue le stress au moyen de sept sondages de pays de l'OCDE et de 1 'En-
quête nationale sur la santé de la population du Canada. Les effets obtenus 
sont hétérogènes entre secteurs et entre chaque composante de la protec-
tion d'emploi. La protection d'emploi augmente significativement le stress 
des travailleurs dans les secteurs à haute destruction d'emploi par rapport 
au stress dans les autres secteurs avec interprétation causale. Quand on dé-
compose 1' effet total, la protection d'emploi accroît significativement le 
stress dans les secteurs à haute destruction d' emploi et le diminue dans 
les secteurs à basse destruction d'emploi. Lorsqu'on s'intéresse aux sous-
composantes de la protection d'emploi, son effet positif sur le stress pro-
vient principalement des limitations imposées aux licenciements collectifs, 
des restrictions à l'usage des contrats temporaires et, finalement, de l'in-
teraction entre ces restrictions, la protection individuelle et la protection 
collective. 
Mots clefs : Protection d'emploi, consommation, heures de travail, 
temps supplémentaire, stress au travail 
Abstract 
This thesis explores in three chapters the impact of employment protec-
tion and related labor market institutions on workers stress, work hours and 
consumption, using a mainly empirical approach. With data from the US 
Current Population Survey (CPS), chapter one examines how labor market 
displacements affect household consumption. Propensity score matching 
and linear regression are used to compare how previously employed wor-
kers react to layoffs and cutbacks in work hours. On average, workers being 
laid off and expecting to be recalled to work within six months eut their 
food spending by 13.7%. On the other hand, layoffs with known recall 
dates and hour loss have no effect on consumption. These displacements 
are then modeled as a Markov using the CPS data to compute ftow s and re-
produce their associated short term and expected long-term income losses. 
This model is used to simulate consumption reactions of representative 
workers, compare their reactions with real data, compute welfare losses 
associated with each outcome and conduct policy experiments regarding 
unemployment insurance. Again , losing work hours has a negligible impact 
on consumption compared to a long term layoff. Unemployment insurance 
reforms offer modest incarne stabilization benefits. 
The second chapter investigates the specifie impact of employment pro-
tection on work hour variability and overtime. In a theoretical mode!, a firm 
chooses between workers and hours per worker as productive inputs. If 
there are hiring and firing costs, variations in output demand generate varia-
bility in work time. Moreover, if the firm has to provide a minimum number 
of hours per worker, it can result in a reduction of average employrnent and 
an increase in average work hours. To test these mechanisms empirically, 
two predictions are derived from the rnodel : (i) labor adjustment costs in-
crease the variability of work hours, especially in sectors with high layoff 
rates ; (ii) a temporary rise in the need for labor increases demand for work 
hours, especially when workforce adjustment is costly. These predictions 
are tested on Canadian data, making use of the differences in individual and 
collective advance notice requirements between Canadian provinces. Both 
predictions are verified for individual notice requirements . Additional no-
tice requirements for mass layoffs have no significant impact. In particular, 
the impact of individual notice on overtime work is positive and significant 
for sectors with high lay off rates, but not statistically different from zero for 
th ose with low lay off rates. The impact of the employment rate on overtime 
use is positive and significant for provinces with lengthy individual notice, 
but negligible when notice requirements are short. 
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Finally, chapter three looks at the effects of employment protection 
laws (EPL) on workers' stress and well-being. Such laws should be benefi-
ciai to permanent! y employed workers by lowering the risk of job loss, but 
may also have adverse effects. In particular, costly separations may induce 
firms to exert pressure on workers or raise the intensity of monitoring. An 
exhaustive empirical analysis is undertaken to verify whether employment 
protection increases or decreases stress using seven surveys from OECD 
countries and the Canadian National Population Health Survey. The effects 
obtained are heterogeneous across sectors and between subcomponents of 
the EPL indices. Employment protection has a positive and significant ef-
fect on work stress in high turnover sectors relative to low turnover sectors, 
which can be interpreted as causal. When decomposing the total effect, 
employment protection increases stress significantly in high turnover sec-
tors, but decreases it in low turnover sectors. The positive effect of EPL 
on stress comes from collective lay off regulations, from restrictions on the 
use of temporary contracts and finally from the interactions between both 
individual and collective employment protection with restrictions on the 
use of temporary contracts. 
Key words : Employment protection, consumption, work hours, over-
time, stress at work 
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Introduction 
Les lois de protection d'emploi ont été instaurées dans le but d'améliorer la situation 
des employés permanents. La question centrale de cette thèse est la suivante : Ces lois 
sont-elles toujours bénéfiques, ont-elles des impacts non anticipés sur les travailleurs et 
comment se comparent-elles à d'autres institutions du marché du travail telles l' assu-
rance chômage et les programmes de partage du temps de travail ? Dans les trois volets 
suivants, les effets non pécuniaires des lois de protection d' emploi sur le bien-être des 
travailleurs et de leur famille sont étudiés à pattir de trois angles distincts en utilisant 
une approche principalement empirique. 
Dans le premier volet, on estime par appru·iement par score de propension l'impact 
des licenciements et de la réduction des heures de travail sur la consommation des mé-
nages. Une approche structurelle est ensuite proposée où le revenu est modélisé comme 
un processus de Markov, afin d'apprécier l'impact de ces chocs sur le bien-être des tra-
vailleurs et d'entrevoir l'efficacité de diverses réformes de l'assurance-chômage et des 
programmes de partage du temps de travail. Le second volet étudie la possibilité que 
les coûts d'ajustement de la main-d'œuvre, et spécialement les lois de protection d'em-
ploi, incitent les entreprises à modifier les heures de travail ou l'intensité du travail au 
lieu de recourir aux embauches et aux licenciements. Enfin, Je troisième volet explore 
les effets de la protection d' emploi sur le stress et le bien-être des employés. Si la pro-
tection d'emploi augmente la sécurité des travailleurs en équilibre partiel en réduisant 
leur risque de licenciement, elle pourrait aussi avoir des impacts négatifs indirects. Par 
exemple, lorsque la procédure de congédiement d 'un travailleur est coûteuse ou incer-
taine, une entreprise peut chercher à la contourner en augmentant la pression sur le 
travailleur, en le surveillant plus étroitement ou, dans les cas extrêmes, en l'intimidant 
pour qu ' il quitte de lui-même. 
Près de 80% des personnes en emploi sont salariées dans les pays industrialisés. 
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Pour les entreprises qui les emploient, les embauches et les licenciements constituent 
une marge d'ajustement essentielle aux conditions du marché. Mais un licenciement 
provoque souvent une perte de revenu à court et à long terme chez le travailleur, en 
plus d'entraîner des conséquences psychologiques et émotionnelles. Ainsi, les contrats 
de travail ne sont pas signés fréquemment, mais ils ont d'importantes conséquences 
matérielles et humaines sur les travailleurs durant l'emploi et après une séparation. 
Des recherches récentes suggèrent même que les aspects non pécuniaires du travail 
ont une importance comparable et même supérieure à celle du revenu sur le bien-être 
des travailleurs. Par exemple, Helliwell et Huang (2010) montrent que le climat de 
travail, particulièrement la confiance accordée aux cadres, est très fortement associé à 
leur satisfaction générale, autant qu ' une importante hausse du revenu. De même, un 
licenciement a un impact négatif sur leur bonheur beaucoup plus grand que ne peut 
l'expliquer la simple perte de revenu d'emploi (Helliwell et Huang, 2004). 
Dans cette optique, un des thèmes importants abordés dans cette thèse est le com-
promis pour les travailleur entre sécurité d'emploi et régularité des heures de travail. 
Le premier volet explore les conséquences de ce compromis du point de vue de la 
consommation et du bien-être des ménages. À ce jour, aucune étude n' a comparé l'im-
pact sur la consommation des ménage de divers types de licenciements et de pertes 
d'heures de travail liées à la conjoncture économique. 6 Les données utilisées pour ce 
volet proviennent du Current Population Survey (CPS) des États-Unis. Ce sondage, 
avec son supplément sur la sécurité alimentaire, est le seul qui détaille avec suffi sam-
ment de précision la situation des répondants sur le marché du travail, y compris les 
changements d'heures de travail. Chaque ménage est sondé deux années consécutives 
pendant la même période de quatre mois, ce qui procure deux observations sur les 
dépenses alimentaires et au maximum huit observations sur le marché du travail. Les 
principaux résultats obtenus par appariement par score de propension sont les suivants. 
Pour les travailleurs employés à temps plein l 'an passé, l'impact d'être présentement 
en licenciement avec retour possible dans les six mois est de - 13.7% en moyenne. Les 
licenciements avec date de retour connue ou les pertes d'heures de travail pour causes 
6. Plusieurs études ont estimé l'impact de plusieurs types de pertes d'emploi sur la consommation 
et elles trouvent un impact entre -6.4% et -27%. La démarche qui se rapproche le plus de celle utilisée 
ici est celle de Browning et Crossley (200la). Grâce à une base de données canadienne de travailleurs 
licenciés, les auteurs estiment par appariement par score de propension que l' impact d 'un licenciement 
permanent, par rapport à un licenciement avec une date de retour connue, est de -6.4%. 
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économiques n'ont pas d'impact significatif. L'impact d'un licenciement permanent 
sur la consommation est de -14.8%, mais si ce licenciement est dû à une fermeture, 
l'impact du choc est de -20.4%. Enfin, les travailleurs qui avaient l'an dernier un tra-
vail à temps plein et sont maintenant découragés sont ceux qui réduisent le plus leur 
consommation de nourriture, de -35.4%. 
Depuis les travaux de Friedman, un des objectifs de la littérature empirique a été de 
vérifier si les ménages réussissent effectivement à lisser leur consommation au cours de 
fluctuations temporaires de revenu, et s'ils s'ajustent complètement aux chocs perma-
nents. Un résultat récurrent est que la consommation s'ajuste souvent trop aux chocs 
transitoires et ne s' ajuste pas suffisamment aux chocs permanents (voir J appelli et Pista-
feri (2010) pour un résumé de cette littérature) . Plusieurs hypothèses ont été proposées 
pour expliquer ces résultats, suggérant des altérations possibles aux fonctions objec-
tifs des travailleurs. L'approche structurelle utilisée ici consiste plutôt à modéliser un 
sous-ensemble de chocs bien définis du marché du travail. 7 Le revenu des travailleurs 
est modélisé comme un processus de Markov alternant entre cinq états : employé, en 
pertes d'heures de travail, en licenciement avec date de retour connue, en licenciement 
avec retour espéré dans les six mois et licencié de façon permanente. Les flux entre 
états sont calculés à l'aide des données du CPS. Les travailleurs gagnent leur plein sa-
laire quand ils sont au travail, en obtiennent une partie quand ils sont en pertes d' heures 
et touchent de l'assurance chômage s'ils sont sans emploi. Le modèle reproduit bien 
la réaction des ménages calculée à partir des données réelles. Il permet également de 
simuler l'impact de réformes de l'assurance-emploi sur la consommation. Les résultats 
indiquent que ces réformes auraient un léger impact sur la consommation des ménages, 
mais un très faible effet sur leur bien-être. 
Le second volet s' interroge sur 1' existence, pour les firmes et leurs travailleurs, 
d' un compromis entre stabilité des heures de travail et stabilité d'emploi. En effet, 
les embauches et les licenciements ne sont pas la seule marge d'ajustement du travail 
pour les firmes. Les cadres peuvent aussi ajuster la production en modifiant les ho-
raires de travail ou l'intensité du travail. La protection d'emploi pourrait donc favoriser 
le recours à des horaires plus instables et à plus de travail supplémentaire, entrainant 
7. Cette approche est dans l'esprit de Dynarski et Gruber (1997) qui considèrent séparément les chocs 
dus aux changements d'heures, vus comme temporaires, et les chocs dus aux changements de salaires, 
considérés comme permanents. 
4 Essays on Employment Protection and its Impacts on Workers Wel/-Being 
ainsi des conséquences physiques et mentales sur la santé, tel que rapporté dans une 
méta-analyse récente sur l'impact du temps supplémentaire sur la santé. 8 Au moyen 
d' un modèle dans lequel une firme choisit entre les travailleurs et les heures de travail, 
on peut montrer que, peu importe le processus d'ajustement des prix ou la forme des 
coûts d' ajustement de l' emploi, dès qu'une firme ne peut ajuster parfaitement sa main 
d'œuvre, elle compensera en ajustant les heures de travail. Pour illustrer ce mécanisme, 
et contrairement à la littérature antérieure 9, le modèle postule un prix de vente qui va-
rie entre deux valeurs, tel que proposé par Bertola (1990). Ce processus stochastique 
permet de confirmer 1' intuition générale au moyen de solutions de formes fermées à 
partir de formes fonctionnelles générales. Deux prédictions sont dérivées du modèle : 
1. le coût d'ajustement du travail augmente la variabilité des heures, surtout dans les 
secteurs avec un haut taux de licenciement; 2. une hausse temporaire de la demande de 
travail augmente les heures de travail, surtout quand l'ajustement du travail est coûteux. 
Ces prédictions servent de stratégie d'identification dans la section empirique. Celle-ci 
exploite des micro-données sur le temps supplémentaire payé tirées de l'Enquête sur la 
population active du Canada. Comme dans le premier volet, la variable de protection 
d'emploi varie entre les provinces. Ces préavis ont deux sous-composantes: les préavis 
de licenciement individuels qui augmentent en fonction de l' ancienneté d'un travailleur 
et les préavis supplémentaires en cas de licenciement collectif, proportionnels à la taille 
du licenciement. Les résultats confirment en général le lien entre la protection d'emploi 
individuelle et la variabilité des heures de travail. Les préavis individuels de licencie-
ment ont un impact positif et statistiquement significatif sur le temps supplémentaire 
à travers leur interaction avec les taux de licenciement et la variation du taux d' em-
ploi. En particulier, l ' impact des préavis individuels sur le temps supplémentaire des 
secteurs à hauts taux de licenciement est positif et significatif, mais il est n'est pas sta-
tistiquement différent de zéro pour le temps supplémentaire des secteurs à bas taux de 
licenciement. L' effet du taux d' emploi sur l ' usage du temps supplémentaire est positif 
et significatif pour les provinces avec long préavis individuels, mais négligeable quand 
les préavis sont courts. Les préavis collectifs n'ont pas d' impact significatif sur le temps 
supplémentaire. 
8. Les impacts incluent une moins bonne santé, plus de blessures, plus de maladies et une plus grande 
mortalité.(Caruso et al. , 2004) 
9. Nickell ( 1978) et Chen et Funke (2004) 
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Enfin, le dernier volet étudie plus largement les conséquences des lois de protec-
tion d'emploi sur le moral des travailleurs. Ces lois devraient en principe bénéficier 
aux employés permanents en réduisant leur risque de chômage. Par contre, la littéra-
ture théorique et empirique démontre clairement que cette législation tend également 
à réduire l'embauche d'employés permanents. Elle n'augmente donc pas le bien-être 
des travailleurs au chômage, en période de probation, en contrat temporaire ou à temps 
partiel. Les lois de protection d'emploi ont également plusieurs impacts secondaires po-
sitifs et négatifs. Ceci étant, la protection d'emploi n'apporte-t-elle que des avantages 
aux détenteurs d'un contrat permanent? C'est la question abordée par le troisième vo-
let de cette thèse. Comme le coût du divorce prolonge parfois de façon excessive les 
mariages malheureux, il est aussi possible que la protection d'emploi exacerbe le stress 
et les tensions au sein des firmes. Par exemple, dans le cas d'un emploi non rentable, 
une firme peut tenter d'éviter les coûts ou 1' incertitude associés au processus de licen-
ciement en faisant pression sur un travailleur pour qu ' il quitte de lui-même en altérant 
les routines de travail, l'organisation ou les techniques de gestion. Elle peut également 
le surveiller étroitement afin de trouver une justification pour le licencier pour faute. La 
protection d'emploi peut aussi pousser les firmes à ajuster le travail en modifiant l' in-
tensité ou les heures plutôt que le nombre de travailleurs . Tous ces mécanismes peuvent 
être source de stress pour le travailleur. En équilibre général, comme la protection ra-
lentit les embauches et allonge le chômage, la crainte de perdre un emploi peut être 
source de stress, ou pousser un travailleur à demeurer dans un emploi insatisfaisant s'il 
doute de ses capacités de se retrouver un travail. 
Pour tester empiriquement ces mécanismes, sept sondages internationaux récents 
contenant des informations sur le stress au travail ont été identifiés : Je European Qua-
lity of Life Survey (EQLS) de 2003 ; le International Social Survey Program (ISSP) de 
1997 et 2005 ; les sondages Euro baromètre de 1996 et 2001 et les Enquêtes européennes 
sur les conditions de travail (European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS)) de 2000-
2001 pour les candidats EU et 2005. De plus, des données canadiennes, les premières 
illustrant la différence de protection d'emploi existant entre les provinces canadiennes 
et les secondes tirées de l'Enquête nationale sur la santé de la population (ENSP) du 
Canada, permettent également d'étudier les relations entre la protection d'emploi et le 
stress. Bien sûr, des facteurs affectant le stress dans un pays ou une région peuvent 
également influencer la volonté de légiférer en matière de protection d' emploi. Pour 
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faire face à ce risque d' endogénéité, deux stratégies sont exploitées. La première utilise 
les variations de la protection d'emploi au cours du temps. La seconde exploite le fait 
que l'impact de la protection d'emploi devrait être plus grand pour les entreprises des 
secteurs d'activité nécessitant davantage de licenciements. Cette idée a été développée 
par Rajan et Zingales (1998) en finance et adaptée subséquemment pour d'autres sec-
teurs, incluant la macroéconomie du marché du travail. Dans l'esprit d'une approche de 
différence en différences, le groupe de contrôle serait un secteur avec faible protection 
d'emploi et le secteur traité serait celui avec une forte protection d'emploi. Bien sûr, 
les deux stratégies pourront être combinées dans la mesure du possible, ce qui équivaut 
à une triple différence. 
Les résultats montrent que la protection d'emploi est positivement et significative-
ment corrélée avec les divers indicateurs de stress, ou non corrélée. En d'autres mots, 
en comparant simplement le stress moyen par pays, il n'y a jamais d'impact néga-
tif et significatif entre le stress moyen au travail et la protection d'emploi. Dans les 
spécifications en triples différences, la protection d'emploi augmente le stress des tra-
vailleurs des secteurs à haut taux de licenciement par rapport au stress des travailleurs 
des secteurs à bas taux de licenciement. Ces résultats résistent à l'inclusion de l' assu-
rance chômage et d' indicateurs d'autres institutions comme contrôles. Dans le cas des 
composantes spécifiques du stress disponibles au Canada, les conclusions sont moins 
précises et dépendent du type de protection d'emploi. Plus que le stress, c'est la qualité 
des relations de travail qui peut être affectée négativement par une forte régulation du 
travail, surtout dans certains pays européens avec forte protection d'emploi. Une pro-
tection plus flexible pourrait donc améliorer à la fois la fluidité du marché du travail et 
les relations industrielles de ces pays. 
Cette thèse a de multiples implications au regard des politiques publiques. La pro-
tection d'emploi devrait être utilisée avec modération pour éviter les conséquences indi-
rectes générant du stress en emploi, en plus de compromettre l' embauche de nouveaux 
employés. Une de ces conséquences est l 'usage accru des heures supplémentaires, tel 
que souligné dans le second volet. Dans les secteurs en perte de vitesse, où la protection 
d'emploi risque spécialement de créer des frictions et du stress, l' objectif devrait être 
de garantir la sécurité du revenu pour les salariés plutôt que de protéger des emplois 
en particulier. Une approche intéressante serait la fiexisécurité qui combine une faible 
protection d'emploi et un soutien aux chômeurs au cours de leur recherche d'emploi 
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ou de leur réorientation professionnelle. Comme l'économie profite globalement du 
progrès technologique, il semble naturel d'épauler ceux qui en subissent fortement les 
contrecoups. 
La protection d'emploi peut amplifier la variation des heures de travail. Mais devrait-
on favoriser la sécurité d'emploi ou la stabilité des heures de travail ? Du point de vue 
de l'impact sur la consommation des ménages, le premier volet suggère fortement que 
les licenciements à long terme ont des répercussions importantes alors que les pertes 
temporaires d'heures de travail sont sans conséquences. Les programmes de partage 
du temps de travail, encore peu utilisés, surtout en Amérique du Nord, seraient donc 
envisageables pour aider les firmes à s' ajuster aux fluctuations temporaires du cycle 
économique en minimisant l'incertitude ressentie par leurs employés. 
l 
1 
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Chapitre 1 
The Consomption Response to Job 
Displacements, Layoffs and Hour 
Losses 
Abstract 
This paper examines how la bor market displacements affect household consump-
tion. It uses the US Current Population Survey (CPS) . Propensity score matching 
and linear regression are used to compare how consumption changes when pre-
viously employed workers experience various labor market displacements such as 
layoffs with expected recall to work within six months, layoffs with known recall 
dates or loss of work hours due to business conditions. The average impact on 
food spending of being currently laid off and expecting a recall within six months 
is - 13.7%, while it is negligible for either reduiced work hours or layoffs with 
known recall dates. In a structural approach, these displacements are modeled as 
a Markov process reproducing their associated short-term and expected long-term 
income losses. This model is used to simulate consumption reactions and compare 
them with real data, compute welfare losses associated with each displacement 
and conduct policy experiments regarding unemployment insurance. The gene-
ral message is that, compared to layoffs with uncertain recall dates, reductions in 
work hours have negligible impacts on consumption. Furthermore unemployment 
insurance offers modest income stabilization benefits. 
--- ~- ~ ----------------------------------------- --
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1.1 Introduction 
According to Friedman's permanent income hypothesis, agents with concave utility 
functions try to consume according to expected lifetime wealth, not current income. 
They would succeed do so if they knew their expected lifetime earnings and had un-
constrained access to credit, or had access to perfect insurance markets. Unfortunately, 
future earnings are difficult to predict, access to credit is limited and insurance markets 
are imperfect due to the presence of moral hazards and information asymmetries. This 
is especially problematic in thelabor market. Given that large firms are Jess risk averse 
than workers, these risks could be internalized in labor contracts. However, as shown 
by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984a), unemployment risk may be necessary if worker effort 
is hard to monitor. Also, with seniority rules, the risk of job loss is unevenly distributed, 
with low-tenured workers bearing most of the burden of labor adjustment. While senio-
rity rules are pervasive in most US firms it is doubtful whether they reflect or promote 
worker efficiency (Carmichael , 1983). 
As a result, labor market displacements may be hard to smooth for households, 
leaving room for income stabilization programs such as unemployment insurance, em-
ployment protection legislation or work-sharing. Each of these programs has specifie 
impacts on labor market flows , wages and efficiency that have received their fair share 
of attention in the literature. However, their relative impact from the worker's perspec-
tive is less clear. How does a stable income from unemployment insurance compare to 
a lower risk of job loss from employment protection ? Should policymakers favor more 
jobs or stable work hours ? This paper will focus on one criterion : the impact of job 
displacements on consumption and consumption utility. 
This choice is motivated by multiple reasons. A more direct and easily measurable 
impact of job displacements would be a loss of wage incarne. But it can be obviously 
compensated for by several mechanisms such as unemployment insurance and spou-
sai labor supply. A change in total income would paint a more accurate picture of 
current household consumption prospects, but it does not take into account access to 
credit. Also, it is only an imperfect account of the changes in household's long term in-
come prospects which are obviously taken into account in today's consumption choices. 
Renee, as argued by Hall (1978), current consumption is probably the best indicator of 
cmrent and future marginal consumption utility since it incorpora tes all of the househol-
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d's relevant information on expected lifetime available income. Of course, the precise 
functional relationship between consomption change and utility change is unknown 
and will have to be modeled in section 1.4. Also, since consomption traditionally has 
to be proxied by consomption spending on food due to data availability, we must keep 
in mind that changing work habits and the availability of free time can also influence 
spending without reflecting a decline in household utility. 1 
A handful of studies have looked at the impact of various kinds of job losses on 
consomption and find an average impact between 6.4% and 27%. 2 But no research 
has compared the impact of various types of 1ayoffs or hour !osses on households' 
consumption, which is the first contribution of this paper. Unlike the previous literature 
in this field, I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) to obtain detailed information 
on workers' labor market situations and work hours. Consomption data comes from the 
Food Security supplement conducted each December since 2001, which provides two 
observations per household. 
The main results are as follows. For workers employed full-time in the previous 
year, the average impact of experiencing a layoff with expected recall to work within 
six months is - 13.7%, while there is no measurable impact of a lay off with known 
recall date or hour losses due to business conditions. A linear framework including 
more outcomes makes it possible to compute the impact of being unemployed after a 
permanent job loss, which is -14.8%. If the job loss is due to finn closure, its impact 
jumps to - 20.4%. Finally, discouraged workers who are now out of the labor force 
experience the largest change, at -35.4%. These effects are larger for single income 
families, and for male workers. They are also larger for food consumed away compared 
to food at home. 
A second objective of the paper is to understand these reactions using a structural 
approach. Following Friedman's seminal work, a large empiricalliterature on consump-
1. For instance, unemployment can reduce expensive eating out without reducing food consumption 
utility. More free time can also be used to look for discounts (Greg Kaplan, 2013). 
2. Using PSID data on food consumption in 1980-83, Cochrane (1 99 J) finds that the consumption of 
workers facing a job Joss is 24 to 27% Jower th an th ose keeping their job. A Iso using PSID data, from 
1968 to 1992, Stephens (2001) finds a reduction of 9% of consumption the year following a job Joss, 
which persists even after six years (he even finds sorne reduction before the job Joss). Finally, Browning 
and Cross ley (2008) apply propensity score matching on a dataset of Canadian workers to compare the 
consumption increase of workers on permanent layoff with that of workers on temporary layoff. They 
find a 6.4% difference between the two groups. 
12 Essays on Employment Protection and its Impacts on Workers WeJJ-Being 
tion bas tested whether households do indeed smooth temporary incarne shocks and 
adjust fully to permanent incarne shocks. A popular approach is to first estimate the 
incarne process by itself, identifying a transitory component following an ARMA pro-
cess and a permanent component following a random walk. Then consumption change 
is regressed on the identified transitory and permanent unexpected shocks. A recurrent 
finding is that consumption is typically too reactive to temporary incarne changes and 
too unresponsive to permanent changes. 3 
Many hypotheses have been proposed to explain these puzzles, often altering wor-
ker's objective function. 4 This paper suggests th at part of the difficulty may come from 
aggregation. Incarne shocks may differ greatly in terms of the timing of temporary 
incarne change and of news on expected future incarne. In particular, the underlying 
assumption in regressing consumption on 'transitory' and 'permanent' incarne fluc-
tuations identified ex-post is that the incarne mode] is well-specified, incorporating all 
information relevant for future incarne available to households, and that households 
have a good idea of how long these fluctuations willlast. But information relevant to 
future incarne may be totally unrelated to current earnings changes. In sorne cases, cur-
rent and future expected earnings could even be negatively related. 5 That is why this 
paper proposes to focus the analysis on a specifie series of well-defined labor market 
shocks and madel them in terms of their impact on present earnings and future expected 
earnings. 6 There are many sources of wealth for households. But for a vast majority of 
them, labor incarne is certainly the most important one. 
Incarne will be modeled as a Markov process, alternating between 5 states : Em-
ployed, losing work hours, on lay off with known recall date, on layoff with recall within 
3. See a review of this literature by Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) 
4 . Attanasio ( 1999) surveys many of them su ch as habit formation s, non-separability, home produc-
tion, goods durability, etc. 
5. For example, imagine the case of a worker who decides to enter the labor market, looks for work 
and finds a new job. In ali likelihood, thi s is best captured as a pennanent positive income shock. But 
how will the worker react to it? Since he was loo king for work, his consumption was probably taking 
this possible new income into account. His future expected income increased significantly the day he 
decided to enter the labor market, not so much the day he found work. In fact, the way his new job will 
influence his consumption will probably depend on the di fference between his new wage and the average 
wage he was hoping to get. If his new wage is close to the minimum wage he was willing to accept, the 
worker will in fact consider his new job as a permanent loss of future earnings, since he would have 
hoped to fi nd better (assuming no on-the-job search once he starts working) . 
6. This is in the spirit of Dynarski and Gruber (1997) who separate income changes due to hour 
changes, deemed temporary, and to wage changes, that should be more permanent. 
Chapter 1 - The Consumption Response to Job Displacements, Layoffs and Hour Lasses 13 
6 months and permanently displaced. Flows between states are computed from the CPS 
data. Workers earn their full wage if employed, part of it if they face hours cutbacks, 
and unemployment benefits if unemployed. 
It has been well-recognized since the seminal work of Jacobson et al. (1993) that 
permanently displaced workers also suffer long-term incarne losses. To a lesser degree, 
there is a probability that workers facing temporary layoff, or even episodes of involun-
tary hour cutbacks, may experience long term incarne losses too. These probabilities 
are also proxied. 
After estimating a consumer's optimal reaction to each labor market outcome over a 
working career of 40 years for a single or dual incarne farnily, 7 1 simulate the consump-
tion path of a representative sample of workers and run the same regressions on the 
simulated data and the real data. 1 also compare the welfare losses from each outcome 
and conduct policy experiments on unemployment insurance reforms and work-sharing 
programs. 8 These reforms have sorne impact on consumption, but modest effects on 
welfare. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 describes the CPS data, Section 1.3 
presents the reduced form approach, section 1.4 presents the structural approach and 
section 1.5 concludes. 
1.2 The data 
The only US database providing detailed information on labor market situations and 
consumption is the Current Population Survey (CPS), the monthly household survey of 
the Bureau of Cens us for the Bureau of La bor Statistics. Each household is interviewed 
for four consecutive months, then leaves the sample for eight months, then is back in 
the survey for four months again. In other words, each household is interviewed for 
the same four months for two consecutive years. Although the CPS is not meant to be a 
7. 1 assume a CRRA utility function with standard risk aversion of v = 2, monthly future discounting 
of f3 = 0.99573, debt limit allowing 8% of current income to serve debt interests (the difference between 
the back end and front end ratio in the US). Retirement is at 60 years old and death at 75 years old with 
non-negative wealth and no bequest. 
8. Another advantage of the structural approach is that whereas changes in consumption are good 
proxies for lifetime marginal utility change in the traditionallife-cycle problem, this link breaks down in 
the presence of credit constraints (see Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) for a discussion of the topic) . 
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panel survey, identifiers allow to match each individual across time with a good success 
rate. All the variable used are described in tables A.1 and A.2 of the Appendix. 
1.2.1 Consomption 
Since 2001, the CPS has conducted its food security supplement survey every De-
cember. Renee, the CPS provides two consumption data points for each household, 
hereby allowing to account for unobserved invariant family characteristics. The main 
variable used will be total household expenditure on food and food-related purchases 
in the preceding week, which gives confidence to the accuracy of recall. The exact 
definition is : last week's household spending at supermarkets, grocery stores, meat 
markets, produce stands, bakeries, restaurants, fast food places, cafeterias and vending 
machines, etc. Like much of the empiricalliterature on consumption, total spending is 
not available. Rowever, many studies highlighted how the elasticity of food expenditure 
may be a very good proxy for the elasticity total expenditure. For example, Gervais and 
Klein (20 1 0) (Table 4) fi nd an in come el asti city of food consomption roughly twice as 
large as housing, but less than half the elasticity of household durables. They also find 
total consumption is more elastic than food at home, but less so than food away from 
home. Renee, food is both a necessity and a luxury good. Also, it will be possible to 
look at two alternative aggregates, consumption at home and spending on food away 
from home, which should provide fair lower and upper bounds for total consumption 
elasticity. 
The total sample co vers 2001 to 2010, losing the first year to first differencing. Also, 
lagged consomption is only available for the households who are leaving the survey. 
After data cleaning, the number of observations in the benchmark regressions are 74 
34 7. Of course, a longer panel for each individual would be better, but it is not essen ti al 
since the main goal of the paper is to compare the relative importance of layoffs and 
hours losses. 
1.2.2 The labor market situation 
The basic CPS monthly file provides a total of eight observations per individual. The 
total sample is restricted to the waves for which consumption datais available. Sin ce the 
food security supplement is conducted in December, the rotation groups answering to 
------- ---- -------- ---- -----
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the supplement are those joining in September, October, November or December. Since 
unemployment spells tend to be short lived, quasi monthly information on the labor 
situation is proving to be very useful, especially when modeling dynamic consumption 
decisions. 9 
Thanks to the numerous CPS items, it is possible to assess very precisely worker's 
labor market situations. Respecting the Survey's logic, I distinguishing between per-
manent job loss and temporary layoffs with known or unknown recall date. Renee, 
the following variables are used in sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2, comparing the impact of 
temporary layoffs to hours cuts : 
- Employed : Currently employed full time 
- Layoff6m : On temporary layoff last week, employer has given indication that 
the worker would be recalled within six months 
- Layoffrecall : On temporary layoff last week, employer has given a retum date 
- Hours loss : Usually works full time, but last week worked less than 35 hours 
because of slack work/business conditions 
In models encompassing more labor outcomes in section 1.3.3, additional states are 
considered 
Layoffperm : Unemployed after losing job with no recall expectation 
Discouraged : Out of the labor force, discouraged 
Overtime : Last week, worked overtime or extra hours at the main job not worked 
usually 
The first differencing controls for ali invariant household characteristics. But to account 
for possible specifie trends in the data, I also include a vector of controls on perso-
nal and labor market situations, namely sex, age, age2, white dummy, black dummy, 
14 sector dummies, 11 occupation durnmies, household size level and yearly change, 
household children number and yearly change, college education, year x region dum-
mies, bouse owner dummy, yearxstate level unemploymentrate, lagged family income 
dumrny. 
In one specification, yearly family income change (the number of income catego-
ries change from one year to the next) will also be included to see if consumption's 
9. Also, with monthly observations following a consumption observation, it is possible to whether 
a particular labor market outcome was anticipated by a worker. However, in the regressions, future job 
Joss or hours Joss did not significantly influence consumption decisions. 
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choice are mostly driven by yearly incarne alone or if labor market outcomes are still 
significant, implying that they also carry information about future incarne prospects (of 
course, Jabor market outcomes could weil remain significant due to the imprecision of 
this categorical incarne variable). 
1.2.3 Mobility supplement 
lt is very convenient to see that the CPS has conducted its Displaced Worker, Em-
ployee Tenure, and Occupational Mobility Supplement surveys in January of 2002, 
2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. Since it is conducted only one month after the Food 
Security Supplement, additional information can be deduced on a subset respondents 10. 
The questions are used to construct the following additional variables, used in section 
1.3.4 : 
- Lost job : During the last years, the res pondent lost a job or left because the plant 
or company closed down or moved. 
- No Ul 1 Expired UI : Was not eligible for unemployment insurance after losing 
the job, 1 had unemployment insurance, but is no longer eligible. 
- Lost health insurance : Had health insurance at old job, but now does not have 
any. 
1.2.4 Outgoing rotation groups 
In the CPS, households in their fourth interview or at their final interview (out-
going rotation groups) are asked a number of additional questions on weekly earnings 
and wages. Also, all waves answer a categorical question on last year's incarne. This 
question is used to build a 'pseudo' continuous variable for last year's household in-
come using the middle of each incarne category. These variables are used to compute 
consumption elasticities to current incarne variation. These estimates will confirm that 
households ' behavior is in line with the evidence from previous literature in section 
1.3.5. 
10. Half of respondents are !ost when the supplement was not conducted the following january (De-
cern ber of 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010). Also, the respondents who exited the sm·vey after Decem-
ber did not answer the January survey. 
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1.3 A reduced-form approach 
This section investigates the consumption behaviors making as few parametric as-
sumptions as possible. The sample always comprises workers who 12 months ago were 
at work in a private for profit or government job, employed full ti me. They are now ei-
ther employed in similar conditions or are facing one of the labor market shocks consi-
dered. In about 25% of households, two or more individuals met the criteria. In that 
case, men are kept in priority since they remain for the most part the primary earners. 
When there are no men, women headed households are kept to maintain a large enough 
sample. In the few instances of several workers of the same sex in one household, one 
of them is chosen at random. 
1.3.1 Impact of hours Joss 
The first question of interest is the precise impact of work hours cutbacks compared 
to other means of temporary labor reduction such as temporary layoffs . The sample 
comprises private sector or government workers employed full time last year that are 
now either 1. still employed in similar conditions ; 2. worked less than 35 hours last 
week for business-related reasons or 3. are on temporary layoff with known recall date 
or 4. on layoff with expectation of recall within 6 months . The benchmark is simply 
a least square first difference model 11 computing the difference in mean consumption 
growth between each category of outcome : 
As described earlier, L1ln (spendingJ is the year to year change in log total weekly 
food expenditure of worker i's household, Layoff6mi is a dummy indicating whether a 
worker i employed full-time last year is currently on layoff, but has received indication 
that he would be recalled within 6 months, Layoffrecalli indicates if worker i is cur-
rently on layoff, but bas a known retum date, Hours lossi is a dummy indicating that 
he is currently working fewer than 35 hours because of slack worklbusiness conditions. 
Other specifications include the number of hours lost in linear or squared terms, or as 
11 . Random effects are inappropriate because lower income workers have simultaneously lower 
consumption and a higher chance of losing their jobs. 
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a set of dumrnies and controlsi are described in section 1.2.2. Finally, the error term is 
assumed independent across individual, but allows for heteroskedasticity by reporting 
cluster-robust standard errors, clustered at the region x year level. The error term is in-
terpreted as incorporating idiosyncratic changes in the marginal value of consumption 
unaccounted for by the controls, including other income shocks. For now, it is assumed 
to be uncorrelated to all unobserved's workers characteristics. Of course, it is entirely 
possible that this linear model may not perfectly account for job characteristics inftuen-
cing both the likelihood of layoffs or hours loss and incarne growth, which would be 
captured by the error term. To control for non-linear effects of job characteristics and 
exclude workers that are not comparable, next section will approach the problem using 
propensity score matching. 
The results, displayed in table 1.3, show that workers on layoff6m reduce their 
consumption by -13.9% compared to those who remain employed, as seen in column 
1. The difference is negligible for workers on layoff6m or hours loss. Columns 2, 3 
and 4 all suggest that workers losing more work hours reduce their consumption more, 
although only column 3 's quadratic specification is significant. A F test does not reject 
the null hypothesis of Hours loss and Num. of hours lost and Num. of hours lost2 / 1000 
being jointly zero. Still, we can easily compute that the consumption reduction peaks 
at - ~2a~l~ = 20.3 hours. On first sight, the overwhelming magnitude of the impact of 
TOOO 
Layoff6m compared to Layoffrecall and Hours loss suggests that a key consideration 
in workers ' consumption decision is the presence of uncertainty over whether he will 
be called back or not. 
1.3.2 A matching analysis 
Although job losses and hours losses due to business conditions are for the most 
part unwanted and not entirely foreseeable, workers keeping their jobs may not be an 
appropriate comparison group for laid off workers, and either group may not be com-
parable to workers experiencing hours loss . Workers in an unsecure job may cautiously 
reduce their consumption, even if they do not lose it. Or, they may simply be less op-
timistic about the future prospects of wages increase. Browning and Crossley (2008) 
provide a formal treatment of these potential biases. 
Least squares models allow to model how these observed differences affect treat-
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ment and control groups. However, a growing body of literature in statistics and bio-
statistics suggest that propensity score matching, as first proposed by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1982) , can have several advantages when estimating treatment effects. By mo-
delling the propensity of receiving treatment, it is possible to make sure that, based on 
observables, there is a significant overlap between treatment control groups, and show 
over which range of value the two groups can be compared, as highlighted by Itzhak Ya-
novitzkya (2005). A poor overlap would suggest a risk of colinearity between treatment 
and other contrais. Imposing corrunon support allows to exclude outliers, another ad-
vantage of matching over least squares (Hill et al ., 2004) . Finally, Rubin 's work (1973, 
1979) has shawn that for well-matched sample, estimates can be relatively robust to 
various modelling, and sorne studies have found that propensity score matching can 
produce estimates closer to real experimental data (Hill et al. , 2004). The context is 
very favourable to the approach since ' treatment ' and 'control ' groups are within the 
same labor market, part of the same survey and there is a wealth of regressors to madel 
the propensity score, important conditions for the matching estimation, as highlighted 
by Heckman et al. (1997). In conforrnity with the previous section, 1 consider three pos-
sible ' treatments' : layoff6m (layoff with recall within six months), layoffrecall (layoff 
with known recall date) and hours loss. 12 
Since there are a total of four possible states a worker can be in, 1 use the pro-
pensity score matching protocol proposed by Lechner (2002) for multiple mutually 
independent treatments. The procedure is as follows : 
1. Estimate by multinomial logit the probability of being in each situation : em-
ployed, layoff6m• layoffrecall and hours loss, controlling for sex, three age dum-
mies, white dumrny, black dummy, (lag) blue collar, ln(Household size), higher 
education, house owner, state-level unemployment rate, year dumrnies and 4 re-
gion dumrnies. Note that it is now possible to use all months in the database. 
Propensity scores using only December observations will serve as a robustness 
check. 
2. For each propensity score, ensure comrnon support by dropping observations 
with propensity score lower than the highest minimum or higher than the lowest 
12. Again, since the idea is to compare the options of a firm that needs to temporarily reduce its 
workforce, the situation of permanent! y laid off workers is not relevant sin ce they probably !ost their job 
for reasons unrelated to the fi nn 's economie situation. 
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maximum in both states. 
3. Perform matching estimation on the six following pairs of treatmentlcontrol : 
Layoff6m/employed, Layoffrecan/employed, hours loss/employed, Layoff6m/hours 
loss, Layoffrecanlhours loss and Layoff6m/Layoffrecall· For each, the hench-
mark matching algorithm will be Mahalanobis distance kernel matching on pr('treatment'), 
pr('control '), a dummy for being under 30 years old and a dummy for higher edu-
cation. 13 14 Sensitivity tests will also involve matching only on the propensity 
scores, and nearest neighbor matching. 
4. For each matching estimation, 1 perform ex post balancing test using standardized 
differences, as proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). 
The multinorniallogit estimation is presented in table A.3 with columns 1 2 and 3 for 
the whole sample result. An eye-catching result is that most regressors have very si-
milar impact on the probability of hours loss, layoffrecall and layoffperm- The three 
outcomes are more likely for men, for younger workers, for blacks, for blue colar wor-
kers and when the local unemployment rate is high. They are less likely for service 
workers, for college and university educated workers and for house owners. In other 
words, the same people are likely to face sirnilar labor market events. This is good 
news since workers having similar probability of facing layoff6m layoffrecall or hours 
loss mean that they are in fact comparable with each others. To confirm this, table 
A.4 of the Appendix shows that the correlation between the propensity of layoff6m 
and layoffrecall is93.66% , between layoff6m and hours loss is 73 .95%, and between 
layoffrecall and hours loss is 83 .16%. Renee, when the control group is the employed 
population, the comparison sample selected by the matching algorithm should be sub-
stantially different from the unmatched population, while it should remain sirnilar when 
both treatment and control groups are layoff6m' layoffrecanor hours loss. This intuition 
is confirmed by figure A of the Appendix. 
Table 1.4 shows the results for the main specification. 15 As discussed earlier, we 
13. These two dummies are added because they are important matching criterias, but systematically 
performed poorly on the Smith and Todd balancing test. 
14. The matching estimation was performed using PSMATCH2 in STATA, w1itten graciously made 
available by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
15. Standard deviations are computed using the variance approximation suggested by Lechner (2001): 
[ 2 
Var( fArT) = ~ Var(Y (1) 1 D = 1) + jE {~=o~h ) · Var(Y (0) 1 D = 0) . 
1 N 1 
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should expect employed workers matched to those facing a layoff or hours losses have 
smaller than average incarne growth. Indeed, when matching Employed workers to 
Layoff6m• Layoffrecall or Hours loss, their mean consumption growth decreases from 
1.3% to 0.5%. But the difference is extremely close to the regression approach of the 
previous section. By and large, the conclusions are essentially unchanged : Workers on 
Layoff6m significantly reduce their consumption, by - 13 .7% on average, compared 
to employed workers (row 1). The difference is also significant when comparing with 
Hours loss (row 4) and layoffrecall (row 6), and there is no measurable impact of Hours 
loss compared to employed workers (row 3). Row 6 shows the comparison between 
layoff with known recall date and recall within six months, the closest to Browning 
and Crossley (2008)'s work. The measured difference is Table A.5 shows that these 
findings are robust to matching only on propensity scores, nearest neighbor matching 
and estimating the propensity score using only December observations. 
1.3.3 Additionallabor market outcomes, food aggregates and 
subgroups 
Until now, the focus has been on studying the fate of workers who's firm needs to 
reduce labor input temporarily, by reducing hours or using temporary layoffs. But other 
outcomes like permanent layoffs, discouraged workers, and workers working overtime 
can be considered as well. I also look at subsamples of workers, such as only workers 
with a single job (last year), single earners, only private sector workers (last year) and 
male or female. Finally, I consider alternative food aggregates : all food expenditure 
except food away and only food away from home. These are credible lower and upper 
bounds for estimating the impact of labor market outcomes on total food expenditure. 
Food at home is also a convenient way to try to root out automatic consumption adjust-
ment directly linked to working full time, such as eating at restaurants. The econometrie 
model is the same as in section 1.3 .1 , with the addition of the new regressors. 
Table 1.5 reports the results. Column 1 shows the benchmark regression with the 
whole sample and ail regressors. Not surprisingly, discouraged workers (who were at 
work 12 months ago) experience the largest consomption reductions, with a point esti-
mate of - 35.4% (statistically different from any type of layoff). 
The reaction of workers experiencing layoffperm is slightly stronger than those on 
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layoff6m, although the difference is not statistically significant. All else being equal, 
we could have expected a stronger response from the permanently laid-off, but these 
two situations are not easily comparable. Temporary layoffs are often the result of less 
foreseeable circumstances and cao bear upon senior workers while permanent layoffs 
tend to be caused by personal circumstances and affect younger workers. To verify this, 
we can compare the average tenure of workers who are going to face a layoffperm and 
a layoff6m next month. The average tenure of workers who are going to be tempora-
rily laid off next month is 6.4 years, whereas the average for permanent layoffs is 3.7 
years 16 . As bef ore, there is no measurable impact of layoffrecall or hours loss. 
There is a very significant increase of 4.1% of food expenditure for overtime wor-
kers, an impact that seems strong for a slight and temporary increase in eamings. Over-
time workers could be expecting larger permanent wage gains in the future, although 
no evidence for such hypothesis could be mustered from the data. 
In column 2, adding yearly income change to the list of controls do not alter the 
result meaningfully. lt probable that labor market outcomes also carry information on 
expected future income that may differ from their impact on last year's income. We 
must also keep in mind that this categorical variable is imprecise quite imprecise. 
The sample restrictions in columns 3 to 7 yield mostly intuitive results, or no dif-
ference with the benchmark regression. Column 3 leaves out workers with many jobs, 
with no appreciable consequence. Single earners, in column 4, react more to all shocks, 
except permanent layoffs which may be attributed to the specificity of permanent job 
losers. The largest contrast is the impact of layoffs6m' which is now at - 21.3%. Lea-
ving out public sector workers has no systematic or strong impact. Consumption reacts 
much more to shocks on male workers than by female workers. Columns 6 and 7 show 
that men experiencing layoffs react more than female, which probably reftects the fact 
that men are still household's main breadwinners. 
Columns 8 and 9 confirm that households reduce their consumption of food away 
from home much more than food at home, to all shocks. Two factors may explain this . 
Food away is complementary to work activities . It cao also be a luxury good that fami-
lies can reduce easily in case oftemporary income reduction. To conclude, as previously 
mentioned, the impact of these shocks on total consumption probably lies between the 
16. Unfortunately, the overl ap between consumption data and tenure data was not sufficient to use 
tenure direct) y in consumption models. 
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estimates of column 7 and 8. 
1.3.4 Job Joss and insurance 
The BLS conducted its mobility supplement in January of 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
2010 and 2012, asking detailed questions about the circumstances of permanent job 
loss. It allows to replace the variable layoffperm with the variable Job loss : a displa-
cement within the last 12 months in circumstances such as plant or company closed 
or moved. Hopefully, firm closure reftects impersonal and unpredictable circumstances 
that can affect senior workers as well as new entrants. Information on unemployment 
insurance and health insurance can also be added. 
The mobility supplement was conducted in January, but the answers are used to 
impute corresponding values to the same worker one month earlier. The downside of 
using the January supplement is a smaller dataset since the supplement information is 
unavailable every other year, or for waves of households leaving the Survey in Decem-
ber. Workers with many jobs are also excluded to be sure that the lostjob was the main 
job. 
Table 1.6 reports the results. Column 1 shows that for workers who were employed 
last year and lost their job during the last 12 months, the impact on consumption was 
-13.1% on average. 
Of the workers who lost their job last year, 48% have already found a new job and 
52% have not. Looking at them separately in column 2, those reemployed (full time 
or part time) seem to have recovered from the loss. For those still without job, the 
reduction is -20.4%. 
Column 3 finds a negative but insignificant impact for having no unemployment 
insurance, or having ]ost health insurance due to a job Joss. But column 4 finds that 
the impact on food spending of having had unemployment insurance but being now 
ineligible is -39.7%. It is strikingly strong, given UI expiration should in principle be 
perfectly foreseeable. Even when controlling for the number of months unemployed in 
column 5, the effect does not go away. Such reaction is hard to reconcile with the fact 
noted by Hall (1978) that anticipated changes in the incarne processes should not help 
24 Essays on Employment Protection and its Impacts on Workers Well-Being 
predict consurnption growth if agents can borrow freely. 17 18 It is however compatible 
with the presence of borrowing lirnits, which are included in the structural rnodel of 
section 1.4. 
1.3.5 Earning elasticities 
The outgoing rotation groups (a quarter of the sarnple) have to answer extra ques-
tions on earnings and wages, which allows to build two variables : weekly earnings 
and total hourly pay, including overtirne pay and extras. This adds up to the rnonthly 
question about total income over the last 12 rnonths. Although this last variable is co-
ded categorically, I build a continuous variable based on the rnidpoint of each category, 
which is far from perfect, but nonetheless a decent cornparison with the two previous 
rneasures. Upward and downward rnovernents in earnings are also considered separa-
rely. 
Table 1.7 shows that the earnings elasticity of consurnption of 4% (col. 1) a wage 
elasticity of 7.9% (col. 3) and an incarne e1asticity of 6.5% (col. 5). These magnitudes 
are in line with previous findings using the Consumer expenditure survey (CEX), nota-
bi y Gervais and Klein (20 1 0) who fi nd OLS es ti mates of in come elasticity of 5.4% for 
food consurnption and 6.7% for total consurnption, or Krueger and Perri (2005) who 
find an incarne elasticity of total consurnption of 4%. 
The three elasticities measures are very strong upward and weaker downward, a 
sign that downward rnovernents are either perceived to be more ternporary, or that hou-
seholds are more reluctant to cutback spendings than to increase it. 
17. Note that selection effect could help to reconcile this result with the Permanent Income Hypothe-
sis. Ceteris pari bus, workers that are eligible for UI for a longer period are more likely to be observed as 
sti ll receiving benefits. Also, the expected length of benefits has a positive impact on expected lifetime 
earnings . Thus, this could create a systematic di fference between workers who used to receive benefi t 
and those who still receive them. However, it is doubtful that it could be enough to explain such a large 
difference, especially given thal there was no difference between eligible and non-eligible workers in the 
first place. 
18. This observation echoes many other findings on reaction to anticipated tax refunds, reviewed in 
Browning and Crossley (200la). 
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1.3.6 The impact of la bor market displacement on yearly change 
in family income 
To assess the magnitude of these estimates, it is useful to verify the extent to which 
household income is affected by work hours losses and layoffs and compare the results 
to existing literature. As just rnentioned in section 1.3.5, last year's family income is 
available as a 16 category variable, but a continuous variable is created by imputing the 
middle point of each income category. To estimate the impact of labor market displa-
cernents on yearly income, the linear model to be estimated will be 
~:!..ln ( incomei) = f3o + {31 Lay off permi + Layoff6mi + f32Layoffrecalli + f33Hours lossi + ycontrolsi +ci 
where ~:!..ln (incomei) is the year to year change in log household income, and Layoffpermi 
Layoff6mi' Layoffrecalli and Hours lossi are dummies indicating whether worker i ex-
perienced a layoff or an episode of work hours losses one month after reporting last 
year's income (discouraged workers were not included because of too few observa-
tions), and controlsi is the sarne vector as that of section 1.2.2, including last year's 
income dummies, but excluding income changes, of course. As before, only one obser-
vation per household is kept (not necessarily December), and male earners are kept in 
priority. 
Table 1.5 shows the results. The biggest impact on annual household income growth 
cornes from a permanent layoff, with a point estimate of -25.9%, while the lowest is 
from hours loss, with -9.3%. To geta rough idea of the magnitude of consumption 
reaction to each outcome cornpared to its actual impact on income a year later, we 
can simply divide table l.S's column 1 consumption reactions with l.S's income im-
pact. Doing so would yield an income elasticity of consumption of 0.57 for permanent 
layoffs and 0.85 for layoffs with recall within six months. These are not only much 
higher than the estimates of income elasticity of table 1.7, but indicate that workers 
seem rather pessimistic in their prospect of ever catching up to their pre-displacement 
earning path, perceiving that the negative impact of permanent and long term layoffs 
on next year's income is a good forewarning of the long term income loss . 
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1.4 A structural model 
So far, all estimates point to the same conclusion : that losing the link with an 
employer (layoffperm and layoff6m) is felt strongly by workers, while temporary re-
ductions in workload (layoffrecall and hours loss) do not seem to matter to them. But 
without a structural approach, it is hard to interpret exactly what these estimates mean 
in a dynamic decision process. Is a worker more influenced by the changes in present 
incarne, the expected length of an unemployment period, the change in the perceived 
risk of other shocks, credit limitations and the risk of bancrupcy or the change to ex-
pected long-term gains? 
To explore these questions, I model the incarne process as a Markov chain between 
five different states: employed, hours Joss, layoffrecall• layoff6m and layoffperm- Each 
entails short term earnings lasses compared to staying employed. Also, each shock 
is associated with a probability of long-term wage loss when he returns to full time 
employment. The model is estimated numerically. In accordance with the CPS, the unit 
of time will be one month. 
With the consumption reaction estimated, I use the model to replicate the results 
found in section 1.3. 
Before writing down the worker's intertemporal problem, I explain its various com-
ponents. 
1.4.1 Instantaneous utility 
The worker's goal is to maximize his expected lifetime consumption utility, sub-
ject to variable incarne and credit constraints. The instantaneous utility is CRRA : 
1- v 
u ( c1) = ~~- v. The marginal utility of consumption is assumed to be separable from 
other components of utility such as leisure. The benchmark parameter for v will be 
v = 2 as is standard in the literature, but note that the results are quite insensitive to a 
wide range of values of v. Consumption and saving is the only decision available to the 
worker. 
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1.4.2 Credit constraints 
There are two constraints to credit. First, workers need to die without debt. Second, 
there is a limit to the debt level. In the United States, the typicallimits for conforming 
loans are a front-end-ratio of 28% and a back-end-ratio of 36%. The front-end-ratio 
is the fraction of income used on housing related expenses, including mortgage. The 
back-end-ratio includes the front-end-ratio plus interest on recurring debt including 
credit cards, car loans, student loans, alimony, etc. Since in the model there are no 
durable goods and only one type of asset, the appropriate measure should be the net 
worth, thus excluding mortgage. The maximal ratio of earnings devoted to paying the 
debt will be Ç = 36% -28% = 8%. The annual nominal interest rate r will be 5%, 
regardless of the debt level. This implies a debt limit of ~~ = 160% of total annual 
income. Sensitivity anal y sis will be performed for Ç. 
1.4.3 Current income 
The income depends on the worker's labor market status. 19 The individual can have 
in 5 different labor market status s, labeled sE {0, 1,2,3 ,4}, which correspond to the 
states used in section 1.3 : O. Employed full time, 1. Hours loss, 2. On temporary layoff 
with known recall date (layoffrecall), 3. On temporary layoff with indication of recall 
within 6 months (layoff6m) and 4. Permanent layoff (layoffperm). Search and matching 
is not modeled explicitly. It is assurned that the worker has separatly solved the problern 
of optimal search intensity and quit decisions. He is taking his labor market situation 
as a given for his choice of consurnption and saving. I use the CPS data to compute the 
Markov matrix of transition between states from one mon th to the next 20 : 
19. Of course, most workers have other income sources and it would have been nice to include them as 
weil. The problem with th at is that it is not straight forward, become the other incarne source ft uctuates as 
weil , and the worker will want to keep precautionnary savings in case of shocks happening to this other 
incarne source. The ideal way would be to have a two income household. But, as it will become clear, 
this would square the number of states of squared ((5*5)*(5*5)=625) very computationally burdensome. 
Note however thal we can probably imagin how this would influence the simulation. An additional 
stable in come redu ces the share of the la bor market eamings in the total budget, reducing the importance 
of shocks. If this addidional income is unstable, it would encourage the household to amass even more 
precautionary savings, reducing a gain the importance of la bor market shocks. 
20. Note that to be coherent with the previous section, I on! y consider employed workers who wwork 
full time last year. I don't consider individuals out of the labor force or unemployed after a quit or entry 
in the labor force, or part-timers. The reason is that it is unclear what is their available income what 
their motivations are. Of course it would be better to incl ude ail possible states , but this is a reasonable 
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TABLE 1.1: Transition probabilities next month 
o. 1. 2. 3. 4. Total Stocks s 
Theoreticala Real 
O. Employed 99.07 0.56 0.11 0.11 0.14 100 97.99 97 .90 
1. Hours Joss 77 .06 18.07 2.14 1.87 0.85 100 0.70 0.81 
2. Layoffrecall 52.9 5.32 25.32 13 .71 2.74 100 0.23 0.27 
3. Layoff6m 34.69 3.4 13.78 35.37 12.76 100 0.27 0.29 
4. Layoffpenn 19.39 0.56 1.12 2.98 75.94 100 0.81 0.73 
a If Mis the is the Markov matrix of transition probabilities, then the theoretical equilibrium stocks are 
( m,,
1
1 
1 1 1 1 )'.(1) ln2 ,1 ln3,1 1114,1 1115 ,1 ln1 ,2 11!2,2 -1 111-3) /11.4 ,2 ms .2 lnl ,3 111.2 ,3 1113,3- 1 m4)3 ms ,3 
lnl ,4 ln2,4 1113,4 ln4,4- l 11l5 ,4 
A striking feature is how short-lived labor market shocks are. It underscores how 
important it is to month as time unit as oppose to a trimester or a year. A worker 
on hours loss has a 77% chance of being back at work full time next month, while 
the chance is 53% for Layoffrecall and 35% Layoff6m· Only Layoffperm has a signifi-
cantly longer duration. Interestingly, for employed workers, the chance of moving to 
Layoffrecall or Layoff6m next month is only 0.11 %. But for workers already on hours 
loss, it is 2.14% and and 1.87% respectively, roughly 20 times higher. It echoes the 
message of table A.4 showing that workers who have a high propensity to face hours 
cutbacks also face high propensities of layoff. Renee, if Hours loss has an impact on 
workers, it might come not from the temporary decline in earnings but from the higher 
risk of being laid off. 
CPS data can be used to compute the impact of weekly earnings of hours loss, but 
doing so requires controlling for dummies of last year's earnings. 21 0n average, the 
compromise for modelling and computational purposes. Also, to verify that it does not distort too much 
workers ftows , I compute the theoretical equilibrium stocks of workers in each states using these flows, 
and compare them with real stocks and see that they match very weil. 
21. Computing the impact of hours Joss on weekJy eamings is subtJe, because hours Joss affect lower 
income workers. But using income growth is not enough because of mean reversion. Low eamers Jast 
year tend to earn more this year, whiJe high earners Jast year tend to eam Jess this year. As a result, when 
computing the impact of Hours Joss using income levels, the impact is a staggering - 47%, while using 
income growth yieJds -9%. Controlling for dummies of weekly eamings categories last year brings 
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loss is 20.81 %. 22 There are no data on weekly earnings for unemployed workers in 
the CPS. But the OECD produces estimates of average replacement rates of net wages 
over average unemployment periods. 23 The estima te was of 30% for most of the 2000's 
decade. The benefits period was extended in July 2010, but this reform barely impacts 
our sample. 
We can definecp (S) as the fraction of full time wage that a worker gets when in state 
S: 
cp (0) = 1; cp (1) = 0.7919; cp (2) =cp (3) =cp (4) = 0.30. (1.1) 
1.4.4 Wage growth and job displacement 
All workers start their carreer at age 20, retire at age 60 and die with certainty at 
75. The starting wage isw = 1, but it rises over through career. The rate of wage growth 
p is a function of age : p (a) is estimated with the CPS data by locallinear regression 
with a triangle kernel of three years. 
Of course, wage growth is affected by the labor market situation since involuntarily 
changing job often entails a loss of seniority and job specifie skills. Estimating long-
term wage losses is challenging and requires long-term panel data not available in the 
CPS. A recent estimation of long-term in come losses from job displacement is the work 
of Davis and Wachter (2011). They estimate the post displacement long-run average 
earning losses at 10% 24 (the same number that was found by Stevens (1997)). As a 
baseline, I will assume that following a layoffperm, when a worker finds a new job, the 
new wage is 10% lower th an the pre-displacement wage and never recovers. 
What about the other shocks? Workers on temporary layoffs may be lucky and be 
recalled to their initial position with identicallong-tenn wage gains. But they may also 
these two numbers much cl oser : to -25.31% in tevets and -20.81% in differences (this tast es ti mate 
will be prefered). 
22. Note that with a 77 .06% chance of being emptoyed again next mon th, it is most likety that periods 
of hours 1oss do not last a whole month. It means that 20.81% probabty overestimates the true cost of 
hours tosses, but without more data or further assumptions, it is difficult to estimate the true cost. 
23. The exact definition of the initial replacement rate is : "is an average of cases of a single person and 
one-earner married couple, an average of cases with no chitdren and with two chitdren, and an average 
of cases with previous earnings in work 67% of average production worker (APW) tevel, 100% of APW 
teve1 and 150% of APW tevel." 
24. These are earning tosses during expansions, but their estirnates for average sample is very close 
and most of the present sample encompasses expansionary years. 
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have to accept a new job with lower qualification, lower seniority and lower wage. 
Without statistics on rates of recall, it is impossible to compute the probability of recall 
directly. But it is possible to proxy it. 
The trick will be to compute the probability of changing sector after a shock. Ja-
cobson et al. (1993) fi nd th at eight year after displacement, the income loss of workers 
having changed sector was roughly twice that of those who had remained in the same 
sector. Hence, changing sector is a good proxy for skill loss that translates into futur 
wage loss. Knowing that, we can ask : What is the average risk that a worker will 
change sector during a certain period of time? How higher is this risk if he just came 
out of each shock? Then, by comparing the impact of a temporary layoff to the impact 
of a permanent job loss, we can estima te wh at fraction of tho se workers experienced an 
involuntary job displacement leading to a permanent wage loss of 10%, and how many 
retum to their initial position with no wage loss. 
More formally, assume that all permanent layoffs involve involuntary job changes, 
and that a constant fraction of these changes, say Ç, involve changing sector. We can 
estimate how each shock contributes to the risk of sector change by estimating the 
following model : 
E (chi,t 1 si,t- 1) = Yo + L YsDs,i,t- 1· 
sE{ 1,2,3,4} 
The sample is made of workers employed full-time at period t and employed full-
time at period t- j , where j may be 12 months. chi,t is a dummy variable indicating if 
the worker i changed sector between period t and t- j. Si,t- 1 is the state of the worker 
last mon th (0 : Employed to 4 : Layoffperm) and Ds,i,t- 1 are dummie variables of the 
state values of Si,t- l· The parameterfo will capture the normal rate of change of sectors 
after j periods for a worker who was employed last month, 25 and the Ys will capture 
the extra changes resulting from the fact that the worker came out of being in state S 
(either Hours loss, Layoffrecal/, Layoff6m or Layoffperm) last month to state 0 (employed 
full ti me) this mon th. Th en, define lJI ( s) as the ratio of involuntary job chang ers wh en 
exiting stateS, lfi(S) = ç{s =a=~ (where by construction, lJI(4) = ~= 1'). As a 
robustness check, involuntary job change was also defined as a change of both sector 
and occupation. Here are results for various choices of j to make sure that they are 
25. Note that the worker may have experi enced other shocks before last months that we cannot ob-
serve, but they are captured by fo . 
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TABLE 1.2: Probability of involuntary job displacement following a shock 
Based on : pr(sector change;,r 1 S;,r- I ) pr(sect. & occ. 
change;.1 [ S;,r- d 
Lag (months): j = 11 i = 12 j = 13 } ={ 11 , 12, 13} 1={11 , 12, 13} 
Hours loss (o/ (1)) 0.070 0.060 0.040 0.069 0.206 
Layoffrecall (V' ( 2)) 0.083 0.047 0.054 0.075 0.282 
Layoff6m (l/f (3)) 0.431 0.480 0.473 0.452 0.625 
Layoffperm (o/ (4)) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
relatively stable, and one specification with ali j pooled that we will use for the model 
(actual regressions in online appendix). As robustness check, 1 also use a change in 
both sector and occupation : 
Hence, in the benchmark solution, the V' ( S) function is 
l/f (O) = 0; V' (1) = 0.069; lf/ (2) = 0.075 ; l/f (3) = 0.452; V' (4) = 1 (1.2) 
1.4.5 Households with multiple incomes 
A fin al complexity arises from the fact that shocks impact one workers, but that 
consumption is at the household level. While earlier literature could convincingly as-
sume single earner families, as column 3 of table 1.5 shows that more than half of the 
families of the sample have more than one income. Since spousal income is a foremost 
way of moothing earning shocks, we should expect single earners to react much more 
than multiple-earner families (as is clearly seen in table 1.5, column 4). 
The ideal approach to dealing with this issue should be to model multiple-income 
household explicitly, but it is easy to see how this would be prohibitive computatio-
nally. 26 A pragmatic solution will be to assume that the income of the rest of the hou-
sehold is fixed . 1 will consider two cases : household with single eamers and multiple 
earners. In the multi-earner households, the average income share of a worker is 46%. 
The income of the rest of the household will increase at the same rate as the worker's 
26. (25 * 25 = 625 states for a dual-eamer family) 
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incarne, but with certainty. In simulations, both types of households will be weighted 
by their proportion in the data. 27 
1.4.6 The worker's intertemporal problem 
The worker's problem at time t is: 
Where 
dtH ~ WtH<P (StH) ç V-r 
dT ~ 0 
crH is the worker's consomption at time t + -r 
- v is the worker's constant relative risk-aversion 
- f3 is the future discount factor 
- A1H is the worker's amount of liquid assets at time t + -r 
(budget constraint) 
(debt limit each period) 
(non-negative final assets) 
S1H is the worker's state at time t + -r, where St+r can be : 0 : employed; 1 
hours loss ; 2 : layoffrecall ; 3 : layoff6m ; 4 : layoffperm 
- <P (St+r) is the fraction of a worker's regular wage received in state S1H, descri-
bed in equation 1.1 
- Pt is the priee level at time t + -r (The inflation is 2.55%, corresponding to the 
annual CPI increase of a representative basket of goods over the 2000's.) 
- pr(Sr+r+ l = s 1 S1H ) is the probability oftransitioning to states given state S1H , 
a Markov process described in table 1.1 
the wage increases smoothly over time, except when exciting a layoff (or hours 
loss) which can trigger a long-run wage loss of 10% : 
- WtH+ l = Wt * (1 + p (a)) if StH = 0 or Sr+r+l > 0, 
27. This solution is pragmatic, but may still overestimate the response to shocks for two reasons . First, 
if other income sources are also unce1tain, families will increase precautionary savings. Second, in the 
sample, there is a small but very significant inverse correlation between the incarne of each household 
members, suggesting that a spouse may enter the labor market or work longer hours to offset a wage Joss 
of the main eamer. 
Chapter 1 - The Consumption Response ta Job Displacements, Layoffs and Hour Lasses 33 
- Wt+'L"+ l = Wt * (1 + p (a)) with probability (1-lji(StH)), and WtH+ l = Wt * 
(1 + p (a))* 0.9 with probability lJf(S1H) if StH > 0 and St+H l = 0 
- p (a) is the monthly wage increase for an employed worker of age a 
- ljf ( S1) is the probability of experiencing a wage loss (not being recalled to the 
original job), described in equation 1.2. 28 
- ris the nominal yearly interest rate of 5%, independent of the level of assets. 
- The Inada condition lim e-tou' (c) = oo ensures positive consumption in every per-
iod. 
- The worker starts working at 20 years old with no assets, retires with certainty 
at 60 years old and dies with certainty at 75 years old with no desire to leave a 
bequest. 
1.4. 7 Results 
The model is solved numerically, starting from last period and each month solving 
the optimal savings/consumption decisions for each asset level. 
1.4.7.1 Response paths 
Figures 1.5 shows the consumption, savings and expected utility loss 29 trajectories 
for a single-earner family after a shock. The household head starts working at 20 years 
old with zero assets, and is consecutively employed until experiencing a shock (and 
never exciting from the new state), either at 30 years old (left row of graphs) or at 58 
years old (right row of graphs). The purple line shows a permanent layoff, the red line 
shows layoffperm, the red line shows a layoff6m ' the orange line shows a layoffrecall' 
the green line shows hours loss and the blue line shows the worker staying employed. 
Of course, most spells are short lived, except layoffperm. To reftect that, each line pales 
after a worker has more than 99% chances of having excited to another another state 
(employed or not). 
As can be seen in the top panels, households eut spending imrnediately following 
a shock in response to a loss of expected lifetime utility. Then, as time goes by wi-
28. Note that for computational reasons, we have to limit the maximum number of times a worker 
experiences wage !osses to 4 (few workers will experience 4 job !osses) 
29. The expected utility loss from going from state 0 (employed) to stateS at time t is V (w, S1,A1)-
V(w1 ,0,A1 ). 
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thout going back to full-time employment, consumption slowly declines. Permanent 
job losses are felt more strongly, followed by layoff6m• layoffrecall and hours loss. As 
a result, as seen in middle panels, households on layoffperm go into debt more slowly 
than households on layoff6m and layoffrecall · 
As seen on the panel on the right, shocks have a much smaller impact for older 
workers who already have accumulated ample savings for retirement and has little time 
le ft to work, a point made by Clarida (1991). As a result, expected utility losses from 
shocks are also much smaller for workers loosing a job at 58 years old than at 30, as 
seen from the bottom panels. 
Figure 1.5 shows the same shocks for a dual-earner family, for which a shocks only 
impacts 46% of the family incarne. All responses from consumption and utility losses 
have comparable shapes as for single earners, except that their magnitude is less than 
half. Note that savings levels are slightly lower for dual income families, reftecting the 
reduced need for precautionary saving. 
1.4.7.2 Simulation 
1 simultate the income trajectory of a large number of workers in single and dual-
earner families, entering the labor market being employed at 20 years old, retiring at 60 
years old. 1 weight the proportion of single-earner and dual-earner families and the age 
composition according to the real data. 30 
Keeping only workers employed full time 12 months ago, 1 first regress the change 
in consumption on the four shocks. Then 1 add as regressors the number of months since 
the job loss or lay off took place assuming a common slope for all shocks sin ce they are 
nearly identical in the first few months, as seen in figures 1.5 and 1.5. Finally, a third 
regression tests how the impact of losing work differs from finding work by including 
workers employed today, but on layoff or hours loss 12 months ago, and lag shocks as 
regressors. The same regressions are also performed on the actual data, including all 
controls. 
Table 1.9 shows the results for the simulated sample of the benchmark in columns 
1 to 3 without standard errors since no error term was included. Columns 4 to 7 show 
30. In the dataset, there are fewer younger or older workers. To get comparable samples, 1 weight the 
simulated workers of each age accordingly to its importance in the real data (using a five year weigh-
ted average). 1 also select the same proportion of single earner (37.41 %) and multiple earner (62.59%) 
families (independent of age). 
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the results for the real sample, with standard errors in parentheses. In bracket is shown 
the p-value associated with the F test that each coefficient is statistically equal to the 
simulated one where colurnn 4 and 7 are compared to column 1, column 5 with 2 and 
6 with 3. 
In the simulated data of columns 1 and 3, households react to permanent job displa-
cements by cutting back consomption by 19%, quite higher than for long-term layoffs. 
This value is much doser to job lasses from jobs dosure in column 7, than job loss 
from any circumstances. The simulated reaction to layoff6m is much doser to the es-
timated point estimates. The simulated reaction to layoffrecall is -9.8% is not much 
higher than the estimates. 
As for Hours loss, the model would have predicted a consumption change of - 1.9%. 
If such is the real reaction to hours loss, it is dear that a much larger dataset would be 
needed to estimate this number precisely. The estimates for Hours loss mostly suggest 
a slight positive effect, although not statistically different from zero or -1.4%. 
If the imprecision of the estimates cali for a larger dataset, they also suggests that in 
the data, reactions to a layoff with known return date or hours loss are probably quite 
heterogeneous. Sorne households may eut consomption like the simulation proposes 
while others may view these unexpected episodes of free time as an opportunity to 
spend more. 
1.4.7.3 Policy discussion 
Table 1.10 shows how various policy experiments affect worker's consomption 
reactions to shocks and utility. As seen in column 1, compared to Hours loss, the ave-
rage impact on consumption of layoffrecall is 5.16 larger, the impact of Layoff6m is 
7.21 times larger and the impact of Layoffperm is 10 times larger. It is hard to say whe-
ther firms should be encouraged towards hours cuts or layoffs without a good theory 
of the firm. But for sure, both sections 1.3 and 1.4 suggest that the impact of hours 
cuts is quite small compared to layoffs, especially given that the average weekly hours 
reduction is 13.42 hours and the earnings reduction is 20.8%. 
Column 2 and 3 consider a 5 point decrease and increase in unemployment in-
surance benefits (paid for by employed workers) . Assuming that workers do not mo-
dify significantly their search behavior, 31 we can see that a 10 points increase, from 
31. Of course, the generosity of UI benefits could influence the length of unemployment spells if 
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.25 to .35 would change average consumption of unemployed workers by -0.127 -
( -0.144) = 0.026, or 2.6 points for workers on layoffperm, 1.7 points for workers 
on layoff6m and 1.5 points for workers on layoffrecall· In terms of elasticity of to-
tal expenditures to unemployment insurance benefits, it would imply an elasicity of 
0 ·~216/~38 1 = 0.096 for layoffperm, 0.059 for layoff6m and 0.050 for lay offrecall· These 
numbers is comparable to the estimates of the impact of UI. 32 To grasp their impact 
on welfare, it can be compared to the impact of a 1% wage increase, presented in 
column 4. For a 30 years old single eamer, increasing wages by 1% increases wei-
fare by 228 .63 - 226.77 = 1.86, while increasing UI by 10 points increases welfare 
by 226.89-226.59 = 0.3. Thus in terms of the gains from a 1% increase in wages, 
the gains are roughly 16%, while for layoffperm who benefit direct1y from Ul, they 
are 69%, and for workers with spouse, they are negligible. These benefits are modest, a 
sign that private borrowing and spousal incarne are effective incarne stabilizers for most 
workers. But they might be larger for workers who are liquidity constrained (Browning 
and Crossley, 2001b). 
Column 4 shows that for a worker with a very low leve] of benefits (5% ), magnifies 
the reaction to a layoffperm by - 0.258- ( -0.190) = -0.068. By comparison, table 
1.6 column 3 found a comparable (although imprecise) point estimate of -0.087 for 
having no unemployment insurance following a job loss. 
Column 5 considers the impact of extending UI to incarne lasses from hours lasses. 
The impacts are too small to measure. However, such a policy could be helpful if hours 
reductions prove less harmful to workers than layoffs and extending UI to hours lasses 
was a way of making them acceptable to workers. 
Of course, we must keep in mind that these simulations take the flows between 
different states for granted. Making these flows would require the much more ambitious 
task of modeling bath labor supply decisions via search intensity, and firm 's demand 
for labor. But note that we can be have a good idea for most of a worker's reaction 
to a change to unemployment insurance. Theory and many empirical papers show that 
workers change their search intensity or the quality of the job offers they will accept (see Card et al. 
(2007)) 
32. Using Canadian data, Browning and Crossley (2001 b) fi nd an elasticity of expenditure with respect 
to the benefits of 0.05 for a single incarne household . By cornparison, looking only at single-incarne hou-
seholds, the sirnulated elasticities are 0.178 for layoffperrn , 0.068 for layoff6rn and 0.045 for layoffrecall. 
On the other hand, Gruber (1997) using PSID data finds larger effects than Browning and Crossley 
(200lb). 
L____ ________ -------------------- ---------------------------------
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increasing benefits' generosity would reduce a worker's effort to find a new job. Thus, 
from the point of view of consumption utility, the gains would be reduced, and even 
potentially negative. 
1.5 Conclusion 
This paper compared the consumption reaction of households to various shocks on 
the labor market, bridging reduced-form non-parametric estimates to reactions simula-
ted from a structural model. The OLS and matching results point in the same direction, 
that workers going through hours cutbacks or a temporary layoff with known recall 
date do not change their consumptions measurably, but that those facing layoffs with 
unknown recall date reduce it significantly, in the order of - 13.7%. The reaction is 
much stronger for single earners, for discouraged workers and those displaced after 
firm closure. The simulated estimates are reasonably close for most estimates. 
From a policy perspective, the estimated welfare effects of unemployment insu-
rance reform are modest, due to the fact that persona! savings and spousal income are 
enough to smooth consumption for most workers. The matching estimates of section 
1.3 suggests that the key consideration for the worker is not so much the present incarne 
or the number of hours worked, but the fact that the link with the bond with the firm 
still exists. This is good news, given that firms also can benefit from keeping ties with 
well trained workers. In other words, being available to renew a match after a shock is 
a positive externality for both parties. Hence, reforms that make it easier to keep such 
a bond could be welfare improving. 
Regarding the consumption literature, this paper suggested that households' reac-
tion can be perfectly compatible with the permanent income hypothesis if shocks are 
modeled precisely enough in terms of present earnings and their impact on expected fu-
ture earnings. It also opens many avenues of research. One would be to test the model 
on more conventional consumption panels such as the Panel Study of Income Dyna-
mics. Also, an improvement to the madel would be to make labor supply endogenous 
since this most certainly infl uence the impact of unemployment insurance reforms. 
Finally, even though the model predicts very modest impacts from unemployment 
insurance reforms, the sharp drop consumption of households with expired unemploy-
ment insurance is a telltale sign that sorne unemployed workers may be seriously 
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liquidity-constrained. Their situation should mandate more scrutiny as they may be 
have both a lower income and lower wealth level and be less able to insure themselves 
against labor market risks. 
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Tables and figures 
TABLE 1.3: Impact of hours cuts and temporary layoffs on consurnption 
Dependent var. Least squares 
L\log food expend.0 2 3 4 
Layoff6111b -0.139*** -0.147*** -0.139*** -0.139*** 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) 
Layoff,.ecat{ -0.047 -0.053 -0.047 -0.047 
(0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) 
Hours 1ossd 0.022 0.053 0.11 0* 
(0.025) (0.059) (0.057) 
Num. of hours los te -0.001 -0.016** 
(0.005) (0.006) 
Nu m. of hours 1ost2 / 1000 0.394*** 
(0.140) 
Lost 0-8 hours 0.027 
(0.038) 
Lost 9-16 hours 0.056 
(0.068) 
Lost > 16 hours -0.039 
(0.056) 
Contro1sf y y y y 
Observations 68 560 64 114 68 560 68 560 
R2 0.016 0.01 7 0.016 0.016 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<O.O 1, ** p<0.05 , * p<O. l 
"Y earl y change in weekly household spending at supermarkets, grocery stores, meat markets, produce 
stands, bakeries, restaurants, fast food places, cafeterias and vending machines, etc. 
hon layoff, employer has given indica tion that the worker will be recall ed within six months. 
' On layoff, employer has given a return date. 
dWorked < 35 hours last week because of slack work/business conditions 
eThis variable is the difference between hours usually worked and hours actuall y worked if Hours loss 
= 1, and zero otherwise. 
I Jnclude sex , age, age2 white, black, 14 sector dummies, I l occupation dummie , household size leve! 
and yearly change, household children number and yearly change, college education, year x region 
dummies, house owner dummy, yearx state leve! unemployment rate, lagged fami ly income dummie 
and yearly change in income category. 
Full sample includes private for profil or government workers employed full ti me last year and are now 
either still employed in similar conditions, worked less than 35 hours last week for business-related 
reasons or are on on temporary layoff. 
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TABLE 1.6: Impact of job loss and insurance 
Dep. var : illog food 2 3 4 5 
expend. 
Lostjob -0.13 1 ** 
(0.047) 
Lostjob & found new job -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 
(0 .062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Lostjob & still not working -0.204*** -0.219* -0.119 -0.141 
(0 .058) (0.122) (0 125) (0 .149) 
No ure 0.000 -0. 102 -0.091 
(0.202) (0.208) (0.223) 
Expired UI -0.397** -0.402** 
(0. 166) (0. 162) 
Months since job loss / layoff 0.006 
(0.015) 
Lost health insuranced 0.034 0.042 0.046 
(0.178) (0. 167) (0 167) 
Layoff6m e -0.156* -0.156* -0.156* -0.156* -0. 168* 
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.095) 
Layoffrecall f -0. 140 -0.140 -0. 140 -0.140 -0.147 
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.093) 
Hours loss 0.019 O.ül8 0.018 0.018 0 .018 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Overtime 0.030** 0.030** 0.030** 0.030** 0.030** 
(00 11 ) (0.01 1) (0.0 11 ) (0.011) (0 .011) 
Con trois y y y y y 
Observations 24 388 24 388 24 388 24 388 24 388 
R2 0.0 15 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<O.OI , ** p<0.05, * p<O.I 
houring the Jast years, !os t or lefl a job because o f : plant or company closed. (A iso not present! y on temporary layaiT.) 
cwas not el igible for unemplo~·ment insurance after losing the job. 
cMonths si nee job Joss or \ayoif 
f Had health insurance atoldjob and not anymore 
lncludes priva te for profit or govemment workers employed full time on a single job last year and are now either still 
employed in similar conditions, worked Jess than 35 hours Jast week for business-related reasons , !ost their job permanent! y 
during the last 12 months. Thesample size is small due to data avai laility. lt excludes observations from 2000.2002, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2010, as well as rotation groups exîting the survey after December. 
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TABLE 1.7: Income elasticities 
Dep. var: Least squares 
~log food expend.a 1 2 3 4 5 6 
~log weekly earningsh 0.040*** 
(0.009) 
~log weekly earnings+ 0.057*** 
(0.012) 
~log weekly earnings_ 0.024* 
(0.013) 
~log wage 0.079*** 
(0.025) 
~log wage+ 0.090** 
(0.038) 
~log wage_ 0.067* 
(0.038) 
~log last year incarnee 0.065 *** 
(0.008) 
~log last year income+ 0.073*** 
(0.011) 
~log last year income_ 0.058*** 
(0.011) 
Controlsd y y y y y y 
Observations 17 264 17 264 8 039 8 039 64 486 64 486 
R2 0.023 0.023 0.032 0.032 0.018 0.018 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05 , * p<O.l 
0 Yearly change in weekly household spending at supermarkets, grocery stores, meat markets, produce stands, bakeries, 
restaurants, fast food places, cafeterias and vending machines, etc. 
bLast week's earnings 
c Household's total income over the last twelve months 
dlnclude sex, age, age2 white, black, 14 sector dummies, Il occupation dummies, household size leve) and yearly change, 
household children number and yearly change, college education, year x region dummies, house owner dummy, yearx state 
leve] unemployment rate, Jagged family income durnmie and yearly change in income category. Note that it also includes 
dummies for hour Joss and overtime. Columns 5 and 6 also include dumrnies for discouraged workers, permanent or 
temporary Jayoffs. 
Full sample includes private for profit or government workers employed full ti me on a single job last year and are now 
either still employed in similar conditions, worked Jess than 35 hours last week for business-related reasons, are on 
temporary or permanent layoff or have left the laborforce because they are discouraged. 
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TABLE 1.8: Impact of hours cuts and temporary layoffs on yearly income 
Dependent var. Least squares 
~log hh income.a 1 
Layoffperm b -0.258*** 
(0.034) 
Layoff6mc -0.157*** 
(0.029) 
Layoffrecall d -0.115*** 
(0.020) 
Hours losse -0.102*** 
(0.017) 
Controlsf y 
Observations 102 569 
R2 0.187 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<O.Ol , ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
ayearly change of log household income, based on the center of 16 categories 
bUnemployed after losingjob, looking for a new job. 
con layoff, employer has given indication that the worker will be recalled 
within six months. 
don layoff, employer has given a return date. 
eworked < 35 hours last week because of slack work/business conditions 
f include sex, age, age2 white, black, 14 sector dumrnies, 11 occupation 
dummies, household size leve! and yearly change, household children number 
and yearly change, college education, year x region dumrnies, ho use owner 
dummy, yearx state leve! unemployment rate, lagged family income dummie 
and yearly change in income category. 
Full sample includes private fo r profit or govemment workers employed fu ll 
time last year and are now either still employed in similar conditions, worked 
Jess than 35 hours last week for business-related reasons or are on on 
temporary layoff. 
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FIGURE 1.1: Typical path of consumption, savings and expected utility loss after a 
shock 
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FIGURE 1.2: Typical path of consumption, savings and expected utility loss after a 
shock 
Chapter 1 - The Consumption Response to Job Displacements, Layoffs and Hour Lasses 47 
TABLE 1.9: Model simulation 
Dep. var : Lllog Simulation Full sampleh Mobil. 
food expend. 1 2 3 4 5 6c 7 
Layoffperm. -0.190 -0.1 48 -0.190 -0.158*** -0.136** -0.161 *** -0.203*** 
or Job !ossa (0.037) (0.051) (0.037) (0.052) 
[.390] [.829] [.434] [.8 18] 
Layoff6m -0.137 -0.119 -0.1 37 -0.151 *** -0.141 *** -0.148*** -0 .128 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.078) 
[.759] [.61 8] [.802] [.913] 
Layoffrecall -0.098 -0.082 -0.098 -0.077 -0.071 -0.079 -0.093 
(0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.084) 
[.722] [.846] [.743] [.953] 
Hours Joss -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 0.013 0.01 3 0.01 3 -0.01 3 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031) 
[. 1 91] [. 191] [.210] [.846] 
Months since -0.01 2 -0.005 
job Joss or layoff (0.008) 
[.4 1 1 l 
lag Layoffperm. 0.130 0.094** 
(0.037) 
[.336] 
Iag Layoff6m 0 .107 0.043 
(0.057) 
[.27 1] 
Iag Layoffrecall 0.083 0.011 
(0.056) 
[.199] 
lag Hours Joss 0.01 2 0.008 
(0.027) 
[.888] 
Contrais y y y y 
Observations 65 040 65 040 69 795 24 388 
R 2 0.0 16 0.01 6 0.0 16 0.016 
-;:t ---:7 
Pr > F ( f3 = f3 sim) [.514] [.514] [.581] [.996] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<O.O 1, ** p<0.05 , * p<O. l . Pr > F <fi = f3s im ) in brackets . 
0 ln the full sample, this variable is Layoffperm : unemployed after losing job, looking for a new job. ln the Supplement sample, it is 
Job loss : !ost or left a job because of: plant or company closed or moved. 
hJncludes private for profit or gov. workers ernployed fu ll ti me on a single job last year and are now either still ernployed in similar 
conditions, worked less than 35 hrs last week for business-related reasons, !ost their job permanently in the last 12 months . 
c Also includes private for profit or govemment workers employed full ti me on a single job now and were fast year either employed 
in similar conditions, or worked Jess than 35 hours last week for business-related reasons, wore on layoff or !ost their job 
permanently during the last 12 months. 
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Chapitre 2 
Employment protection and Work 
Hours Variability 
Abstract 
1 mode! a firm's input choice between workers and hours following output 
demand variations . Hiring and firing costs generate variability in work time. 1 
also study the impact of lirnits to work hours reductions which, in interaction 
with employment protection, can shed sorne light on stylized differences between 
North American and European labor markets. 
To test these mechanisms empirically, 1 use two predictions from the mode! : 
(i) Labor adjustment costs increase work hour variability, especially in sectors 
with high Jayoff rates; (ii) A temporary rise in labor requirements increases de-
mand for work hours, especially when workforce adjustment is costly. These pre-
dictions are tested on Canadian data, making use of the differences in indi-
vidual and collective advance notice requirements between Canadian pro-
vinces. Unobserved province characteristics are controlled for. Both predictions 
are verified for individual notice requirements. Additional notice requirements for 
mass layoffs have no significant impact. 
2.1 Introduction 
Hiring and firing workers is an essential margin of adjustment for firms facing ever-
changing market conditions . But for workers, a layoff often entails short-run and long-
-------------------------- -- - --- -------------------~-----·------
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run incarne lasses, as well as psychological and emotional consequences. As a res-
panse, Western countries have adopted employment protection legislation (EPL) such 
as severance payments, advance notice requirements and legal oversight of dismissal 
processes. The theoretical and empiricalliterature has shown that by limiting the free-
dom to dismiss employees, EPL reduces labor market fluidity (OECD Employment 
Outlook 2004), and affect a firm's abibty to adjust output to changing economie condi-
tions. For workers, EPL should ceteris paribus benefit employees holding a permanent 
contract (insiders) by reducing their risk of being fired, but make permanent contracts 
harder to obtain for workers on temporary contracts or unemployed (outsiders). But hi-
ring and firing is not the only margin of adjustment for firms. Managers can also adjust 
output through capital or through changes in working hours or work intensity. If so, the 
stringency of EPL for firms could be overstated. Also, EPL could have adverse indi-
rect consequences for employed workers, such as less stable work schedules and more 
overtime shifts with psychological and physical health consequences. 1 To show how 
EPL can increase the variability of work hours, this paper proposes a simple theoretical 
model and tests empirically two of its predictions. 
First, a firm's labor adjustment problem is considered in the presence of hiring and 
firing costs. Adjustments can occur through the extensive margin, i.e. the number of 
workers, or the intensive margin, i.e. hours per worker. With minimal assumptions, 1 
show that regardless of the process governing priee changes or adjustment costs, as 
soon as the firm cannot adjust freely its workforce, it will compensate by changing 
work hours. To illustrate this mechanism dynamically, the product market varies only 
between a high and a low demand level, as in Bertola (1990) (and contrary to previous 
literature 2). This stochastic process allows for closed-form solutions and general func-
tional forms. Within the same setting, 1 also consider limits to hour reductions, a feature 
more akin to labor markets in North America and sorne European countries. Combined 
1. A recent meta-analysis on the impact of overtime work on health points to "poorer perceived 
general health, increased injury rates, more illnesses, or increased mortality", among others . Also, see, 
Wasmer (2006a) for a thorough investigation of the link between EPL and stress at work. 
2. Nickell (1978) is the first to explore a firm 's choice of workers, hours and capital with a ftuctuating 
demand and dynarnic costs to adjustment, assuming perfect foresight. This assumption is criticized by 
Chen and Funke (2004) who stress the importance of uncertainty and draw upon real options litera ture for 
a more realistic model. The realism of their assumptions allows for severa! meaningful results, su ch as a 
description of a range of priees where on! y hours are adjusted, a consequence of linear labor adjustment 
costs. 
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with EPL, limits on hour reduction help to understand key stylized facts regarding tur-
nover and average working hours of different labor markets. 
From the model , I also derive two stylized predictions : (i) Labor adjustment costs 
increase the variability of work hours, especially in sectors with high lay off rates ; (ii) A 
temporary rise in labor requirements increases demand for work hours, especially when 
workforce adjustment is costly. These predictions serve as identification strategies in 
the empirical part of the paper. 
The link between employment protection and work hours variability has been scar-
cely empirically studied. 3 In the macroeconomies literature, Abraham and Houseman 
(1995) find that the speed of employment adjustment following output variations is 
slower in France, Belgium and Germany than in the United States, but they cannot 
measure any difference for hour adjustments. Merkl and Wesselbaum (2009) compare 
the relative importance of the extensive and intensive margins in German and American 
labor markets and do not find significant differences. 
In contrast, the present empirical analysis is based on micro data within a single 
country, Canada. Using information on employment and paid overtime from the Ca-
nadian Labor Force Survey, I test whether advance notice requirements affect the de-
mand for paid overtime work. Notice requirements are an important part of employ-
ment protection legislation and vary measurably between Canadian provinces in two 
dimensions : one, notice for individual dismissal and two, additional notice in case of 
collective dismissal. In the spirit of difference in differences techniques, I compare the 
impact of EPL on various subsamples of workers, using strategies devised from the mo-
del's predictions. This allows to include province dummies controlling for unobserved 
province differences in the use of overtime work and their willingness to regulate labor 
contracts. In the first strategy, EPL is interacted with the average layoff rate specifie 
to each activity sector, since employment protection should be more binding for firms 
who need to lay off workers more frequently. In the second strategy, EPL is interacted 
with employment rate variations. The effect of this interaction term should be positive 
since the impact of EPL impact on overtime work should not be uniform over time. 
Rather, EPL increases the need for overtime work when labor demand is high and may 
3. The most recent macroeconomies literature on work hours has documented the significant decrease 
in average working hours in severa! European countries compared to America, but few papers have 
looked at hour variations over time. 
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decrease it when labor demand is low. In other words, labor adjustment costs should 
amplify the correlation between labor demand and overtime hours. A third approach 
exploits the fact that collective notice depends on the number of workers laid off, thus 
indirectly on firm size, a11owing for the comparison of firms of different size within 
provmces. 
The results generally confirm the link between employment protection and the va-
riability of work hours. Individual notice requirements have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on overtime work through their interaction with layoff rates and em-
ployment rate variations. Collective notice requirements have no significant impact on 
over1ime. After brie fly discussing the magnitude of the coefficients, I present robustness 
checks and regressions on subgroups of workers. 
The rest of the paper is as follows : section 2.2 presents the model, section 2.3 
exposes the empirical analysis and section 2.4 concludes. 
2.2 A model of labor force and work time adjustment 
under uncertainty 
The model follows Nickel (1978) in its adjustment process and wage function. I 
introduce uncertainty by allowing two priee levels, following Bertola (1990). Contrary 
Bertola (1990), however, I allow the hourly wage rate to increase with with work hours. 
2.2.1 Structure of the model 
The static model 
Labor n and hours h are perfect substitutes in the production function 
y= y(nh) 
with y (nh) continuous, y'> 0 and y" < 0 embodying decreasing retums to scale. The 
labor cost is 
C=nw (h) 
with w(h) continuous, w(O) > 0, w' > 0 and w" > O. Here, h represents the average 
number of effective hours worked in the firm and w" > 0 means that for a given number 
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of employees, longer average hours increase the portion of employees who will work 
for an overtime pay. A similar wage function is used by Nickell (1978). This approach 
differs from the traditional kinked wage function with every hour un der a threshold paid 
at normal rate and a premium paid for every overtime hour. Appendix B.1.2 provides 
three microeconomie justifications for this choice. I also assume an endless supply of 
workers willing to work for the given wage con tract w ( h). 
The firm is a priee taker on the product market. The instantaneous profits are 
TI = py(nh)- nw (h). (2.1) 
In the benchmark case, work hours can be adjusted at will without cost. I also ex-
plore the case where hours cannot be set lower than a floor hrrun • which is probably 
a more appropriate model for the North American labor market. Note that assuming 
market power would accentuate the decreasing value of labor (nh) , but would not qua-
litatively affect the tradeoff between workers and hours. 
Static solution 
The first order conditions are for hours : 
npy' (nh ) = nw' (h) (2.2) 
and for labor : 
hpy1 (nh) = w (h) (2 .3) 
A simple substitution of 2.3 in 2.2 shows that in this static setting, hours per worker 
would be independent of the priee level, labor or output. It is a realistic result given the 
Jack of correlation between firm size and average work hours per worker : 
hw' (h) = w(h) (2.4) 
Differentiating equation 2.2 shows how ddn is positive. Since a priee increase in-
.P 
creases the marginal value of labor, the firm wants to employ more workers : 
dn 
dp 
_ y_'_( n,-h-.,.) _ > 0 
- py" (nh) h (2.5) 
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Before considering any dynarnics, it is already possible to consider what would 
happen to work hours if the firm was prevented to full y ad just its workforce following 
a priee change. To see this, instead of the full adjustment ~; of equation 2.5, we can 
assume that the firm on! y adjusts parti ally a fraction 1 -a of its full desired adjustment: 
(1- a) _;~Y(~it) h' with 0:; a :; 1. Taking the total derivative of 2.2 and substituting 
dn _ (1 ) y' (nh) . 
dp - -a - py'' (nh)h' we get. 
dh py" (nh) h~; +y' (nh) 
dp w" ( h) - py" ( nh) n 
dh ay' (nh) 
> 0 (2.6) dp w" (h)- py" (nh) n 
Hence, following a priee increase, the if the firm does not increase its labor force 
optimally, it will compensate by also increasing hours per workers. This result applies 
to any dynarnic setup and any type of labor adjustment cost. With this result in rnind, 
the goal of the next section is to illustrate this result in a simple dynamic setting with 
general functional forms for adjustment costs. 
Demand fluctuation 
The demand for the firm's output, as reftected by its sales priee, varies between a 
high priee p and a low priee E.. following a Markov process. There is a probability q of 
switching from p to E.. and probability q_ of switching from E.. to p. This high and low 
bar notation designating a variable when priees are high (75) or low (E_) will be kept 
throughout the model for notation consistency. 
2.2.1.1 Labor adjustment costs 
The madel considers infini tel y lived firms over continuous time. In period t , the 
fi rm inherits workers from an instant ago nt-dt and gets a priee Pt E {75, p} . The firm 
is free to ad just its labor force by 11nt = nt - nt-dt. Adjustment costs are allowed to 
be asymetrical and have general functional fom1s. Hiring costs are denoted ch and the 
fi ring costs is denoted cf. Consider a change in the workforce 11n, have the following : 
- lf11n ;:::: O: 
- ch (11n);:::: 0, c;1 (L1n) > 0 
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-Cf =0 
- If iln ~ 0 
- cf ( iln) ~ 0, cj ( iln) < 0 
-Ch= 0 
We can therefore express adjustment costs as CA (iln) =ch (iln) +Cf (iln). Both ch and 
cf are twice differentiable. 
The shape of these costs will determine the amount and speed of adjustment (see 
Durlauf and Blume (2008) for a review of the most common adjustment costs used in 
macroeconomies). Two cases are possible : graduai adjustment, typically the result of 
convex adjustment costs, or instantaneous adjustment, a corner solution that generally 
results from weakly concave adjustment costs or from the presence of fixed adjustment 
costs. 
With only two priee levels, if the firm adjusts instant! y after a priee shock there will 
also be only two level of workers, and hours. For its simplicity, the derivations showed 
later will consider this case. 
In the presence of convex costs however, the firm can instead prefer to delay la-
bor adjustment over time. Appart from specifie cases 4 , graduallabor adjustment would 
have to be solved through numerical simulations. Note that the results of section 2.2.1 
will always guarantee that following a priee shock, the more a firm delays labor adjust-
ment, the more it will compensate by temporarily adjusting hours in the direction of the 
priee change. 
2.2.1.2 The dynamic optimization problem 
In terms of Bell man equation, the value of the firm V[ (Pt , nr - dt) is its instantaneous 
profits over the instant dt, TI (Pt, nt) dt, minus the la bor adjustment costs, CA ( Llnt) plus 
its expected future value vt+dt (Pt+dr, nt ), discounted by the interest rate r. Intime t +dt, 
if Pt = p, there is a probability q that it will have changed to p_, while conversly, if 
Pt = p, there is a probability q that it will have changed top. The values of the firm for 
- -
each priee level can thus be expressed for p and p_ as : 
4. With gradual labor adjustment, analytical results are possible for the steady state values of labor 
and hours when p =pif fi ring costs are linear, or when p = pif hiring costs are linear. 
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1 
Vt (p, nt-dt) = TI (p, nt) dt- CA (~nr) +- { qVt+dt (p , nt) + ( 1 - q) Vt+dt (p, nt)} 1+r -
(2.7) 
1 
Vt (p ,nt- dt) =TI (p ,nt) dt- CA (~nt)+- {qVt+dt (p ,nt) + (1 - q) Vt +dt (p ,nr)} 
- - 1 +r -
(2.8) 
For simplicity, there is no workers quit, the hiring process is instantaneous and 1 
ignore alternative means of output smoothing, such as shift work or inventory adjust-
ments. The full derivation of the model is shown in technical appendix B .1.1. 
2.2.2 Benchmark results 
To summarize the results, 1 present graphically the firm 's decisions for various va-
lues of linear firing costs . Appendix B.l.l shows that if these adjustment costs are 
neither too concave or too convex, these results hold for any functional form meeting 
the assumptions described in section 2.2.1.1. 
Figure 2.1 (on the left) shows the benchmark case of the firm's choice of labor force, 
hours and output for both priee levels, p and p_, as a function of firing costs. For clarity, 
there are no hiring costs (ch= 0) and firing costs are linear (cj = 0). Plain lines are the 
benchmark mode! while dotted lines show the firm's actions if hours were fixed . 
We first consider the dotted lines. Looking at the labor force adjustments, as seen 
on the upper graph of figure 2.1 , wh en fi ring costs are zero (cf = 0), the firm can freely 
choose its optimal labor force, hiring when priees go up and firing when priees go 
down. But for positive values of firing costs c 1, the firm starts to li mit fi ring, but also 
hiring, to avoid turnover costs. At point A, firing workers is simply too expensive and 
the work force is kept constant regardless of the priee level. Looking at the bottom 
panel of figure 2.1, we see th at output varies most at cr = 0 wh en la bor varies most, 
and remains fixed at point since labor is fixed and hours are not allowed to vary. 
Now let's consider plain !ines showing the same firm 's decisions if both workers 
and hours per workers are allowed to vary. Looking at the middle panel, we see that 
at cf = 0, sin ce no adjustment cost prevents the use of the workers at their marginal 
instantaneous value, hours are kept steady at their optimallevel. This is simply a special 
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case of equations 2 .4's result. For positive Cf, since the firm does not want to adjust its 
workforce full y, it will compensate by adjusting hours as well, using longer work hours 
when priees go up and shorter hours when priees go down. Again, this is a special 
case of the general result showed by equation 2.6. Since the productive loss from not 
adjusting the workforce is now mitigated by the capacity to adjust hours, the point 
where workers are kept constant, point B, occurs for a smaller value of Cf than pointA. 
As for the impact of hours adjustment on the firm output, it is initially ambiguous. But 
close to point A where the number of workers is always fixed, the ftexibility of hours 
allow for output to remain more flexible as weil. 
The general results derived in appendix B.l.l can be summarized as follows: 
- Firing costs : 
- Increase the variation of work hours 
- Decrease the variation of the nurnber of workers and the vari ati on in firm out-
put 
- The probabilities of shocks q and q_ and the interest rate r : 
- Reduce workers turnover an increase hours adjustment. 
- Magnify the impact of adjustment costs on hours. 
As discussed by Bertola (1990), the effect of adjustment costs on average employment 
is ambiguous and depends on the functional forms of the production function . The 
effect on average hours is also ambiguous. The previously discussed effects apply to a 
firm that undergoes labor adjustrnent. 
If adjustment costs are too large, priee fluctuations too small or shocks too frequent, 
labor force will be kept constant (past point A orB of figure 2. 1). Ali output adjustment 
cornes through hours and additional adjustment costs obviously have no impact neither 
workers nor hours. 
2.2.3 Hours regulations : minimum hours 
The assomption of freely adjustable work hours is probably a strong one. As poin-
ted out by Huberman and Lacroix (1996), temporary work hours reductions are more 
common in certain European countries than North America. While European workers 
generally agree to hours reductions since they help to stabilize employment, American 
labor unions since the 1930's have viewed them as arbitrary concessions asked from 
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a = 0.8, ch = 0, cf E [0, 7], ï'j = Cj_ = r = 0.1, Wmin = W = 1. 
workers. As North-American collective agreements progressively included guaranties 
of minimum hours, tenure has become the accepted path to job security while work-
sharing agreements and collective hours reductions have remained mostly out of favor. 
Since the following empirical section uses Canadian data where hour reductions are 
uncommon, it is advisable to verify th at the madel 's results hold even wh en the firm's 
ability to reduce work hours is hindered. The derivations of the firm 's reaction in the 
presence of a floor on work hours are presented in Appendix B .1. 1.4. 
To illustrate the main findings, fi gure 2.2 shows in dashed lines how a floor to hours 
affect the firm's decisions, using otherwise the same functional forms and the same 
parameters as the benchmark case with free hours adjustments. On the central panel 
of the figure, we see that for firing costs Cf superior to point D, the minimum hours 
requirements become binding when the priee is p_. The firm has to keep work hours 
longer than it would like. To compensate for this excess output per worker, the number 
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employees !1 is reduced more than the benchmark case. Un til point B, this floor on hours 
did not impact n and lï, but for cf superior to B, it causes the firm to keep less workers 
working longer, even when the priee is p. To sum up, the priee floor 
- forces the firm to keep more workers when the priee is low and when the priee is 
high (past point B) ; 
- increases turnover rate (between points A and C) ; 
- induces a shift toward longer hours, even when the priee is high (past point B). 
As shawn in Appendix B.L.1.4, with general functional forms, these results are quali-
tatively the same as long as adjustment costs are not too convex or too concave. 
In jurisdictions with minimum hours institutions, work hours should be longer on 
average and worker flows should be greater. We are easily reminded of the contrast 
between sorne European workers enjoying strong employment security, but accepting 
temporary reductions in weekly hours while their American counterpart enjoy a more 
dynamic labor market, but with longer and more stable hours. 
Note that maximum hours regulations also exist in most jurisdictions. For example, 
the European Union member states introduced the Working Time Directive in 1993 
that caps the work week at 48 hours. When binding, a limit on weekly hours forces a 
firrn to compensate by hiring more workers and have them work shorter hours during 
low demand periods. It also forces the firm to rely more on staff adj ustments. However, 
these effects should not be overstated since overtime work is already costly and never 
involves more than a fraction of the workforce. 
2.2.4 Two testable predictions 
The main claim of this paper is that employment protection should increase the va-
riation of work hours. Although a simple cross section anal y sis would be of great value, 
confounding factors or the interplay of many different labor market institutions could 
cause spurious correlations. Instead, in the spirit of difference in differences strategies, 
I will address the risk of endogeneity by exploiting its different effect on different sub-
samples. Note that to compute the impact of employment protection, we will simply 
consider a change in a linear component of firing costs, designated L. 5 
5. Let us redefine the function cf (!ln) = c JO (!ln) + L x !ln, where L is a linear component of cf th at 
will be allowed to vary. 
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First prediction : Employment protection should increase hours variations more 
in sectors with higher layoff rates. 
Pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998), the first mechanism exploits the different 
effect cr should have on various activity sectors. If firms in a certain industry seldom 
tire workers, employment protection should have little impact on their overtime deci-
sion compared to others. 
In terms of the model, consider the different impact cf will have on a firm th at fi res 
workers compared to one that does not. The impact of firing costs on hours variations 
for a firm that tires workers is 
d (li- h.) 
dL 
- q+r ~+~+1 
1 + \}' 
where r and \!' are second order terms that should be small if the second order terms 
of adjustment costs are not too large. 6 The impact on a firm that does not tire workers 
is simply zero. Hence, sectors in which more firms lay off employees should see more 
variations in work time. 7 
Second prediction : Employment protection should increase the demand for 
hours, especially when demand for workers is high. 
The second mechanism exploits the ti me dimension. As seen on figure 2.1, there is 
a positive comovement between employees and hours (li ~ h.) and (n ~ !1_). Moreover, 
with low cr, large variations in workers are accompanied by low variations in hours, 
while for larger cf, hours variations get larger and employment variations get smaller. 
The 'effect' of employment on hours is ~ = ~::::~ and the impact of firing costs on this 
effect is 
.!!_ (t:.h) = .)..__ d (li - h.) _ h- h. 
2 
d (n- !1) 
dL t:.n n - !1 dL (n - !1) dL 
which should again be positive for reasonable curvatures of the adjustment costs 
functions . This mechanism is clearly illustrated by figure 2.1. Hours fluctuations are 
6. [' = r c~ + q + r) c;: (ïï- !1) [!!)(tt) b ( w"(ïï) - py"(nïï)) - ïï.)(ïï) ~ ( w'~!!) - d'l(!!b_))] and 'l' = 
b ( w''(ïï) - ïil' (nlî)) [ (q + r) c;; (n - !1) + qcj (ïï- !1) J + ~ ( w';lltl - pj'~!!!l)) [q:<; (n- !1) + (q + r) cj (n- !1) J 
7. Note that the exact layoff rates and their variations can be due to various parameters such as priee 
variations or shock probabilities and depend on the third derivatives of y ( nh ), w (h) and c 1 (n- !1) . 
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positively correlated to labor demand (since n 2: !1 and h 2: h_). But we can observe how 
ch affects this correlation. When ch is near zero, large fluctuations in labor demand are 
linked to tiny variations in hours, while near point B, small variations in labor demand 
are accompanied by large fluctuations in work hours. 
2.3 Empirical section 
In this section, I use Canadian employee level data to test whether employment 
protection increases work hours variations. Canada is a good context to test hypotheses 
related to employment protection because employment protection differs between pro-
vinces on an important dimension, advance notice requirements, that was exploited by 
several authors. 8 Also, Statistics Canada collects highly detailed labor market data that 
can be compared between provinces. 
2.3.1 Dependant variable : Paid overtime 
Sin ce no firm-level data on work hours is available in Canada at sufficient frequency, 
hours data will be derived from the Canadian Labor Force Survey. Unfortunately, infor-
mation from a single worker is not enough to deduce employment and hours vatiations 
of his employer since individual variations in hours, especially working fewer hours, 
often reflect personal choices like vacations or illness. What we need are variables spe-
cifically related to firm's labor needs. Luckily, the Labor Force Survey has one such 
item : paid overtime. 
In most types of jobs, paid overtirne specifically indicates a higher than normal de-
mand for work. Overtime work signais that a firm would rather have a limited number 
of workers paid at a higher average wage rather than more workers paid at the regular 
wage. In other words, for the firrn, the priee of overtirne is srnaller than the priee of 
extra workers. Of course, labor schedules of different sectors may be affected by other 
factors , but these should be common for the whole sector accros Canadian provinces 
and be accounted for by sector dummies. The precise question regarding paid over-
time was introduced in 1997 with the wording : "Last week, how many hours of paid 
overtime did he/she work at this job ?" The definition of paid overtime is : "any hours 
8. For example Friesen (2001) or Kuhn (1993). 
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worked during the reference week over and above standard or scheduled paid hours , for 
overtime pay or compensation (including time off in lieu) ." 
Almost 60% of employees worked no paid overtime in the reference week, while 
for those who did, the mode was eight hours. If the objective was to model the exact 
number of ovettime hours, the best way to do so would be with a selection model. 
However, since the interest is the demand for overtime hours, not the exact number of 
hours for a particular individual, I collapse the problem in a binary response model : 
overtime work or no overtime work. If a firm needs more hours to complete the daily 
work, it can extend the overtime hours of a handful of workers, but it is also very likely 
to ask for a greater number of them to stay longer. This is especially true if their tasks 
are complementary. Note also that each province has laws imposing minimum rest 
periods, capping the amount of overtime available per employee. Although I consider 
this binary response madel to be more adequate, I will also fit a linear model on the 
number of overtime hours as robustness check. 
2.3.2 Empirical approach 
Given that advanced notice requirements in Canada have not changed since the mid 
1980's, the time dimension cannot be used as a source of variation for EPL. Thus, I 
propose three empirical strategies to measure the impact of employment protection on 
work hours that rely on the variation of EPL's effect on different subgroups of observa-
tions. They will rely on the two strategies derived from theory in section 2.2.4 and, for 
collective notice requirements, its impact that varies between provinces and firm size. 
The goal of these approaches is to allow for the inclusion of province fixed effects to 
addresses the problem of confounding factors or unobserved province characteristics 
both linked to employment protection and overtime work. In other words, it is possible 
that differing cultural attitudes of workers, labor unions and judicial decisions both 
affect the stringency of employment protection and the average work hours within a 
province. But it would be harder to argue that the different work hours between sub-
groups of workers would be linked to a province's legislative process other than by the 
causal relationship implied by the current model. 
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First strategy : Overtime should be used more often when employment protection 
is stringent, especially in sectors with a high layoff rate. 
As detailed in the previous section, the first strategy assumes that employment pro-
tection should be especially stringent for sectors that rely heavily on layoffs, an ap-
proach pioneered by Raj an and Zingales (1998), and used ever since in many contexts. 9 
In a difference in difference analogy, the high lay off sectors are the treatment group and 
the low layoff sectors are the control group. 10 
The latent propensity to work overtime can be expressed as 
0 . * vertlmei P s = 
' ' 
/31 Ind. not. p x Lay off Rates + /32 Coll. not. p f x Lay off Rates 
+/33Coll. not.pf + Y1Empl. rateps + Y2Empl. dev.pst 
+cpind. controlsi + F Ep + FEr + F Es+ Uip 
where Overtimei,p,s is the propensity for overtime work for individual i in province 
p working in sector s. 11 Ind. not.p is the average ad vance notice requirement for in-
dividual dismissal in province p, weighted by average layoff rate by tenure length., 
Coll. not.pf is the advance notification period for collective di smissal s in province p 
for a firm of size f (note th at since province x firm size dummies are not included, Coll. 
not.pf also has to be included on its own) , Layoff Rates is the average "fri ctionless" 
lay off rate of activity sector s, Empl. rateps is the average employment rate for province 
p and sector s, Empl. dev.pst is the quarterly deviation at time t of the employment level 
of sector s in province p from its period average: Empl. dev.pst = Empl. rateps1 - Empl. 
Rateps. ind controlsi is a vector of individual specifie control s. F Ep , F E1 and F Esare 
sets of province dumrnies, time dummies (1 1 year dummies and 4 quarter dumrnies) 
and of sector dummies. The error term is Uip = Vip+ Eip. where Vip is an error term that 
can be correlated within province p and the error term Eip is a idiosyncratic error term 
of individual i. 
9. See for example Micco and Pagés (2006), Cingano et al. (2009) or Ciccone and Papaioannou 
(2006). 
10. Sorne authors using this strategy simply split sectors into two groups : high layoff rates and low 
layoff rates sectors. Apart from avoiding the assumption of a linear relationship , the purpose of such a 
simplification is unclear. Interacting advance notice requirement with layoff rates is both more precise 
and Jess arbitrary. 
11. Individuals can be in the sample more than once, but since the ti me dimension is irrelevant for the 
identification, it is not indicated for clarity 's sake. 
l 
1 
64 Essays on Employment Protection and its Impacts on Workers Well-Being 
Second strategy : Employment protection should Increase the correlation 
between overtime variations and employment variations. 
The model predicts that hours and the labor force used by a firm should both be cor-
related with the demand for its product. But note that if adjustment costs are small, the 
firm should adjust mostly with staff adjustments, while if firing costs are high it should 
adjust mostly using the intensive margin, work hours. Hence, this second identification 
strategy looks at second order effects. 
The Labor Force Survey does not provide any information on the labor demand 
of the worker's employer. However, it is perfectly reasonable to expect demand for 
firms output to be correlated, say within a particular province and industrial sector. 
If so, the demand for workers should be correlated accordingly and have an impact 
on the aggregate labor market. Overtime hours should thus be positively correlated to 
aggregate employment levels. Since the goal is to identify temporary demand shocks, I 
use the quarterly deviation of the employment rate from its sample average. 
The model evaluated becomes: 
J31Ind. not.p x Empl. dev.pst + J3zColl. not.pf x Empl. dev.pst 
Overtimetpst = + J33Coll. not.pf +YI Empl. rateps + rzEmpl. dev.pst 
+<f>ind. controlsi + F Ep + F Et+ F Es+ Uip· 
Note that since the first and second strategies are not mutually exclusive, I also 
include them both in a single regression to see that the coefficients are stable. 
Third Strategy : Comparing the impact of collective notice between provinces 
and firm sizes 
Since collective notice requirements depend on the number of employees fired, this 
dimension can be used on its own to allow for province dumrnies as well. The model is 
0 . * /31 Coll. not. pf + Y1Empl. rateps + yzEmpl. dev.pst vertJ.meipf = 
+ <f>ind. controlsi + F Ep + F Et + F Es+ Uip· 
Additional evidence : Cross province estimates 
Finally, a simple cross-province model will be estimated to see whether employ-
ment protection increases average overtime. Of course, a causal interpretation would 
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be much harder to make in this setting since province dummies cannot be included in 
this model. Ali that can be done is to control for them as much as possible. Specifically, 
Canadian provinces differ substantially in their laws on overtime per se. Among the 
most important ones, the overtime wage is 1.5 times the normal wage rate in seven pro-
vinces whereas in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, it is 1.5 times the 
minimum wage. Additionally, overtime starts after a 40 hours week in Newfoundland, 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia, after 44 hours in New Brunswick, Que-
bec, Ontario and Alberta and after 48 hours in Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia. 
To control for these laws, 1 include in the regression the length of the standard work 
week, along with a dummy for Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. More 
specifie laws exist (see Friesen 2001 for more details) . I also control for the province's 
GDP per capita. The cross province model is 
f31Ind. not.p + f32Coll. not.pf + Y1Empl. rateps + Y2Empl. dev.pst 
Overtime7P = 
+t/Jind. controlsi + ljfprov. controlsP + F E1 + F Es+ Uip· 
2.3.3 Estimation 
Cluster robust standard errors Since Moulton (1986), it is well known that the stan-
dard errors of institutional variables tend to be seriously downward biased when they 
are regressed on micro data. The standard procedure is to correct them by accounting 
for within-group correlation at the level of the variable of interest, which is the pro-
vince level. Keeping in rnind that Moulton's intragroup correlation corrected standard 
errors are quite restrictive in their assumptions, the cluster-robust formula introduced by 
Huber (1967), White (1 980) and Liang and Zeger (1986) 12 are preferred for the hench-
mark estimates since they correct for more general forms of heteroscedasticity 13. This 
also accounts for the autocorrelation within province over time, especially individual 
overtime decisions since households stay in the survey for severa! consecutive months. 
12. The estimated covariance structure for N observations within J groups is 
13. See Hoxby 2005 for a discussion of the difference between the two cluster corrections. 
l 
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Probit and two step estimation procedures To have uniform framework in which 
ail the strategies can be included simultaneously, the empirical models will first be 
estimated by probit. Unfortunately, with few clusters and institutional variables that are 
fixed within cluster, there is still a risk that cluster-robust standard errors be biased, 
a serious concern with only ten provinces. With a fixed variable at the cluster level, 
the cluster-specific error term do not average out even as the within-cluster number of 
observations goes to infinity (see Donald and Lang, 2007 or Wooldridge, 2003). As 
advocated by the authors, a minimum distance approach will be implemented. 
Note that the marginal effect of interacted variables can be misleading when part of 
a non-linear modellike probit. To make marginal effects 's interpretation more transpa-
rent, the first stage of these two step estimates will be modeled as a linear probability 
model. The detailed estimation procedure are described in appendix B .2. 
2.3.3.1 Robustness checks and sub-group estimations 
Although the probit model is considered more appropriate, 1 verify that the results 
hold under simple OLS regressions on the number of overtime hours. Since the interac-
tion of collective notice with layoff rates or employment rates always turned out insigni-
ficant, I make sure that the results still hold with individual notice alone. I also exclude 
the employment rate from the regression since it is potentially related to both employ-
ment protection and overtime work. Finally, I perform estimations on subsamples of 
the data, looking at various firm sizes. 
2.3.4 Right band side variables 
Advance notice requirements in Canada 
In Canada, most dimensions of employment protection legislation have been shaped 
by case law and are generally difficult to quantify. Fortunately, the advanced notice 
requirements adopted during the 1970's and 1980's are a notable exception. As shown 
in table B.2 of appendix B.3, they vary between provinces along two dimensions : 
protection against individual dismissals and protection against collective dismissals . 
The length of individual notice requirement is proportional to a worker's seniority. 
But this dimension will not be used, simply because there is no a priori reason for a 
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firm to give more ove1time work to senior employees. Hence, provincial averages will 
be used. 14 
Contrary to individual notice, advance notice for collective dismissal is a function 
of the number of di smissed employees. With only the firm size as relevant information , 
the simplest approach is to assume that a firm with n employees faces potential notice 
requirements for layoffs of up to n employees. Given that mass layoffs often occur as a 
result of firm closures, this does not seem like an unfair assumption. 
The construction of individual and collective advance notice requirement indices 
from the specifie laws is shown in table B .3 . Note that since advance notice require-
ments do not cover employees in seasonal jobs, temporary contracts or construction 
sector contracts, they are removed from the sample. 
Layoff rates A good measure of layoff rates can be obtained directly from the LFS . 
The layoff rate is simply the number of workers who have been fired (i.e. have been 
unemployed for a certain time lap after a lay off) divided by the number of employed 
workers. Since layoffs are a flow, the shortest time lap is best. Otherwise, unemployed 
workers start to fi nd new jobs and the flow becomes a stock. The best compromise bet-
ween a short time lap and an appreciable sample size must be based on the rate at which 
unemployed workers fi nd new jobs. Figure B .3 shows the distribution of unemployment 
durations for workers who suffered a permanent layoff due to business conditions (ca-
tegories 12 and 13 of table 8.4) from a private sector job with permanent contract. Up 
to four weeks in unemployment, the frequency is stable, suggesting that few of them 
find work. This pattern is the same for every industrial sector taken separately. Hence, 
layoff rates are computed with workers who lost their job within two weeks ago, but 
robustness checks will also be tried as robustness check. 
14. To compute these averages, the most natural set of weights is the proportion of layoffs in each 
seniority category, since it accounts for both the average fraction of workers in each category and the 
actual chance of being fired. But obviously, different employment protection between provinces will 
influence workers' seniority. In a province with higher EPL, workers will be fired Jess often, accumulate 
more tenure and enjoy even more protection through this feedback mechanism. Computing average 
individual protection using province specifie weights on tenure lengths would de facto take this into 
account. This might be fine in princip le, but sin ce I am interested in the impact of laws them selves - and 
this effect is itself patt of their jmpact - I will instead weight by country average layoff ratios for each 
tenure. Still, I will use province specifie weights as robustness checks, noting that either set of weights 
changes the average only very slightly. As for the measure of layoffs, it will be discussed thoroughly in 
the fo llowing section . 
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A net advantage of layoff rates computed from the LFS is that the LFS records 
the precise reason for which the job was terminated. By contrast, firm-level data rarely 
states when a layoff was motivated by economie conditions. Instead, researchers often 
use the net number of separation or turnover as a proxy for it, lumping layoffs for any 
causes and quits together. But as shown by table B.4, economie layoffs only represent 
a mere 16% of alljob separations. 
Unfortunately, there is no way in the Labor Force Survey to detect layoffs for mul-
tiple job holders or layoffs during the period if a new job was found before answering 
the survey. Additionally, with layoff questions, there is al ways a risk of bias from mis-
reporting the reason of job termination. However, without a priori reason wh y such bias 
should be different between provinces, it should not affect the outcomes of interest. 
Since almost no province require ad vance notice requirements for temporary layoffs, 
I ex elude them from the computation of the lay off rates. Of course, seasonal jobs, tem-
porary contracts, self-employed and public sector workers are also excluded. 
Controls The employment rate is a necessary control, capturing the general demand 
for work, which could affect both overtime use an legislative processes. In the theore-
tical model of section 2.2, the labor supply is assumed infinite. In general equilibrium 
however, if firms have a hard time meeting thcir labor needs purely because of labor 
market tightness, they could use overtime to also avoid search an recruitement costs . Of 
course, there is a real risk that the employment rate may itself be affected by employ-
ment protection, although the literature is not settled on this issue (see OECD Employ-
ment Outlook 2004). To address this uncertainty, 1 split the employment rate into long 
term province x activity sector specifie employment rate (Empl. Rateps) and its quar-
terly deviation from the sample mean (Empl. dev.psd : Empl. dev.pst = Empl. ratepsr-
Empl. Rateps · The quarterly deviation does not present any problem because it is or-
thogonal to the time invariant provinciallaws. Since the average unemployment rate is 
potentially endogenous, it will be included but estimates without it will be presented as 
robustness checks. I use employment rates that are activity sector specifie to make sure 
that the diversity of industrial compositions in each Canadian provinces is accounted 
for and because the sector x province is the fundamental unit of identification. 
At the individual leve], controls include sex, age dummies, employee tenure, firm 
size dummies, industrial sector dummies, occupation type dummies, and the type of 
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union membership, all described in appendix B.3. 
To increase the model's precision, 1 also add nine year and four quarter dumrnies to 
capture seasonal variation. 
2.3.5 Results 
Table 2.1 shows the benchmark results of the probit estimation. Table 2.2 shows the 
minimum distance estimates using a linear probability modelas the first stage. 
2.3.5.1 First identification strategy 
Column 2 of table 2.1 shows the first identification strategy which interacts ad-
vance notice requirements with sectorial layoff rates. The coefficient for individual 
notice x Layoff Rate is highly significant, but the interaction of collective notice with 
layoff rates is not significant. These results are confirmed by the minimum distance 
estimates in column 1 of table 2.2. 
The linearity of the model of table 2.2 makes it straightforward to interpret. Consi-
der the difference of impact of a 1 week increase in individual notice requirernent (it is 
the difference between New Brunswick and Saskatchewan). For a sector with a layoff 
rate 0.0035 points higher than another sector (the standard deviation is .0035), the in-
crease in the likelihood that a worker is asked to work overtime is 1 * 0.0035 * 5.695 = 
0.02 points. Given that the average proportion of overtime workers is 10%, this is a 
20% increase of the number of overtime workers. This number is substantial given that 
advance notice requirements are only one aspect of employment protection. 
Of course, this number is a second order effect. We would like to get a sense of the 
first order effect of employment protection for each sector, which is the su rn of the ave-
rage first order effect and the interacted effect. The average first order effect cannot be 
identified while controling for province dummies, so we will have to be cautious when 
interpreting it. To compute it, column 2 of table 2.2 presents the same estimation, repla-
cing province fixed effects with average individual and collective notice requirements, 
as weil as and province controls. As shown in column 2, doing so reduces slightly the 
magnitude of the impact of individual notice x lay off rate to 4.177, but it is still signi-
ficant. Table 2.3 presents these first order effects for a Jow layoff rate sector and for a 
high layoff rate sector. The impact of individual notice on workers in low layoff rate 
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sectors is not significant, but for workers in high layoff rates sectors, it is positive and 
significant. A one week increase in individual notice is associated with a 3.4 point in-
crease in the probability of overtime work, or a 34% increase of the number of overtime 
workers. 
2.3.5.2 Second identification strategy 
Column 3 of table 2.1 presents the second identification strategy interacting ad vance 
notice requirements with the deviation of the employment rate. In agreement with the 
madel, the correlation between overtime work and employment deviation is amplified 
by individual notice requirements. Notice for mass layoff interacted with employment 
rate deviation has no effect. 
Column 3 of table 2.2 confirms the probit estimates. Using table 2.2's estimates, 
we can compute the impact of a temporary increase of the layoff rate for different 
levels of individual notice requirements, shawn in column 3 and 4 of table 2.3. For 
a low notice province where average individual notice is 1.28, the impact of a one 
point increase in employment rate (at the average collective notice of 5.47) is 0.01 * 
(0.1947 * 1.282 - 0.01962 * 5.471- 0.1576) = -0.000154. For a long individual no-
tice province where individual notice is 2.36, the impact of an increase 0.01 * (0.1947 * 
2 .355-0.01962 * 5.471 - 0.1576) = 0.00193. Hence, as shawn in table 2.3, the corre-
lation of employment rate and overtime work is essentially zero for low EPL provinces, 
but it is positive and significant for high EPL provinces. In these provinces, a one point 
increase in employment rate is accompanied with a 0.00193 / 0.1 = 1.9% increase in 
the number of overtime workers. 
Column 1 of table 2.1 presents both strategies within the same regression, confir-
ming that they are independent and one does not affect the other. 
2.3.5.3 Third identification strategy 
Column 4 of table 2.1 suggests that when controlling for province effect and firm 
size effect, collective notice increases the likelihood of overtime work on its own. Ho-
wever, the minimum distance estimation shawn in table 2.2, column 4 shows that this 
coefficient is not very stable and that its standard error is larger than the earlier es-
timation would suggest. This echoes Friesen (2005)' s findings that individual notice 
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requirements greatly reduce the likelihood of layoffs for Canadian workers, but that 
collective notice requirernents had no discernible impact. 
2.3.5.4 Cross-provinc~ estimates 
Colurnn 5 of table 2.1 shows that neither individual nor collective notice require-
ments are significant in a cross province setting. It confirms the suggestion of figure 2.5 
that shows a cross section of the fraction of employees working paid overtime against 
average individual and average collective notice requirements for each province. The 
relation is slightly positive with individual notice requirements , and inexistent for col-
lective layoffs. All else being equal, a positive relation could have been expected, al-
though as previously discussed, possible endogeneity precludes any causal relationship 
here. 
2.3.5.5 Robustness checks and sub sample regressions 
Table 2.4 shows vari()US robustness checks, counterfactuals and subsample regres-
sions for the same specification as table 2.1' column 1 that combines both strategies. 
Colurnn 1 fits the same model, but through a linear mode] on the exact number 
overtime hours, including the zeros. Although less significant, especially for individual 
notice interacted with layoff rates, the results are qualitatively the same. 
Colurnn 2 confirms that the interacted individual notice is still significant, even 
when excluding collective notice from the model. 
Colurnn 3 excludes average employment rate, likely to be correlated both with no-
tice requirements and overtime, but this has no di scemible impact on the coefficients of 
interest. 
Colurnns 4 through 6 split the sample by firm size, with column 6 Jumping together 
the firms of 100 to 500 employees with the 500+ employees. The effect of collective 
notice is absorbed by the firm size dummies for column 4 and 5, but remains for column 
6. For individual notice x layoff rate, the impact of individual notice is strongest for me-
dium sized firms (20 to 99 employees). As for the interaction of individual notice with 
employment rate deviati()n, it is slightly larger but much less significant for medium-
sized firms . Collective n()tice interacted with layoff rates is negatively correlated with 
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overtime work in small firms which Jacks a clear interpretation given that these firms 
are hardly concerned with mass layoffs. 
Finally, colunm 7 and 8 compare the impact of notice requirements on overtime for 
union members (orthose covered by a union) or non-members. The impact is compa-
rable for both groups. This is understandable given that unions should tend to make 
jobs safer and regulate more the use of paid overtime. 
2.3.6 Discussion 
Outside the realm of proper experimental settings, it is al ways risky to speak of cau-
sal links. However, thanks to these three identification strategies, a confounding factor 
linked to employment protection and overtime work would have to be felt especially 
by workers in sector with high layoff rates, in high labor demand periods, or in !ar-
ger firms. As for reverse causality, it seems even more unlikely since this legislation 
has existed since the 1980's and would have to assume that overtime work in a single 
sector had influence on the legislative process of an entire province. 
One could still ask whether these findings capture a real relationship or could they 
be due to pure chance. Are advance notice requirements really binding for firms ? In 
the Canadian context, the general consensus is that they are. Friesen (2005) points out 
that notice periods may force firms to employ a worker under its marginal productivity, 
especially since the prospect of being laid off may reduce his motivation. The worker 
could also leave abrupt! y if he finds a new job bef ore the end of the notice period. Ci ting 
Jones and Kuhn (1995), she also notes that many Ontarian firms prefer to pay the wage 
equivalent of the notice period in severance payments instead of keeping them for the 
mandatory period, a clue that advance notice periods are a significant burden for them. 
Furthermore, Wasmer (2006) points out that notice requirements do not stand alone, 
but are part of a larger body of employment protection legislation and customs. They 
are the end product of severa] legal decisions that reftect the general attitude of each 
province vis-à-vis layoffs for economie reasons. He also shows how individual and col-
lective advance requirements are correlated with the Index of labor Market Regulation 
compiled by the Fraser Institute. This index incorporates several dimensions such as 
the processes of certification and decertification ; arbitration process ; union security ; 
successor rights ; treatment of technology ; replacement workers ; third-party picketing ; 
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and openness of the provinciallabor Relations Boards." 15 
Finally, thanks to LFS data on layoffs, it is actually possible to use the present 
data to verify the link empirically. Figure 2.5 shows monthly permanent layoff rates 
as a function of the provincial individual and collective advance notice requirements. 
For individual dismissals, the relationship is clearly negative, whereas it is unclear for 
collective dismissal. These stylized results match the more formal conclusions of Frie-
sen (2005) that individual ad vance notice requirements reduces layoffs in the Canadian 
context. 
2.4 Conclusion 
By restricting the leeway of labor management, employment protection reduces 
the risk of layoffs for employed workers, as documented by ample empirical research. 
However, if firms try to offset these restrictions by tampering with work schedule and 
increasing overtime work, these laws can have adverse side effects for employees. In 
a mode] of labor adjustment under fluctuating priees, 1 showed how an increase in 
dynamic costs to labor adjustment generate fluctuations in work time. 
These results help explain how firms in highly regulated labor markets can remain 
competitive by adjusting labor through the intensive margin. They also show how "at-
will" employment doctrines combined with restrictions to downward work hours ad-
justments can explain the high turnover rates observed in American labor markets . 
1 tested two stylized predictions from the mode], using overtime data from the Ca-
nadian Labor Force Survey and differences in Canadian advance notice requirements 
legislation. The impact of individual advanced notice requirements on overtime work 
is positive and statistically significant when interacted with layoff rates or with em-
ployment rate variation. The extra notice requirement in case of mass layoff is not 
significant. 
Of course, Canada is a North American economy with rather low employment pro-
tection. This analysis should be replicated in other contexts such as OECD countries, 
ideally using high frequency firm leve] data on employment and hours. However, since 
firm data of this kind is sel dom available, this paper showed how to approach the ques-
tion indirectly using detailed employee data from labor surveys. 
15. See Clemens et al. (2003). 
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Finally, these findings should not be construed as advocating for the withdrawal 
of employment protection legislation. Rather, they highlight additional concerns that 
policy makers and labor unions should keep in rnind when choosing between EPL 
and other labor market institutions such as unemployment insurance. For workers, they 
reftect the trade-off between the risk of becoming unemployed and variable work sche-
dules. 
Do workers pre fer stable hours or stable employment ? Modeling this trade-off more 
formally should be part of future work. For now, the increasing popularity of work-
sharing programs 16 suggests that a growing number of Canadian workers may prefer 
collective reductions in work hours instead of selective layoffs, especially during eco-
nomie downturns. For employers, work-sharing is a way of avoiding costly layoffs and 
the loss of experienced workforce while waiting for demand to rise again. These pro-
grams should stabilize employment during economie slowdown. Their macroeconomie 
impact has received little attention to this date also point to future research paths. 
16. Work-Sharing programs are designed to allow managers and employees to agree on a temporary 
reduction of work hours to a void temporary layoffs during economie downtums. They must be approved 
by the Employment Insurance Commission and range between 6 and 26 weeks, up to at most 38 weeks. 
Similar programs also exist in other OECD countries. They are present in 17 U.S . States, but few 
companies use them because the state contribution is not large enough to make them attractive. On the 
contrary, they are important in many European country's strategy to stabilize employment. For example, 
in German y, if a worker sees his work hours reduced, the pro gram replaces 60% of his !ost in come. 
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2.5 Tables and figures 
TABLE 2.1: Paid overtime, pro bit 
Dep. Variable : Pro bit 
Works overtime0 Ali Strat. 1 Strat. 2 Coll. Between 
2 3 4 5 
Ind. not./ x Layoffrates' 32.21 *** 32.35*** 
(8.34) (8 .34) 
Coll. not.p/ x Layoff rate5 0.42 0.42 
(0.35) (0.35) 
Ind. not.p x Empl. dev.pu e 1.03*** 1.07*** 
(0.36) (0.37) 
Coll. not.pf x Empl. dev.pst 0.00 0.00 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Collective noticepf 0.02 0.02 O.OJ ** O.OJ ** -0.004 
(0.01) (O.O J) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003) 
Empl. rateps f -0.11 -0 .12 0.60 0.59 0.55 
(0.47) (0.48) (0.42) (0.43) (0.50) 
Empl. dev.psr -1.37* 0.69*** -1.47* 0.68*** 0.68*** 
(0.76) (0. 17) (0.78) (O. J7) (O.J8) 
Individual noticep -O.J9 
(0.11 ) 
lnd. controJs8 y y y y y 
Activity sector dummies y y y y y 
Firm size dummies y y y y y 
Province dummies y y y y 
Ti me dummies" y y y y y 
Province controlsi y 
Number of observations 4 379 885 4 379 885 4 379 885 4 379 885 4 379 885 
Number of clusters 10 JO JO JO JO 
Adj usted R2 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.091 
(cluster robust std. error in parenthesis) ; *** p< O.O 1, ** p< 0.05, • p< O. I 
" Dummy for overtime work 
b Average provincial advance notice requirement for individuallayoffs, weighted by the countrywide tenure layoff rate. 
c ' Frictionless ' ac ti vity sector layoffrate 
d Provincial ad vance notice requirement for collective layoffs, firm sizc specifie 
• Quanerly deviation from the provincexactivity sector specifie average employment rate for the period. 
f Province x activity sector specifie average employment rate for the period . 
g Contrais includes employee tenure, firm size dummies, age dummies, occupation type dummies and contract type 
dummies . 
" lnclude year and quaner dummies 
1 lncludes a dummy for NS, NB and NF, where the overtime premium is equal to one and a half times the mi nimum 
wage. Also includes for the provincial number of hours in the standard work week and provinces GDP per capita. 
Only incl ude private sector employees wi th pemtanent conrract in non-seasonal jobs. Excludes construction workers. 
·. 
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T ABLE 2.2: Paid overtime, 2-step linear probability model 
Dep. Variable : 2 nd stage of 2-step linear probability mode! 
Works overtimea Strat 1 Strat 1, margi Strat 2 Coll. Between 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ind. not./ x Layoff rate/ 5.695*** 4.177** 
(1.601) (1 .615) 
Coll. not.p d x Layoff rates -0.205 -0.201 
(0.164) (0.131) 
Ind. not.px Empl. dev. pst e 0.195** 
(0.077) 
Coll. not. Px Empl. dev. 1JSt -0.020 
(0.012) 
Individual noticep 0.154** -0.011 
(0.060) (0.012) 
Collective noticepf 0.000 
(0.001) 
Collective noticep -0.008 -0.000 
(0.005) (0 .001) 
Empl. dev.pst -0.158 
(0.139) 
Ind. controlsg y y y y y 
Activity sector dummies y y y y y 
Firm size dumrnies y y y y y 
Province dummies y y y 
Province contrais y y 
Time dummieslz y y y y y 
Province controlsi y y y y y 
Number of observations 312 312 509 40 10 
Number of clusters 10 10 10 10 
R 2 0.823 0.805 0.675 0.901 0.747 
(std. error in parenthesis); *** p< O.Ol , ** p<0.05, * p <O. l 
a Oum my for overtime work 
b Average provincial ad vance notice requirement for individuallayoffs, weighted by the countrywide tenure layoff rate. 
c ' Fri ctionless ' activity sector layoff rate 
d Provincial ad vance notice requirement for individual layoffs. firm size specifie 
'Quarterly deviation from the provincexactivity sector specifie average cmployment rate for the period. 
f Prov ince xactivity sector specifie average employment rate for the period. 
g Contrais includes employee tenure, firrn size dummies, age dummies, occupation type dummies and contract type 
dummies. 
h Jnclude year and quarter dummies 
; lncludes a dummy for NS, NB and NF, where the overtime premium is equal to one and a half times the minimum 
wage . A Iso includes for the provincial number of hours in the standard work week and provinces GDP per capi ta. 
jThis spec ification is used for the next table 's estimates. lnstead of province dummies. it 
includes prov ince controls described in secti on 2.3.2. 
Only include private sector empl oyees with permanent contract in non-seasonal jobs. Excludes construction workers. 
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TABLE 2.3: Paid overtime, marginal effects (2-step lin proba model) 
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 
Var. (col. 2) (col. 3) 
At Layoff rates Layoff rates Ind. not.p Ind. not.p 
= -.0410 = -.0287 = 1.28 =2.36 
1 2 3 4 
Ind. notice -.017 .034** 
(.012) (.016) 
Coll noticep .0003 -.0022 
(.0004) (.0016) 
Empl. dev. psr -.015 .194*** 
(.051) (.045) 
(std. error in parenthesis); *** p< O.Ol, ** p< 0.05, * p< O. l 
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Chapitre 3 
Employment Protection Laws and 
Work Stress 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of employment protection on workers' stress 
and well-being. Employment protection legislation (EPL) helps in securing wor-
kers in partial equilibrium, by lowering the risk of job Joss, but may have adverse 
effects too. Costly separations may induce firms to exert pressures on workers or 
rai se the intensity of monitoring. 
We undertake an exhaustive empirical analysis to verify whether stress in-
creases or decreases with employment protection, using seven international sur-
veys and one national health survey. The effects are heterogeneous across sec-
tors and components of EPL. We obtain positive and significant effects of EPL 
on stress in high turnover sectors relative to low turnover sectors with a causal 
interpretation. The net effect is positive in high turnover sectors and sometimes 
negative in lower turnover sectors. The positive effect of EPL on stress cornes 
from collective layoff regulations, restrictions on the use of temporary contracts 
and the interaction of said restrictions on the use of temporary con tracts with both 
individual and collective employment protection. 1 
1. This chapter is written with Etienne Wasmer 
82 Essays on Employment Protection and its Impacts on Workers WeJJ-Being 
3.1 Introduction 
Is employment protection legislation (EPL) a good deviee for increasing workers' 
well-being ? lt is known from research in labor economies that the answer is often ne-
gative. All else being equal, employment protection increases job duration and might 
therefore be beneficiai to currently employed workers. However, it is also well establi-
shed that EPL redu ces the hiring of permanent employees. That is, it fails to increase the 
well-being of outsiders, i.e. non-employed workers and workers not covered by EPL, 
including temporary workers, part-timers and those under probationary periods. On the 
positive side, employment protection also protects specifie human capital investments 
and secures workers, as it cao be a substitute for private insurance against layoffs in a 
world of imperfect insurance markets, given the numerous moral hazard problems. 2 
EPL may, however, also have additional and unexpected adverse effects : in the 
same way that divorce costs may force couples to stay together in spite of chronic 
confticts, employment protection may exacerbate strain and tension within firms. The 
most obvious example is the case of an economically non-viable job. To save on layoff 
costs, firms may pressure workers to leave. Firms may even induce workers to quit by 
decreasing the quality of work environments and, in extreme cases, harassing workers. 
But even in a productive job, firms may react to high layoff taxes by adjusting monito-
ring methods, routines, workplace organization and management techniques in a way 
unfavorable to workers' well-being. None of these outcomes is particularly gratifying 
for workers, potentially resulting in increased stress and job dissatisfaction. 
We identified seven recent international surveys containing information on stress 
at work : the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) of 2003 ; the International So-
cial Survey Program (ISSP) of 1997 and 2005; the Eurobarometer of 1996 and 2001 
and the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) of 2000-2001 for EU candi-
dates and 2005. These surveys contain three different stress-related questions. In the 
EWCS 2000-01 and 2005, and in Eurobarometer 1996, the question was "Does your 
2. See Lazear (1990), Burda (1992), Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) and Autor et al. (2006) for the 
effect of EPL on employment and wages , Mortensen and Pissarides (1 999) for the effects on worker tur-
nover and job creation, Delacroix and Wasmer (2006) for investments in specifie human capital , Pissa-
rides (2001) and Blanchard and Tirole (2008) for EPL as a substitute for insurance in imperfect markets , 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) for the effect on discrimination, Ichino and Riphahn (2005) for the effect 
on absenteeism, Saint-Paul (2002) for the effect of EPL on international trade and specialization and 
Belot et al. (2007) for the effect on productivity and welfare, among many others. 
r 
1 
- ------------ ------------------------------------
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work affect y our health? If yes, how ?", where stress is a possible answer. In the ISSP 
1997 and 2005, and in Eurobarometer 2001, the question was "How often do you find 
work stressfu1? : A1ways, Often, Sometimes, Hard1y ever, Never ?". Finally, in EQLS 
2003, the question was "My work is too demanding and stressful : Strongly Agree, 
Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree" . An additional data-
base, the Canadian National Population Health Survey, NPHS hereafter, can be used 
to investigate the relations between EPL and stress, using cross-province differences in 
employment protection. AU surveys can be used to establish the sign of a correlation 
of stress indicators with the OECD Employment protection legislation index (OECD 
2004). 
Causal inference, however, requires additional information : it has to deal with the 
issue of the endogeneity of employment protection laws across countries or across pro-
vinces. Factors affecting stress in a country (or a region), such as employment or wages, 
may have an influence on the determination of employment protection. We propose two 
strategies. The first uses time variations in EPL, to the extent that they are exogenous 
and provide enough variance. The second one, our and preferred strategy, is based on a 
recent line of research and uses the fact that while EPL may be uniform within a country 
or region, its stringency will differ between activity sectors due to their different layoff 
needs. This idea was pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) in finance, and subse-
quently adapted to several other fields, including labor economies. More precisely, a 
growing body of literature on the macroeconomie impact of employment protection 
has used this exact same strategy (Cingano et al. 2010, Claessens and Laeven 2003, 
Galindo et al. 2003). This amounts to a difference-in-differences approach in which 
the control group would be a low job destruction sector and the treatment group would 
be a high job destruction sector, and the treatment would be a high level of EPL. Of 
course, this strategy and the time variations can be combined, in the equivalent of a 
triple-differences approach. 
This second arder identification strategy based on sectors is widely used, but clearly 
subject to various interpretations. First, as it will be made clear later on, the effect of 
employment protection is an interaction one : The total effect of EPL is the sum of 
the linear effect, applying to all sectors, and the interaction effect, with the degree of 
job destruction of the sectors. Second, if the interaction effect can be interpreted as 
the direct effect of EPL on management on stress as we do, it can also be interpreted 
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in a different way : it could be argued that higher sectoral job destruction rates raise 
stress in countries where EPL is high, because EPL reduces hiring in these sectors. 
This second interpretation is consistent with the view of this paper that EPL may have 
adverse effects even on insiders, but through a general equilibrium effect. The inclusion 
of sector and sector time dummies as well as group-specifie unemployment rates in our 
regressions should however absorb these general equilibrium effects to a large extent. 
Our results are as follows . In all datasets, we find that EPL is either positively and si-
gnificantly correlated with various indicators of stress or uncorrelated. In cross-country 
analysis, we never found a negative and significant correlation between average work 
stress and EPL. When data availability allows for the identification strategy described 
above, we find positive causal effect of EPL in high turnover sectors relative to low 
turnover sectors. The results are robust to the addition of unemployment insurance and 
indicators of collective wage settings institutions as controls. In addition, the total ef-
fects of EPL taking into account the linear effect would vary from positive (in high 
turnover sectors) to negative (in low turnover sectors). As for more specifie compo-
nents of stress, available in Canada, the evidence is less clear-cut and depends on the 
type of employment protection, whether it is protection for individual dismissal or ad-
ditional provisions for mass layoffs. In particular, we find that the perception of risk of 
job loss is reduced by individu al EPL, but hostility at work, the incidence of hectic jobs 
and repetitiveness of tasks are all increased by individual EPL. Collective EPL reduces 
help from colleagues but individual protection increases it. 
Alternative identification strategies, such as diff-in-diff approaches based on large 
policy changes in EPL across provinces or states, such as those used by Autor et al. 
(2006) or Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) in the United States, would provide a very 
useful confirmation of these results . However, US data on work-related stress covering 
the relevant period are difficult to obtain. The only surveys with workplace stress and 
information on state of residence only cover the.post-2002 period. Unfortunately, there 
is little or no variation in EPL across US states posterior to 2002. Renee, this research 
agenda is left to future work. 
Beyond, one of this paper's conclusions is that the quality of labor relations is adver-
sely affected by labor regulation. This confirms the importance of industrial relations 
and, further, of trust in the social relationships between unions and employers, as em-
phasized in Blanchard and Philippon (2004 ). Our paper suggests that EPL does genera te 
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individual confticts and poor industrial relations, which provides a possible explanation 
for the poor quality of labor relations in European countries with high EPL. It is also 
consistent with improvements in British industrial relations, as indicated by Blanchard 
and Philippon (2004, p. 24), following the experience of Thatcher's deregulation in 
the 1980s. Another of this paper's !essons pertains to the need to understand and ge-
neralize other results regarding EPL's paradoxically adverse consequences : recently, 
Postel-Vinay and Saint-Martin (2005), Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009), and Deloffre 
and Rioux (2004) have documented, using the European Community Panel survey, a 
strong negative link between perceived job security and employment protection. The 
ISSP and the NPHS data used here contain specifie questions on how respondents per-
ceive the risk of losing their job and the stress this perceived risk provokes. Our paper 
investigates the sarne question posed as a special case by these three papers. 
The paper is organized as follows . Section 3.2 develops the economies of stress 
and EPL. Section 3.3 develops the empirical strategy. Section 3.4 investigates, with a 
cross-sectoral cross-country identification strategy based on Eurobarometer 1996 and 
the EWCS 2000-01 and 2005, the links between EPL and work-related stress causing 
health disorders. based on Eurobarometer 1996 and the EWCS 2000-01 and 2005 Sec-
tion 3.5 uses Canadian health data to go deeper into the analysis of the components 
of job stress, using an identification based on provincial differences in EPL interacted 
with sectoral job destruction rates. Section 3.6 provides additional insights from all 
three surveys by using harassment data, work disorder data and the fear of job loss. 
Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 Mechanisms 
3.2.1 Economie intuitions 
To develop the main theoretical points, let us reduce EPL to the area pertaining to 
its main economie impact, namely, pure taxes on layoffs. Two potentially important 
aspects of EPL are thus ignored : its redistributive side between firm and worker, the 
impact of which is generally neutra! because it is internalized in wages (Lazear 1990, 
Burda 1992), and the complexity for firms involved in laying off for fault. 
We surnrnarize here the economie intuitions of EPL's impact when firrns are in a 
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position to affect workers' environments, for better or for worse, based on a madel 
developped fully in Appendix C.4. The model's mechanisms can be sumrnarized as 
follows. Jobs and workers match in period 1 ; at the end of the period 1, the firm and 
the worker know the productivity of the match and the utility of the worker in this 
match. Based on this, continuation or separation decisions are taken. Separation can be 
implemented in severa] ways . The firm can fire the worker for economie reasons (that 
is, a no-fault layoff denoted by NF-layoff). This has a cast -r to the firm, a part of it is a 
pure tax, a part is a severance payment to the worker. The firm can also try to save on 
firing costs in two different ways : first, by attempting to layoff for fault or for cause (a 
F-layoff), which has no direct cost but has uncertain success, and second, by letting the 
worker quit. In the case of a quit, there is no cast of separation for the firm. 
Each period, the worker chooses an effort level eon the job, and receives a wage w. 
The wage is assumed to be exogenous. 3 Overall, the flow utility of a worker is 
%' = w + ( -[c(e) +q111 ] + qw + V ) , 
wage disutility from effort and of monitoring firm' s effort to affect 'Pl random utthty of match 
non-pecuniary component of the job 
(3 .1 ) 
where the utility of the worker is reduced by c(e) + qm, where qm 2:: 0 is the intensity 
of monitoring, and c( e) is increasing convex in effort. The quantity qw is a variable 
chosen by the firm to affect the utility of the worker. It is interpreted as the quality of 
the working environrnent. This quantity can be either positive or negative. In addition, 
v is a random variable reftecting unknown factors ex-ante, such as the quality of the 
relationship of the worker with his/her colleagues or with the management. The mode-
ling choices imply that monitoring and working conditions are perfect substitutes and 
th us, in this case, are formally the same "abject". The quantity qm- qw +v reftects the 
general environment of the firm, which is bath random through v and chosen by the 
firm through the q's. 
3. By this exogeneity assomption, we want to prevent employers to eut down the wage so that the 
worker would necessarily quit at zero cost for the finn. This assomption is meant to capture the fact 
that such an explicit behavior by firms is limited by nominal downwards wage rigidity. The fact is that a 
strong wage eut may be as effic ient as bullying to make workers quit, but this can be detected by a judge 
much more easily and th us ex-post qui te costly. We will come back on this point in the conclusion of this 
Section. 
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The worker can obtain a level of utility %' outside the firm. This level of utility 
depends a priory on search frictions and is lower in a more sclerotic labor market, 
although we do not explicitthis link in the paper. Th us, if not fi red, the worker will quit 
the firm at the end of period 1 if utility on the job in period 2 is lower than %'. 
On the firm 's side, monitoring and affecting working conditions is not costless. Let 
C(qm,qw) be the cost function with q111 ~ 0 and qw ~ O . The monitoring intensity qm 
is set each period. In contrast, working conditions are persistent through the two per-
iods, and are decided in period 1. 4 So, by the cost of qw, we re fer here to the cost 
paid in period 1, which does not have to be repaid in period 2. The cost function is 
assumed increasing and convex in both arguments. Further, the minimum cost is rea-
ched in C(O, 0) = O. This means that it costs sorne money to affect-either positively or 
negatively-the working conditions of the worker. Note that the cost of a negative qw 
can be interpreted as a reputation cost. 
The effort of the worker enters linearly in the revenue function, as a normalization. 
There is a random productivity component denoted by ê . So, overall , the fl ow profit of 
the firrn is 
n = e - w - C(rl\qw) + E 
worker's effort to affect TC wage cos t from monitoring and working conditions random product ivity of match 
Compared to the NF-layoff, the F-layoff has two additional features. First, it gene-
rates additional stress to the worker, denoted by L. and entering negatively in the utility 
function. It can be thought as the supplementary cost of effort to bring the case to an 
arbitrage court. Second, it is a random procedure. In many cases, such labor conflicts 
are arbitrated by an outside party (judge, semi-professional court) and the decision, ba-
sed on severa! informai factors and cannot be perfectly anticipated. We will denote by 
F the probability of success of this procedure, where F depends on the effort of the 
worker and the moni toring intensity of the fi rm. Figure 3.1 conveniently summarizes 
the partition in a diagram representing the productivity of the match and the utility of 
the worker. The existence of positive layoff costs -r creates an incentive to F-layoff. 
This arises with a probability monotonie in -r/(1- F ), thus higher with -rand F. The 
existence of stress from being in a F-layoff procedure creates an additional incentive to 
quit to avoid such a procedure. This arises with a probability monotonie in I./(1- F), 
thus higher with L, and F. 
4. This is not important : what matters is that the firm sets qw before the information on productivity 
and idiosyncratic utility is revealed. 
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FIGURE 3.1: Phase diagram of separation 1 non-separation decisions where '! is the 
layoff cost, r. is the stress from a layoff for fault and F is the success (for the firm) of a 
layoff for fault. 
Overall, the model delivers a relation between the lay off cost '!and the non-pecuniary 
pmi of the present discounted value of utility of the worker, which may be positive ( we 
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call thise the ''job security effect"), or negative. Broadly speaking, the negative effects 
fall into two categories, partial equilibrium effects and general equilibrium effects. 
In partial equilibrium, the first effect of EPL cornes from the fact that firing is a 
worker discipline deviee in a moral hazard context (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984b ). As 
laying off becomes increasingly expensive or difficult, managers may instead have to 
resort to psychological pressure to ensure workers effort, thereby increasing stress. One 
can group these mechanisms under the label "psychological pressure effect". The lat-
ter generates a positive link between individual EPL (as opposed to collective EPL, 
applicable in the event of mass layoffs) and stress. 
A second set of mechanisms arises when jobs are nonviable, i.e. in recessions or 
when a task becomes obsolete. In such cases, an efficient labor market would require 
firing for economie reasons (no-fault layoff). As this becomes more costly, the firm with 
one or severa] redundant workers negatively affects working conditions. It can also try 
to establish professional faults by raising monitoring intensity and thereby obtaining 
dismissals at lower cast, which potentially generates fmther stress. We call this the 
"harassment effect". Employers pushing employees to quit would be a slightly different 
mechanisrn, referred to as "bullying effect". 
Finally, in general equilibrium, EPL reduces labor turnover : it reduces the rate 
of job separations, resulting in firms opening fewer positions. This lengthens periods 
of unemployment and possibly raises the quasi-rent associated with holding a job. In 
terms of stress and well-being, this has two consequences. First, the fear of layoff is 
exacerbated, since workers have more to lose : this is a stress-factor and could presu-
mably explain the results of Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009). 5 The second effect is the 
reduction of gains from quitting. As a result, at the margin, employees do not leave 
firms even when they dislike their jobs, colleagues or managers. This is referred to as 
the "mismatch effect". 
It is worth mentionning a last effect, not present in this static madel, but that could 
be included in a dynamic extension. Indeed, when product demand fluctuates over the 
business cycle, firms have an interest to adjust total hours. The adjustment may occur 
through the extensive margin (employment) or the intensive margin (hours per worker) . 
If layoffs are more costly due to EPL, firms will tend to choose the latter, generating 
5. See also Postel-Vinay and Saint-Martin (2005) and Del offre and Rioux (2004 ). 
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stress from work hours and work Joad fluctuations. 6 We cali this the "workload effect". 
3.2.2 Insights on workplace bullying from other social sciences 
The phenomenon of bullying (harassing, mobbing) has become recognized in se-
veral countries as an important source of workplace stress. This can be described as 
specifie situations in which a victim is repeatedly targeted by negative or offensive ac-
tions over an extended period of time (Einarsen et al., 2003). The incidence of bullying 
varies according to which population was interviewed or to survey methodology. In 
our own dataset of European countries, 7.2% report having experienced buliying or ha-
rassment. Among ali stressors, buliying is one of the best predictor of work stress and 
low self confidence, as evidenced by many studies, including a 2002 analysis by the 
Department of Psychology at the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health among mu-
nicipal employees (Vartia-Vaananen, 2003). These results echo earlier findings by Wil-
son (1991) and Zapf et al. (1996), reviewed in Einarsen (1999). Among consequences, 
Bjorkqvist et al. (1994) find victims reporting insomnia, nervousness, melancholy, apa-
thy, concentration and social problems. 
Organizational rearrangements are often a cause or a factor in the onset of bul-
lying. They can include off-shoring, downsizing, unpaid overtime and plant closures 
(Liefooghe and Davey, 2001). Similarly, a survey of Irish workplaces showed that or-
ganizational changes often lead to buliying (OMoore et al., 2003), as did earlier studies 
(Seigne, 1998; McCarthy, 1996; Sheehan, 1998). Linked to the organization is the fact 
that bullies are mostly supervisors, foliowed by coworkers and subordinates. In their 
meta-analysis, Einarsen et al. (2003) note that out of 25 studies in 10 European coun-
tries, 17 of them fi nd managers to be the first perpetrators. 
In line with the model of the previous section, and according to a 2003 survey 
conducted by the Workplace Bullying and Trauma Institute, 70% of buliied workers 
are ultimately disrnissed or quit by themselves, an eventuality that Leymann (1990) 
called the 'expulsion' stage. Zapf and Gross (200 1) report that buliying victims strongly 
advise other victims to leave the organization. The judicialliterature often refers to this 
'voluntary ' leaving as constructive dismissals. In recent years, several countries have 
6. Lepage-Saucier (2009) shows theoretically and empirically that a higher degree of employment 
regulation leads firrn to vary more hours and Jess employment. It follows that workers may temporarily 
be overloaded, resulting in more stress . 
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included anti-bullying provisions in their employment law (Einarsen et al. (2010) look 
at the cases of Australia, Canada, Quebec, the European Union, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and France). U nfortunately, from the victim' s point of view, 
making the case for a constructive dismissal is not easy, especially without obvious 
changes in working conditions such as pa y cuts or serious task reassignments 7 
In France, Seiler-Van Daal (2000), surveying 1210 employees in Alsace at "Méde-
cine du Travail" in a non-representative sample, found th at 9.6% of the workers met the 
criterion for moral harassment (bullying), although only 7.3 % reported it. It came from 
the hierarchy in 49% of cases, from co-workers in 25% of cases, from both in 17% 
and only in 5% of cases from employees under supervision. lt started after workplace 
reorganization (29% ), leave of absence by the worker (26% ), the arrivai of a new ma-
nager (28%) or after sorne conflict. lt led to various disorders (mood 72%, sleep 70%, 
psychological disorder 52%) and resulted also in anxiety (60%) and abnorma1 fatigue. 
Finally and most relevant for our purpose, the hostility faced by these employees led 
them to leave the firmin 61% of cases, including 44% after a voluntary quit. 
In a study carried out by the IPSOS Social Research Institute, in 2000, based on a 
sample of 471 representative employees, 30% answered yes to the question "Have you 
ev er faced bullying, moral harassrnent ?", including 31% for men , 29% for women, 
30% in the private sector, and interestingly, 29% in public firms, 37% reported having 
witnessed bullying, moral harassrnent, 24% answered yes to "Did your supervisor ever 
avoid or refuse to talk, repeatedly and visibly ?", 16% answered yes to "Did your su-
pervisor ever take away your responsibilites, give your workload to colleagues ?", 12% 
had been once subjected to insults or offending behavior from supervi sor (repeatedly). 
Finally, in line with the model, 12% out of the 30% facing bullies believed that these 
intended to make them leave or move to another branch of the firm without indemnity. 
An official government agency from the French govemment 8 wrote « Recurrent 
observations link the rise in layoff for cause to new human resources management 
practices. In order to avoid mass layoffs (who generally imply risk and litigation), 
layoffs for cause may become one of the va rio us ways to downsize or reallocate workers 
in case of a restructuring. Less visible than layoffs for economie reasons, they may 
7. In the UK, a famous case is Mrs Gaynor Meikle who !ost her case for constructive dismissal in the 
Employment tribunal, but successfully appealed the first instance decision.(Hughes, 2004) 
8. DARES (Research unit from the Ministry of Labor) (2003). «Les nouveaux usages du licencie-
ment pour motif personnel". 
l 
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preserve the reputation of the .finn and would be painless for the "corps social" (social 
body). They may also allow for more finely tuned and selective layoffs. » Indeed, in the 
1990's and early 2000's, there had been a strong decline in economie layoffs in France. 
At the end of the period, layoffs for cause became the second reason of the entry into 
unemployment, with twice as many infiows as the number of layoffs for economie 
reason. 
3.3 Empirical strategy 
3.3.1 The regressor: the OECD Employment protection 
legislation index 
The OECD produces various indicators of employment regulations for each coun-
try. The indicator we will use is the composite indicator, that is, a weighted average 
of the estimated costs imposed on firms from various employment regulations. It is 
meant to be comparable across countries and time. Its three components are i) pro-
tection against individual dismissal, ii) protection against collective dismissal and iii) 
restriction on temporary contracts. The latter dimension is important, because restric-
tions on temporary contracts can force firms to provide permanent contracts with job 
security when they would have preferred not to. Appendix C.2, Table C.l 0 and Figure 
F.3 provide details on EPL in OECD countries. 
3.3.2 Identification 
Our approach to causality follows pioneering work by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
We interact EPL levels withjob destruction rates of the sector of activity of the worker. 
Sectors such as services that experience smaller demand fluctuations and keep a more 
stable workforce should be less affected by stringent employment protection than those 
that require large and frequent layoffs. 9 
9. A growing body of literature on the macroeconomie impact of employment protection has used 
this strategy (Cingano et al. 2010, Claessens and Laeven 2003, Galindo et al. 2003). Turnover is prox.ied 
by the activity sector's natural rate of job destruction, where the natural rate of job destruction is defined 
as the average of job destruction rates of a given sector across countries. 
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The intuition of this method is a difference-in-differences approach. The treated 
workers are those most affected by employment protection. They should be the ones 
working in activity sectors with high job destruction rates . The control group is made 
of workers in sectors with low job destruction rates. The presumption is that EPL is 
country-specifie but common to all sectors of activity within a country. Hereafter, we 
refer to this strategy as a difference-in-differences approach when it is applied to a 
single survey, or as a triple-difference approach when we use the time dimension and 
pool the surveys for the three years. 
The most general econometrie model using the time dimension is : 
WorkStressheallh;,c,s,t = f3tEPLc,t X IDs + J32Xc,t + j33Zi + FEc,t + FEs,t + FEc,s + êi,c,s,t 
(3.2) 
where WorkStresshealth;,c,s,t is the reported stress of individual i , in country c, sector s 
and at time t, EPLc,t is as described earlier the employment protection level of country c 
at time t, IDs is a measure of job destruction of sector sin which individual i works, des-
cribed in subsection 3.3.4. Zi is a vector of controls for individual i , including sex, five 
age dummies, household children dummies, household size dummies, finn size dum-
mies, job title and weekly hours, as weil as age and sex specifie unemployment rate. 
FEc,t ,FEs,r and FEc,s are vectors of country x year, sec tor x year and country x sector 
effects, respectively. In specifications not including FEc.t (table 3.1, Colunms 4 to 6), 
we replace it by a vector X c,t of country x time controls, including bargaining coverage, 
union density, wage centralization, wage coordination, unemployment insurance and 
per capita GDP. In specifications with no country-time effects, EPL in the country and 
time is obviously added. Finally, the residuals have two parts : êi,c,s,t = ).le + Vi where 
).le is the unobserved cluster effects of country c. The noise Vi is assumed to be asymp-
totically normally distributed. 
Note that work stress may be linked to other labor market institutions. If such insti-
tutions were correlated with EPL, or if the timing of their reform matched that of EPL 
reforms, it could potentially be a confounding factor. Without an actual natural expe-
riment, the best strategy is to control for as many other institutions as possible with the 
vector Xc 1• 10 
' 
10. Section 3 .4.4 investigates this question in more depth. 
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3.3.3 Two stage estimation 
We will however proceed in two steps to estimate this equation, to avoid downward 
biased standard deviations. We first aggregate the data at the country x sector x year level 
in a first stage assuming a linear probability madel : 
p (WorkStresshealth; ,c,s ,r 1 c,s,t ,Zi) = Dc,s,t + f33Zi 
where Dc,s,t is a vector of country x sector x time dummies for the individual i. This li-
near probability madel will facilitate the interpretation of the marginal impact of cross-
terms in the second stage 11 . In a second stage, we then estimate the dummy variables : 
Dc,s,t = /3JEPLc,t X IDs+ /32Xc,r+FEc,t + FEs,t + FEc,s + Uc,s,t (3.3) 
where each cell is weighted by its number of observations in the F1 stage. The resi-
duals have two parts : Uc,s,t = f..Lc + Vc,s,t where Jlc is the unobserved cluster effects of 
country c. Residuals are clustered at the country level to avert the risk of within-country 
autocorrelation. 
We will discuss the various alternative interpretations and the possible limitations 
of the tests in the result Section 3.4.3. 
3.3.4 Job separation rates 
To be valid, it must be possible to show that lay off rates are comparable within the 
same industry across countries. Internationally comparable layoff rates are uneasy to 
compute, but Micco and Pagés-Serra (2004) show how job reallocation of different in-
dustrial sectors, an important determinant of layoffs, are highly correlated across coun-
tries in a panel of 18 countries. They also show in a simple madel how the impact 
of EPL should indeed be more important in sectors with high job reallocation rates 
compared with those with low rates . 
11. As described in Wooldridge (2001), p. 455, the mode! is first estimated by ordi-
nary !east squares to produce unbiased estimates of Var ( WorkStresshealrh;.c.s t 1 c,s,t,z;) = &? = 
WorkStresshealthi.c ,s,t * ( 1 - WorkSt resshealth;,c.s,,), where values of WorkSt resshealth;,c,s,t larger th an 0.99 
are set to 0.99 and values lower than 0.01 are set to 0.01 to maintain predicted probabili-
ties within the unit interval. Then, we use &? to produce feasible GLS estimates to re-estimate 
p ( WorkStresshealr h;,c.s ,, 1 c, s, t , Z;) with weighted !east squares. Note th at earlier specifications involving 
probit estimations yielded very similar results. 
------------ ---~----
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Unfortunately, no standardized measure of layoffs rates exist across the OECD. As 
proxy, we use net annualjob destruction rates JD, defined as the total net loss of jobs by 
firms over a year divided by the average total employment over the two years, described 
in Section 3.4.2. 
The job destruction rates are computed from firm data of the Amadeus database of 
Bureau van Dijk, a rich firm level database covering allEU countries. Our job destruc-
tion measure is the sum of year to year negative employment changes within ail firms 
who had a negative employment change, divided by average employment over the two 
years: 
To avoid the criticism that job destruction is itself impacted by EPL, sorne au thors 
have used job destruction levels of a country with low employment protection. Cingano 
et al. (2010) convincingly argue that the use of the sample country average of turnover 
rate is a better measure than the turnover rate of a single country such as the US. Since 
no large European countries have sufficiently low level of EPL, we instead follow the 
method proposed by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) and Ciccone and Papaioannou 
(2009) to obtain 'frictionless' job destruction levels by removing the sector-specific 
linear impact of EPL from our JD measures. In other words, we perform the following 
estimation : 
lDc,s,t = asEPLc,t + f3s + Yc,t + êc,s,t 
where lDc,s,t is the countryxsector x year specifie job destruction level , EPLc,t is the 
country x year employment protection, as captures the sector specifie impact of EPL on 
JD, f3s is a sector-specific set of duilllllies and Yc,t is a set of country x year dummies. 
We weight the observations by the underlying number of employees in each cell, and 
remove the ones wüh less than 10 firms. Our measure of sectoral job destruction level 
for sector s will be fis, interpreted as the hypothetical job destruction rate for a country 
with EPL of zero. 
Finally, instead of a continuous job destruction variable, several authors use a dummy 
for highly affected and non-affected sectors, based on a threshold job destruction rate. 
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We will explore these specifications in robustness checks. 
3.4 How does EPL affect health through work-related 
stress? 
3.4.1 Definition of workplace stress 
We start our empirical investigation with the health effects of work-related stress. 
This is arguably the most interesting one : it places emphasis on abnormal stress af-
fecting health, not normal stress that every worker experiences now and then. lt is thus 
in line with the theory section as it is more related to objective health conditions than 
alternative measures of stress. 
The phrasing of the question related to work stress is : Does your work affect your 
health, or not ? - in what way ? and the possible answers include stress; anxiety; hea-
daches; heart disease ; irritability ; sleeping problems ; stomach ache ; backache. 
This work-related health question is thus a binary variable. We create a variable 
WorkStresshealth taking values 1 or 0 depending on whether the individual reported 
work-related stress affecting health. This variable WorkStresshealth is only available in 
three databases : 
- Eurobarometer 44.2 Working Conditions in the European Union Survey, Nov. 
1995- Jan. 1996 
- European Working Conditions survey 2000-2001 
- European Working Conditions survey 2005 
3.4.2 Sample 
We only keep individuals between 25 and 64 years old working full time in the 
private sector, not self employed and having a permanent contract. We group toge-
ther the Eurobarometer surveys of 1996 and the European Working Conditions Survey 
of 2000-2001 (EU candidate countries) and 2005 to build a harmonized unbalanced 
pseudo-panel. Keeping only OECD countries for which EPL is available, this panel 
of countries contains a total of 21 European countries for years 1996, 2000-01 and 
2005, that is a total of 53 country x periods. The database contains 28 367 workers, 
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each country x period containing between 229 and 1072 observations. It is not a true 
panel since there is no follow-up of single respondents over time. Since weighting pro-
cedures were different between surveys, we did not weight the data. All variables and 
their summary statistics are described in more detail in Tables C.2 and C.3 in Appendix 
C.l. 
Figure 3.2 reports cross-country correlations between the EPL indicator and stress . 
In all cross-sections (Eurobarometer 1996, EWCS 2000-01 and EWCS 2005), there is 
a positive relation between EPL and the fraction of workers affected by stress-related 
health problems. 
3.4.3 Results 
Our main regression result, based on equation (3 .3) is reported in Table 3.1. It can 
be summarized as follows : Reforms increasing EPL cause stress-related health pro-
blems in high job destruction sectors relative to law job destruction sectors. Co lurons 
1 and 2 exhibit our main identification strategy : interacting job destruction rates in the 
sector with EPL, controlling for country x year and country x activi ty sec tor and also 
for sector x year in Column 1. Column 1 is our benchmark specification, and reports 
three bilateral interaction dummies (country x sector, country x time and sectorxtime). 
In both , the coefficient of interest, EPLc,t x JD5 is very significant. Following a reform of 
employment protection, employees in sectors with high job destruction rates are more 
likely to report work stress related health problems compared to employees in sectors 
with low job destruction rates . Additional results are as follows. 
1. In high EPL countries, workers in high job destruction sectors experience more 
work stress-related health problems, relative to law job destruction sectors. By 
removing country x sector dummies, Column 3 measures the absolu te impact of 
EPL on worker 's stress, according to the job destruction rate of their activity 
sector. Like in the benchmark specification, the coefficient is positive, although 
only significant at the 10% level. 
2. Quantitatively, the benchmark effects of Columns 1 and 2 are potentially large : 
if a country faces an increase by 1 of EPL index ( over a scale 0-4 ), the lev el of ad-
ditional stress-related health problem induced by a 1 percentage point difference 
in sectoral job destruction rate (the median sector has a JD rate of 3.7%) leads to 
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Work stress and Employment Protection 
Does your work affect your health? How?: Stress 
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FIGURE 3.2: EPL indicator and stress-related health problems 
Chapter 3 - Emp/oyment Protection Laws and Work Stress 99 
an effect on stress of 4.51 * 1 * 0.01 = 0.045. Knowing that 26,7% of individuals 
report stress, the fraction reporting stress increases by 0.045 / 0.267 = 17% or 4.5 
percentage points. This is not a small effect, even though time variations of EPL 
are smaller than 1 point. 
3. Within-country variations in EPL have no overall effect on stress-related health 
problems. Colurnns 4 represent within country effect. They are not significant : 
i) either there is not enough time variations in EPL to generate enough variations 
to identify the effects of changes in EPL on stress-related health problems, ii) or 
those variations have not produced any effect on stress-related health problems, 
iii) or finally the effect is heterogenous across sectors. 
4. EPL is positively correlated with stress-related health problems in the cross sec-
tion of countries. Colurnn 5 of Table 3.1 shows the regression results for the 
simple cross section of European countries without country fixed effects. The 
link between employment protection and stress is positive and highly significant. 
5. Column 6 separates EPL into its country average over the period and its yearly 
deviation, with interaction terms. The effect of EPL changes are indeed larger in 
high job destruction sectors, consistent with the third interpretation of the insi-
gnificance of the coefficient of interest in Colurnn 4 (see #4 above) . 
6. The total decomposition of EPL's effect in Column 6 allows to compute the total 
effect of EPL and of EPL changes for different sectors. Table 1 b provides su ch 
calculations. For instance for sector with high job destruction levels such as ma-
nufacturing, with ID= 0.064, an increase by 1 unit of EPL has a positive and 
significant effect. For workers in low job destruction sectors, such as hotels and 
restaurants with JD = 0.032, the absolute impact of an EPL increase on stress 
is negative and significant, pointing out, in line with the theory part, that the 
amount of effective EPL (that is, interacted with JD) may have aU-shape pattern 
with regards toits effect on stress. The other two Columns (2 and 3) present al-
ternative specifications where EPL is interacted with two dummies reflecting the 
intensity of job destructions : in Colurnn 2, it is interacted with (1 Ds < 0.037) or 
(IDs;::: 0.037); in Colurnn 3, it is interacted with a higher threshold (0.041). The 
positive effects of EPL or of its change over time is positive and signifi.cant in 
high turnover sectors. In low turnover sectors, it is either insignificant or negative 
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significant for the change in EPL, and still positive for the mean effect. Overall, 
this summary table suggests that, in levels, the effect of EPL is al ways positive, 
while the effect of changes in EPL are positive only in high JD sectors and ne-
gative in low job destruction sectors, thus painting out to an ambiguous effect of 
EPL on stress, as also suggested in the model. 
7. In addition to stress, the EWCS surveys also ask for other stress-related work 
health problems, such as anxiety, headaches, stomach problems, irritability, slee-
ping problems. We daim that these health problems are more precisely self-
assessed than stress which can greatly depends on one's own perception. Thus, 
we use them to replicate in Table 3.2 our main identification strategies, correspon-
ding to Table 3.1, Colurnn 1 (interactingjob destruction rates in the sector with 
EPL with three bilateral interaction dummies countryxsector) and Column 6 (de-
composing the impact of EPL and EPL changes between sectors). The variables 
of interest are "Stress-related health consequences excluding stress", Table 3.2, 
Columns 1 and 2 and "Stress-related health consequences including stress", Co-
lumns 3 and 4. All effects are extremely similar, apart from their lower magni-
tude. 
An alternative interpretation to these results is that the positive interaction coefficient 
reflects another mechanism : in countries with high EPL, a high rate of job destruction 
generates more stress in the sector relative to a sector with lower job destruction. This 
is due to the fact that EPL reduces re-employment probabilities overall. This interpreta-
tion, in line with the general equilibrium properties ofEPL on stress in our introduction, 
would actually be dismissed if we had perfect sector-time controls in the regressions, 
because those variables would totally capture this general equilibrium effect of EPL. 
And indeed, in this regression, 12 these controls do not undo our positive and significant 
interaction term. We are confident that our results are driven by the partial equilibrium 
effects (bullying, pressure, management), and are perfectly comfortable that a part of 
the effects are amplified by general equilibrium interactions. 13 In sum, given that our 
specifications include country effects, country time effects, sector country effects and 
12. as in the regression of Table 3.3 discussed below. 
13. To minimize the risk that the interaction coefficient be affected by the general equilibrium effects 
of EPL that might be felt different! y by workers according to sector's job destruction rate, we also tried a 
specification where job destruction was interacted with both EPL and unemployment rate of the age and 
sex category of the worker, which did not change in the coefficient of interest. 
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sector time effects, as well as the rate of unemployment in the gender and age category 
of the worker, such general equilibrium effects would already be largely captured by 
these variables. The coefficient of interaction can be safely interpreted as net of these 
effects, which in our view, favars the interpretation of partial equilibrium effects . 
3.4.4 The role of unemployment insurance 
In this Sub-section, we further explore the role of other labor market institutions, 
in part to provide a robustness check, in part to investigate the role of unemployment 
insurance. Indeed, the amount of stress generated by the risk of layoff may be reduced 
by the existence of a generous unemployment compensation. Table 3.3 investigates 
these questions in introducing country and time specifie unemployment insurance. 14 
It shows that the effects of EPL on stress is robust, as the inclusion of additionalla-
bor market institutions does not affect the sign and significance of our effects. Further, 
we sometimes find mildly significant and negative effects of unemployment insurance 
(UI) on stress in Columns 4 and 5, in a cross-section of countries and sectors. In unre-
ported results, we also explored the respective role of more labor market institutions, 
with similar conclusions, and additional interesting effects : union density and bargai-
ning coverage marginally raise stress, while wage centralization seems to be reducing 
stress. We also included unemployment rates and per capita GDP . 
3.4.5 The effect of sub-components of EPL 
In this subsection, we further investigate the role of components of EPL. We se-
parate out the three main sub-components described in Section 3.3.1 and Appendix 
C.2 : protection against individuallayoffs, against collective dismissals and regulation 
of temporary employment. As Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.4 reveal, the positive effect 
of employment protection cornes from the last two components : regulation on collec-
tive dismissals and temporary layoffs strongly and significantly raise stress in high job 
destruction sectors, relative to low job destruction sectors. Protection against individu al 
lay off is not significant. Regarding the effect of EPL1emp on stress, we ex plain in Appen-
dix C.2 that this indicator is an index of the restrictions of use of temporary contracts : it 
14. The OECD summary measure is defined as the average of the gross unemployment benefit repla-
cement rates for two eamings levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment. 
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is the sum of indicators of the maximum number of successive temporary con tracts and 
of indicators of the maximum cumulated duration of temporary contracts. In Column 
3, we looked deeper in the details of EPLtemp by grouping the subcomponents, avai-
lable from the OECD and described in Appendix C.2, in these two broader categories : 
Restriction to the scope of temporary contracts, EPLcemp- valid, and limits to their maxi-
mum duration, EPLremp-limi~>· It appears from Column 3 that the positive effect cornes 
from the second component, the maximum cumulated duration of temporary contracts. 
Renee, our interpretation is that when employment protection on regular layoffs (indi-
vidual and collective) cannot be alleviated through the recourse to temporary con tracts, 
the stress effects of EPL for regular contracts is augmented, all the more that there are 
restrictions on temporary contracts. This is very much in line with a discussion from 
the OECD (2004) who argues that the se various components of employment protection 
are complementary with each other. 15 Indeed, in Columns 4 and 5 of our Table 3.4, we 
further document evidence of a strong complementarity between the three components 
where the variable EPLprod is the product of individual, collective and temporary pro-
tection. In Columns 6 to 10, we test the complementarity of the components of EPL 
two by two and find that they are ali positive, and that EPLtemp x EPLind is significant 
when introduced separately, and that EPLremp x EPLcoll is significant wh en introduced 
separately or simultaneously. Renee, two are complements to each other : ind and temp 
on the one hand and coll and temp on the other hand. 
This exercise suggests an interesting avenue for research : the cost of regulations 
cao sometimes be alleviated when there are ways to get around them. When there are no 
ways, the costs are actually much larger as the inconsistencies between market forces 
(here, the need to layoff for firms) and regulations reinforce each other. 
15. Quoting the OECD : "However sorne complementarities between different components of em-
ployment protection regulation remain. Des pite sorne notable exceptions, strict regulation for temporary 
contracts tends togo hand-in-hand with strict regulation for permanent contracts (Chart 2.1, Panel B). 
Otherwise, employers may have an incentive to substitute regular contracts with temporary work and 
fixed-term contracts. The various provisions that contribute to the strictness of dismissal regulation for 
permanent contracts appear to be complementary to each other." 
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3.5 A cross-province analysis in Canada : work stress 
and its components 
We obtained a privileged access to a detailed national health survey in Canada. This 
database contains Yariables on stress that can be partly compared to the variables in the 
international surveys. In addition, it contains detailed components ofworkplace activity 
leading to a more accurate description of the effects of EPL. Fin ally, Canada's employ-
ment protection can be decomposed into individual protection and protection against 
mass layoffs, leading to new insights . We can replicate the cross-sectional results of 
previous sections, and attempt to replicate the cross-industry results . In the latter case, 
however, the analysis suffers from a caveat : the sector-specific job destruction data 
used in Canada are obtained from the same sample of countries as in the earlier sec-
tion. Future works should be based on job-destruction data in Canada, even if we have 
already explored proxies based on Canadian workers flows. Finally, we obtain some 
within-regions estimates, in using individual time variations in the degree of employ-
ment protection described next. 
3.5.1 Provincial employment protection 
In Canada, employment protection differs across provinces in dimensions such as 
firing taxes, severance payments, maximum number of days of temporary Jayoff and 
finally advance notice. 
An interesting feature in light of this paper's purpose is that ad vance notice has two 
distinct dimensions in Canada : ad vance notice in case of individuallayoff, and ad vance 
notice in cases of mass layoff. The length of notice for individual layoffs depends on 
worker seniority. EPL in cases of mass layoff is determined by the size of the layoff. 
Sorne provinces, such as Alberta or British Columbia, have no provisions for collective 
layoffs, while others have relatively large provisions, up to four months in the largest 
firms in Quebec, for example. For individual EPL, the total length of the notice period 
varies across regio11 and either progresses rapidly or remains relatively fl at. Averaging 
across firm size provides a regional average of EPL denoted by EPL_collbasic· Avera-
ging across seniority levels provides a measure ofEPL denoted by EPL_indbasic· These 
two indicators were shown to be correlated with indices of regulation of provincial 
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labor markets (Friesen 1997) and with turnover in the labor market. 
However, given the specifie nature of the dataset, we can improve the accuracy of 
EPL indicators applicable to individuals in the survey as follows. First, we may want to 
use information on individual seniority and individual 's firm size. The difficulty is the 
absence of information on firm size and to sorne extent on seniority of employees in 
the NHPS in the relevant sample. 16 In addition, these two variables are endogenous : 
individuals sensitive to stress may quit jobs in which they are less protected against 
dismissal. One can address both problems using an imputation technique for seniority 
and finn size, in using the Canadian labor Force Survey (LFS). The dataset contains 
infonnation on tenure in months and establishment and firm size, as weil as a set a 
variables denoted by Zit common with the NPHS (region, industry, occupation, gender 
and age) . 17 
From the information on tenure and on the region of individuals in LFS, we built 
the exact number of weeks of advance notice protecting individuals from individual 
layoffs. Similarly, from information on establishment size, one obtains the exact oum-
ber of weeks of advance notice in case of mass layoffs. We will use the imputed mea-
sures at the individual level, which are exogenous by construction. They are denoted 
by EPL_ind;mpured,it and EPL_coll;mputed,it· Since roughly 10% of layoffs are group 
layoffs 18 and that individual protection also applies in the case of a mass layoff, we 
create a measure oftotal EPL defined as EPL_all = EPL_indùnputed,it +0.1EPL_collimputed,it · 
3.5.2 The Canadian National Population Health Survey (NHPS) 
The database is the Canadian National Population Health Survey (NHPS hereafter) 
and specifically its Household longitudinal component. 19 lt consists of 8 cycles: 1994-
1995, 1996-1997, 1998-1999, 2000-2001 , 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2006-2007, and fi-
nally 2008-2009.1t includes 17 276 persans of all ages, with a longitudinal dimension 
and individual identifiers. The survey is designed to be representative of the cross-
16. Tenure can be constructed from the NPHS questionnaire only from cycles 1, 2 and 3, whereas 
stress is available from cycle 4 on ward, that is, 2 to 10 years after the last observation of tenure. 
17. We used the monthly files for years 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002, th at is a total of 60 files , 
containing overall slightly more than 3 million observations, and about 500 000 different individuals 
(there is a rotating scheme of about 6 months). 
18. This is based on numbers from Morissette et al. (2007) and the au thors' own calculations. 
19. A detailed description is avai lable at Statistics Canada's website, at http ://www.statcan.ca/cgi-
binlimdb/p2SV.pl ?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=3225&lang=fr&db=IMDB&dbi=E&adm=8&dis=2 
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section and has a longitudinal follow-up. For most regressions involving chronic stress, 
cycles 1, 2 and 3 could not an be exploited. 20 
The questionnaire bas severa] questions related to stress classified into four broad 
categories : family stress in relation with partner, family stress in relation with children, 
work stress, and stress due to financial problems. Detailed workplace stress questions 
were constructed independently by a team of sociologists and the derived variables 
were made available by Statistics Canada to the research community and directly in-
cluded in the dataset. 21 There are 12 questions related to job stress used to build an 
aggregated job stress index. 22 
The relevant stress questions for our analysis are described as follows in the Ma-
nuai : you are exposed to hostility or conflict from the people you work with ; your job 
requires that you do things over and over; your job is very hectic ; your job allows you 
freedom to decide how you do your job ; you have a lot to say about what happens in 
your job; your superviser is helpful in getting the job done; the people you work with 
are helpful in getting the job done; your job security is good; with possible answers: 1 
Strongly agree, 2 Agree, 3 Neither agree nor disagree, 4 Disagree, 5 Strongly disagree . 
We will report results with these questions . 23 Adding up the stress dimensions from 
these questions, the NHPS survey provides its general work stress index. It is construc-
ted by summing up the score of all questions with valid answers (reversed for questions 
on repetitiveness, hectic, physical effort and hostility) in order to create a general scale 
20. The Manual of the longitudinal survey states that, due to a translation problem, "In Quarter 3 of 
Cycle 1 (1994) collection, not ali eligible working people were asked the work stress questions in the 
French interview. This may result in sorne bias." Further, a COITection for refusais, included in Cycles 4 
and 5, has not been implemented for Cycle 1. For this reason, we will do most regressions with Cycle 
4 through 8. The implication is that most regressions will be based on five observation per individual, 
excluding the possibility of having efficient fix effect estimators . Cluster-corrected standard errors at 
the province leve! deal with the issue of within-province correlation, including the correlation of an 
individual's stress over time. 
2 1. This team was lead by Blair Wheaton from the University of Toronto . 
The full description of the data can be found on pages 122-128 in the De-
rived Variables Documentation 2004, available at http ://www.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-
binlimdb/p2SV.pl ?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=3225&lang=en&db=imdb&adm=8&dis=2 
22. Many of these questions are also avail able in the two international datasets of previous Sections, 
notably the European Quali ty of Life Survey and the International Social Survey Program. The metho-
dology is thus considered as relatively standard in quantitative sociology. 
23. Additional questions are : Your job requires that you learn new things. Your job requires a high 
leve! of skill. Y ou are free from conflicting demands that others make. Y our j ob requires a lot of physical 
effort. 
--l 
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where a higher score means more stress. 24 lt scales from 0 to 48. Sorne of these twelve 
questions are combined into sub-components of stress : in particular, stress from psy-
chological demands; stress from skill needs; stress from job loss. Figure 3.3 reports 
cross-province correlations between overall stress and these three sub-components. 
3.5.3 Sample and data description 
We provide in Table C.4 of the Appendix C.1 the sample composition per province, 
with a significant number of individuals in each. The analysis will be restricted to a 
sample of respondents between 25 and 64 and excludes retirees and the self-employed. 
The 15 to 24 year old population is also excluded because it is often employed part-
time, there being no available control for part-time employment in the relevant cycles. 
However, including the 15-24 year old population in regressions does not change the 
results much. Construction workers are also excluded because they are generally not 
covered by advanced notice requirements. After keeping full-time private sector wor-
kers between 25-64 years old who are not self-employed and not in the construction 
sector, the final dataset contains over 5000 individuals, or over 20 000 observations. 
3.5.4 Empirical strategy : a difference-in-differences analysis 
As in previous sections using cross-country data, we find that stress in the work-
place is positively associated with individual employment protection, as well as im-
puted stress within province, allowing for province fix effects. We will estimate an 
equation similar to that of equation 3.2, but without time subscript given the lack of 
time-series variation in provincial EPL in Canadian provinces over the sample period. 
Note also that we do not aggregate the data first since doing so would defeat the purpose 
of imputing EPL at the individuallevel. The equation estimated is : 
WorkStresscomponent; = ,81EPLp x IDs+ fuZi + FEp + FEs + FEt + Ei,p (3.4) 
where p refers to a specifie province and "component" refers either to the main index 
or to each of the sub-component described above. As before, we control for several 
24. For more information on the psychological literature motivating thi s index, see Schwartz et al. 
(1988). 
Chapter 3 - Employment Protection Laws and Work Stress 
Work stress and Canadian Employment Protection 
Different stress dimensions 
lndividual EPL vs. Overall stress 
- ,----------------------------------. 
rn 
iiï o 
> -
0 
• PEl 
"" • NF 
m ,_--------.--------.--------.---------~ 
2 3 
lndividual EPL 
4 5 
lndividual EPL vs. Psychological stress 
ro .---~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~ 
"' "' "' ~ ~ 
<Il ocr 
(1J 
.S::! "<:t'" g><i 
0 
..C N 
~.q: 
cr. 
···---
•QC 
• AL .!Ot.l 
, .-SN3C 
----• PEl _ . ..---
.---t--'" 
----~-----·-; N S 
ocr ,_----~--.--------,--------,---------~ 
Ul N 
"0 . 
Q) 
Q) 
C o 
.!!!. 
~~ 
E 
:? ocr 
- .. 
"' 
"' ~ CD 
2 3 
lndividual EPL 
4 
lndividual EPL vs. stress from skills needs 
• SA 
5 
~ ' ~----~·~N~F,_-------.--------.---------~ 
2 3 
lndividual EPL 
4 5 
lndividual EPL vs. stress from job loss ~ ----~~~~-=-=--~~~~~~~~----~ 
"'- •QC ~ ~ 
--
.0 
-~~ 
E .,.c 
_g ~ 
Ul 
"'"" ~ '"""-: 
Ci) -
• NF 
• ON 
----·-·---~liS _________ .Jt BC 
• MA • PE l • NB • SA 
2 3 
lndividua l EPL 
• AL 
4 5 
FIGURE 3.3: EPL and various stress components 
107 
108 Essays on Employment Protection and its Impacts on Workers Well-Being 
individual characteristics, such as childhood traumas, sex, urban/rural, household size, 
household type, children in household, education, recent immigration, country of ori-
gin, 19 age dummies and 47 occupation dumrnies. 
As stated above, our job destruction index (JD) was built with Amadeus data on 
European firms. It may thus not be a good proxy for actual Canadian-specific job des-
truction rates. We however lack equivalently good data for Canada. However, we tried 
to address this issue in constructing alternative "layoff rates" index using worker flows 
instead, with no dramatic change in the results of next Section. Time dummies are in-
cluded for precision, even though the variable of interest, EPL, do not vary over time. 25 
3.5.5 Results 
3.5.5.1 Overall stress 
Table 3.5 presents the benchmark Canadian results based on equation (3.4) regres-
sing the WorkStress index and its components on individual and collective advance 
notice requirements. In Columns 1 to 4, we present between-province results for the 
impact on stress of individual and collective employment protection, either basic or 
imputed and their sum (weighted by the incidence of each type of layoff in the data). 
We confirm the positive correlation between each measure of EPL and workplace stress. 
When we include province effects to obtain within-estimates (Columns 5 and 6) we still 
obtain positive effects for total EPL and individual EPL, although collective EPL now 
has a negative sign. Finally, the interaction with job destruction, that may be interpreted 
as causal, now exhibits a non-significant coefficient for individual EPL, a positive but 
marginally significant effect for collective EPL, and no significance for total EPL. See 
Columns 7 and 8. 
3.5.5.2 Components of stress and job's characteristics 
We also investigate the link between EPL and the various sub-components of work-
place stress. The regression results are reported in Appendix in Table C.5 and the margi-
nal effects are calculated in Appendix Table C.6. The results are as follows. The effect 
of individual EPL is to raise hostility at work, raise the incidence of repetitive tasks, 
25. Namely, we used employee data of the Canadian labor Force Survey or the Canadian Workplace 
and Employee Survey (WES). None yielded substantially different, statistically significant results. 
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raise the incidence of hectic jobs, but reduce the absence of decision freedom (it may 
raise the stress from deciding oneself), reduce the probability of having little to say on 
the job, and raise the probability of having helpful supervisors and colleagues. It also 
reduces the perception of job insecurity. The effect of collective EPL has more insi-
gnificant coefficients. When significant, it reduces the incidence of repetitive tasks, of 
hectic jobs, raise the absence of decision freedom and of having unhelpful colleagues. 
It does not seem to have an effect on job insecurity, hostility at work and on having 
little to say on the job. 
3.6 Alternative variables describing workplace 
problems 
3.6.1 Harrassment and health effects of work disorder and job 
satisfaction in EWCS 
The 2000/2001 European Working Conditions Survey includes a question related 
to harassment and bullying. The exact phrasing is "Over the past 12 months, have you 
or have you not, been subjected at work to intimidation?". In 2005, the phrasing was 
more precise "[Over the past 12 months] have you personally been subjected at work 
to bullying 1 harassment ?" The wording is not the same (and we have no way of as-
sessing how close these two formulations are in other languages), but since we control 
for country x time, we choose to lump the two variables in a common 'harassment' 
question. 
Bath specifications of Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.6, based on equation (3.3), find 
that the fraction of workers reporting bullying is positively affected by the interaction 
of EPL and job destruction, although mil dl y significantly. The magnitude of the effect 
is roughly similar to the stress effect in Table 1 's benchmark specification. The remain-
der of Table 3.6 reports the link between EPL and Anxiety, Headaches, Initability and 
Sleeping problems, four of the most likely symptoms of work stress. The results ex-
hibit similar patterns, although mostly insignificant individually. Notably, EPL x JD is 
significant for Anxiety at the 1% leve! for Columns 3 and dEPL x JD is significant at 
the 10% level for Column 4, and dEPL x JD is also significant for irritability at the 5% 
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level in Column 8. 
Finally, all waves of the EWCS survey included a question on general job satis-
faction, simply worded "Are you very satisfied, satisfied, not very satisfied or not at 
ali satisfied with working conditions in your main paid job?". Job satisfaction is ano-
ther interesting subjective variable to consider : it encompasses work stress, salary and 
other working conditions. Column 11 of Table 3.6 shows that an increase in EPL is 
associated with an insignificant decrease in job satisfaction difference between sectors. 
Column 12's specification shows that high EPL countries have least job satisfaction, 
and that EPL changes are mildly associated with job satisfaction improvements, but 
confirm the absence of differentiated impact between sectors. 
3.6.2 Incidence of stress at work, job satisfaction and fear of job 
loss in ISSP and Eurobarometer 2000-2001 
3.6.2.1 Sample and data description 
The International Social Survey Program and Eurobarometer 2000-2001 contain 
useful information on stress and workplace disorder. We grouped together the ISSP 
1997, the Eurobarometer 2001 and ISSP 2005 , in a second pseudo-panel. Keeping 
OECD countries, this panel contains 20 European countries plus Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and Turkey over three periods, or 53 country x periods. The panel contains 
a total of 14 084 observations, each country x periods containing between 126 and 1081 
individuals. However, the database do not contain information about sectors. Thus, the 
causal inference is based on within-country variations which are sometimes relatively 
small. The con tract type is unavailable for ISSP 2005. Workers with temporary or no 
contract could therefore not be excluded from this wave, contrary to the analysis of 
previous Section. All variables are described in more detail in Tables C.8 and C.9 in 
Appendix C. 1. 
The stress variable measures the frequency of stress in the workplace. The exact 
question in the three surveys is : "How often do you find work stressful ?" with possible 
answers Always; Often; Sometimes; Hardly ever; Never. They are coded 1 to 5. We 
create a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if often or always stressed and 0 otherwise, 
as we are seeking abnormally high stress 1evel. We call it WorkStressf requency· 
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3.6.2.2 Correlations 
A first look at the dichotomous variable WorkStress frequency averaged at the country 
level indicates that, in aU years, it is positively correlated with the degree of employ-
ment protection. In the fi rst chart (ISSP 1997), the Czech Republic seems to be an 
outlier, possibly generating a U-curve in stress, although such non-linear relations in 
this paper have not been found to be significant. 
A drawback in the datasets is the absence of information on sectors of activity 
of the surveyed individuals. The previous identification strategy based on sectors can 
therefore no longer be implemented. We therefore make use of the panel dimension 
of the survey instead, in trying to capture country fixed effects and using the within-
dimension and using partial reforms of EPL within countries. 
3.6.2.3 An identification strategy based on time differences in EPL 
The most general regression is therefore 
WorkStreSSjrequeneyi,c,r = f31EPLc,t + f32Zi +FEe+ FE1 + Ei ,e,t (3.5) 
where EPLc,t is the employment protection leve! of country c at time t, Zi,t is a vector of 
individual contrais at time t for individual i, and FEe and FE1 are vector of country and 
time dummies, respectively. 26 As before, explained in section 3.3.3, we perform a two 
stage estimation clustering the residuals of the second stage at the country leve! : have 
two parts : Ec,t = J.le + Ve,t where J.lc is the unobserved cluster effects of country c. In the 
first stage, depending on the nature of the dependent variable, we fit a least square, pro-
bit or ord red logit mad 1 27• Accordingly, w assume a re idual distributed normally 
logistically when we use an ordered logit estima te with the original, untransformed data 
with five possible answers_ 
The individual controls in Zi,t are sex, age, education, marital status, rural or ur-
ban area, job title, occupation type, firm size, working with dangerous substances and 
weekly hours. Their summary statistics are reported in Table C.9 in Appendix C.l. 
26. Contrary to the regressions in Section 3.4, the fewer number of countries x periods prevents us 
from including country control ~. 
27. Si nee we cannot interact EPL with job destruction rates, there is no reason to use a linear probabi-
lity model instead of probit. 
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Appart from stress incidence, we also investigate various additional variables reflec-
ting the perceived quality of relations at the workplace and work satisfaction. Table 3. 7 
reports cross-sectional correlations as well as within-country effects from changes in 
EPL. Recall that we cannot use the triple difference based on job destruction data as the 
sector of activity of the individuals is not available in the survey. Column 1 shows that 
more protected countries are also more stressed, and Column 2 also show that EPL in-
creases are mildly associated with more stress. Columns 3 and 4 show no link between 
EPL and work relations. Column 5 suggests that in low-EPL countries, workers tend to 
be Jess optimistic about finding new jobs, but that but that over ti me, the effect seems to 
be opposite. Columns 7 shows that the fear of job loss is higher in high EPL countries 
(significant at the 10% leve!), a result that was also found by Clark and Postel-Vinay 
(2009), but the effect on the feeling of job security is insignificant. One interpretation 
is a general equilibrium effect : EPL protects jobs but raises the risk of not finding 
a new job after displacement. Finally, Column 12 shows a weak improvement on job 
satisfaction following an EPL increase. 
3.6.3 Is work too demanding and stressful? (EQLS 2003) 
The European Quality of Life Survey 2003 contains a question on whether work is 
"too demanding and stressful". The drawback is that this is only a one year survey. As 
reported in Figure 3.5, there is a strong cross-country correlation between EPL and this 
specifie measure of the intensity of workplace stress. 
Unfortunately, we will not be able to implement a good empirical strategy with 
EQLS 2003, given the absence of repeated cross section with this variable and the 
absence of an activity sector variable to implement Rajan and Zingales' strategy. We 
do not report any regression here, even though the effect of EPL on stress is obviously 
large and significant, but without a causal interpretation. 
3.6.4 Use of psychoactive drugs and depression incidence in NHPS 
In NHPS, severa! variables based on objective clinical characteristics of individuals 
are available, such as depression scale, predicted probability of depression, use of tran-
quilizers such as Valium or Ativan, of anti-depressants such as Prozac, Paxil or Effexor, 
of sleeping piUs such as Imovane, Nytol or Starnoc). In Wasmer (2006b), in instru-
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menting the individual employment variable by local labor market conditions (such 
as county-level employment and participation rates), it is found that that for sorne va-
riables, EPL has a significant effect : it is associated with a rise in the incidence of 
depression, on the consumption of anti-depressants and of tranquilizers, but shows no 
effect on the use of sleeping pills and on the incidence of abnormally high pressure. 
3. 7 Po licy implications and concluding comments 
Does EPL improve the well-being of employed workers? This may be the conven-
tional wisdom, but theory suggests counteracting effects due to employers' response : 
stress and work strain may depend positively, and not negatively, on EPL. In this paper, 
we have explored systematically these effects and tried to be as exhaustive as possible 
regarding the available datasets. 
The data analysis indicates positive correlations between EPL and many areas of 
stress in the data; as regards to the causal effects, when the identification permits it, we 
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find heterogeneous effects, positive in high turnover sectors and sometimes negative 
in low turnover sectors, where the protective role of EPL dominates. When separating 
out the effects of various components of EPL, it seems that regulations on temporary 
employment amplify the main effect of employment protection on regular contracts, 
while unemployment insurance reduces stress. 
As a final remark, it is important to have a better understanding of the potential ne-
gative effects of EPL on workers' well-being. This may open the way to labor market 
reforms in several European countries. Many observers appear to agree that EPL harms 
outsiders (unemployed, female, and young workers). But if it also affects workers do-
ser to the political core (protected workers), the tenns of the debate could drastically 
change, and this implies even more scope for reform. Our research has severa! policy 
implications. First and paradoxically, employment protection may not always raise the 
welfare of employees. This arises both from adjustment of firms' behaviour and from 
a perception of increased risk of longer unemployment duration implied by higher tur-
nover costs faced by firms. Although most of these adverse effects of employment 
protection may not be consciously perceived by employees and their representatives, 
they suggest that, a few months or years after a successful deregulation of the labor 
market, the well-being of workers may not have worsened, but instead have improved. 
This will not make the reform easier to pass, but at least it will ease the transition to a 
new, and hopefully better, equilibrium. 
A second insight is that unemployment compensation is partially substitutable to 
employment protection : a more generous unemployment insurance could reduce the 
level of stress experienced by workers, although our results may require further in-
vestigation. Therefore, a policy package raising unemployment insurance and reducing 
employment protection may raise workers' well-being, with two additional concerns 
however. It could increase moral hazard regarding job search, as the unemployed wor-
kers may search less actively. There is also a public finance externality since firms may 
transfer the costs of layoffs on social security, instead of internalizing them through 
severance pay and the various costs of firing regulations, solved by a system of expe-
rience rating (the system is carefully described in Blanchard and Tirole (2003), Blan-
chard and Tirole (2008)) : firms would pay higher social contributions when they have 
bad a higher rate of layoff in the past years. In addition, one should take into account 
the potential effects of additional taxes on layoffs on workers ' well being. This would 
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lead to a different level of optimal experience rating system if such effects of EPL on 
stress were incorporated in the calculations of social welfare, as they should. 
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Tables and figures 
TABLE 3 .1: Effect of EPL on workplace stress : cross-sector/country 
Main variable Linear probability mode! (2-Step GLS estimati on) 
Work affects health : stress0 Main spec. : DDD DD Within-country Cross-country Effects decomposition 
1 2 
EPLc/xJDs' 4.508* 4.765*** 
(2.248) (1.219) 
EPLc,r 
dEPLc/x JDs 
mean EPL/xJD, 
dEPLc,r 
mean EPLc 
Indiv. Contro1sf y y 
Country Controlsc/ 
Time dum. 
Sector dum. 
Country dum . 
Country x Time dum. y y 
Sector xTime dum. y 
Country x Sec tor du m. y y 
Nu m. of obs. 584 584 
Nu m. of elus. 2 1 21 
R2 0.782 0.747 
note; *"'* p< O.O l , ** p< 0.05 . • p< O. l. Robust s.e. in parentheses. 
a Docs your work affect your N!alth ? How?- Stress? 
b Employment protection index (OECD 2004) of coun try c at ti mc t 
3 
0.7 13 
(0.4 18) 
y 
y 
y 
584 
2 1 
0.5 12 
c 'Friction less ' Job dcstructioo rate of activity sector sa la Cicconc-Papaioannou (2006) 
d Deviation of EPLc,t from lk country average ovcr the pcriod: dEPLc,t=EPLl',r-mean EPLc 
t> Mean EPL of country c ove: the pcriod 
4 5 6 
-0.0399 0.0476*** 
(0.0359) (0.0 142) 
5.250*** 
(1.11 5) 
0.256 
(0. 380) 
-0.233*** 
(0.0535) 
0.0468** 
(0.0222) 
y y y 
y y y 
y y y 
y y y 
y 
543 543 543 
19 19 19 
0.375 0.290 0.3 17 
f Includes sex, 5 age dummies,household children dummies, household size dummies, 5 finn size dummies, 12 job tille dummies, 1 1 week.Jy hours dummies and age and 
sex speci ific unemployment rate. 
R lncludes bargaining cavera ge, u nion dcnsity, wage centra lization, wage coordination, UI replacement rate and per capita GDP of country c at lime 1. 
note: Only includes fu ll-time private sector workers in a permanent contract bctwcen 25 and 65 years old. 
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TABLE 3.2: Health consequences on workplace stress ofEPL (EWCS 2000, 2001, 2005 
and Eurobarometer 1996) 
Linear probabili ty mode] (2-Step GLS estimation) 
Other stress·related health Stress-related health Stress-related health 
problems" consequences excluding consequences including 
stress stress 
2 3 4 
EPLc/x JD/ 2.802 3.285 
(2.430) (2.507) 
dEPLc/ x JD 2.852** 4.366*** 
(1.21 6) ( 1.223) 
mean EPLc/ x JD 0.523 0.51 7 
(0.408) (0.357) 
dEPLc,r d -0.138** -0. 19 1*** 
(0.0587) (0.0550) 
mean EPLc e 0.0380 0.0563** 
(0.0267) (0.0266) 
lndiv. Contro]sf y y y y 
Country Controlsc/ y y 
Three time dummies y y 
Twelve sector dummies y y 
Country x Time dum. y y 
Country x Sec tor du m. y y 
Sector du m. x Ti me du m. y y 
Number of observations 584 543 584 543 
Number of clusters 2 1 19 2 1 19 
R2 0.783 0.359 0.803 0.363 
note: ••• p<O.OI, •• p<0.05, • p<O. I. Robust s.e. in parcnthescs. 
n Docs your work affect your hcalrh? How?- Anxiery, hcadaches, stomach problems, ini tability. sleeping 
problcms. 
b Employmcnt protection index (OECD, 2004) of country c at ti mer 
c 'Friclionlcss' Job destruction rate o f activ ity scctor a la Cicconc-Papaioannou (2006) 
d Deviation of EPLr,r from the country average over the period: dEPLc,r= EPLc,1- mcan EPLc 
" Mean EPL of country c ovcr the peri ad 
1 lncludes sex, 5 age dummics, household childrcn dummies. houschold sizc dummies. 5 finn sizc dummies. 
12 job title dummies, I l weekly hours dummies and age and sex speciific unemployment rate. 
g lncludes bargaining coverage, union dcnsity, wagc ccntralization. wage coordination, UI replacement nue 
and pcr capita GDP of country c at ti me 1. 
note: Only includes fu ll-time private sector workers in a permanent contract bctwccn !5 and 65 ycars old. 
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TABLE 3.3: Control for unemployment insurance (EWCS 2000, 2001, 2005 and Euro-
barometer 1996) 
Main variable 
Work affects 
Linear probabili ty model (2-Step GLS estimation) 
Three components 
health : stress• 
EPLc/xJD/ 
Ulc,r x JD,. 
EPLc,r 
ur 
Indiv. ControJsd 
Wage coor. dumc,r x IDs 
Wage coor. dumc,r 
Time dum. 
Sector dum. 
Coun. dummies 
Other coun. controlse 
Coun . x Ti me dum. 
Sector x Time dum. 
Coun .x Sect. dum. 
Num. of obs. 
Num. of clusters 
R2 
Main 
specification 
DDD 
2 
5.277** 5.502*** 
(2. 11 3) (1.788) 
0. 219 0.205 
(0.239) (0.245) 
y y 
y y 
y 
y y 
574 574 
20 20 
0.784 0.748 
note :*** p<O.OI , ** p<0.05. * p<O. l. Robust s .e. in parentheses. 
11 Does your work affect your health ? How? - Stress? 
DD 
3 
0.8 14** 
(0.360) 
-0.0332 
(0.0329) 
y 
y 
y 
574 
20 
0.51 6 
Within-
country 
4 
-0.0399 
(0.0359) 
0.00345 * 
(0.00199) 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
543 
19 
0.375 
h Individual dimension of cmploymcnt protection index (OECD, 2004) of country c at ti mc t 
r' Frictionlcss' Job destruction rate of activity sector s a la Cicconc-Papaioannou (2006) 
Cross-
country 
5 
0.0476*** 
(0.0142) 
0.00125* 
(0.000690) 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
543 
19 
0.290 
d Includcs sex. 5 age dummics. houschold cbildrcn dummics. houschold sizc dummics, 5 fi nn sizc dummics, 12 job 
title dummies, Il weekly hours dummies and age and sex speci ifi c unemployment rate. 
" Includes bargaining coverage, union density. wage ccntrali7..ation. and pcr capita GDP of country c at tl mc t. 
note: Only includcs fu ll-ti me privatc sector workers in a permanent contract bctwecn 25 and 65 ycars old. 
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Conclusion 
How should workers be protected against labor market uncertainties ? The goal of 
this thesis has been to see how layoffs and hours losses affected worker's consump-
tion choices and to consider the impact of various institutions, especially employment 
protection legislation, on non-pecuniary aspects of labor relations. 
Chapter one computed the consumer's response to layoffs and involuntary cutbacks 
in work hours using propensity score estimates, followed by a structural approach. The 
impact of being laid off with unknown recall date is - 13.7%, compared to workers 
who remained employed ; it is insignificant for layoffs with known recall dates or for 
cutbacks in work hours . The structural model reproduced well the reduced form esti-
mates. Simulating various reforms to unernployment insurance, it was shown that their 
impact on the unemployed households' consumption is small and th at the ir impact on 
welfare is very modest. All in all, both approaches suggest quite convincingly that 
workers' consumption reactions to hour cuts is very small. Hence, given the choice 
between one layoff or two partial reductions in work hours, a firm choosing the latter 
would probably have less impact on employees' marginal propensity to spend and their 
consumption utility. From a macroeconornjcs perspective, reducing hours would also 
have a smaller effect on aggregate demand. This would add to the benefits for the firm 
of not breaking a match with well trained workers in response to a temporary reduction 
of the firm's need for labor. Since the structural madel seems to fit well the present data, 
future avenues of research should test this Markov in come process on consumption data 
containing more than two periods per household, such as the PSID or CEX. 
Chapter two explored whether employment protection could induce firms to adjust 
labor through the intensive margin, hours per worker, instead of the extensive margin, 
the number of workers. A model of firm labor adjustment showed how restrictions to 
worker adjustments inevitably lead firms to compensate by varying hours. The model 
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was extended to show that the minimum hours agreements present in many European 
countries and North American, tend to increase average working hours and to decrease 
hiring. Using Canadian survey data, it was shown that longer individual advanced no-
tice requirements increase overtime use in sectors with high layoff rates and in mo-
ments when the employment rate is higher than average. Policymakers should be aware 
of the risk of the ex cess use of overtime work if labor con tracts are too rigid. Of course, 
Canada being country with mild employment protection, the same empirical analysis 
should be reproduced in other contexts, such as European countries where employment 
protection is stricter. 
Finally, chapter three challenged the preconception that employment protection is 
always beneficiai to workers holding a permanent contract. lt was shown that overly 
rigid labor con tracts could backfire if firms try to circumvent lay off costs wh en jobs are 
non-viable. When decomposing the total effect of employment protection in the triple 
difference setting, employment protection changes increased stress in high turnover 
sectors, but decreased stress in low turnover sectors. In cross section, it was also clear 
that the countries with the most stringent employment protection legislation were home 
to the most stressed workers . The most important source of stress in the OECD index 
of employment protection is the restrictions to temporary contracts. Such restrictions 
amplify the impact of the protection of permanent contracts. It is also the subcom-
ponent of EPL that has undergone the most reforms in recent years as governments 
find it politically difficult to reform permanent contracts that constitute a rent held by 
insiders. What this research shows, however, is that even insiders may suffer from too 
much protection and would likely benefit from legislative reforms. This issue will only 
become more acute in the years to come as the trend in capital-biased technological 
change puts more pressure on workers in declining sectors and accelerates the Schum-
peterian process of creative destruction . If firms find it hazardous to hire workers in 
permanent contracts, they may intensify their use of capital, or keep workers in tem-
porary positions. This will accentuate the problem of labor market dualism emerging 
in many OECD countries, as pointed out by research such as Lepage-Saucier et al. 
(2013). Renee, the goal should not be to protect specifie jobs, but rather to protect wor-
kers ' income. It is especially true for declining sectors, where workers would benefit 
from a strong safety net rather than continue to be protected in non-viable jobs. Pro-
tection should be done through policies that encourage rather than hinder hiring, such 
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as the Danish flexicurity approach that combines weak employment protection, strong 
unemployment insurance and help to retrain and assist unemployed workers in their job 
searches. 
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TABLE A.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Mobility supplement variables Mean SD Min Max 
Lost job last year & found new job 0.015 0.123 0 1 
Lost job last year & still not working 0.015 0.123 0 1 
Firm closure* 0.270 0.444 0 1 
No unemployment insurance* 0.268 0.443 0 1 
Expired unemployment insurance* 0.176 0.381 0 1 
Lost health insurance* 0.331 0.471 0 1 
Months since job loss* 3.285 3.459 0 17 
Observations : 27 500 
*Subset of respondents who lostjob last year and are still not working 
Earnings variables Mean SD Min Max Observations 
Weekly earnings 925.121 573 .824 0.03 2884.61 21 866 
Hourly wage 16.082 7.815 1.13 99 9 359 
Househo1d income in the last 12 75.282 42.375 4.25 175.000 75 153 
months (thousands) 
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TABLE A.3: Propensity scores estimation 
Multinomial Logit 
Sample: September to March Only December 
pr(Hours pr(Layoff, pr(Layoff, pr(Hours pr(Layoff, pr(Layoff, 
Propensity score : lost) known ret. in 6 lost) known ret. in 6 
return date) months) return date) months) 
2 3 4 5 5 
sex (man) 0.119*** 0.480*** 0.564* ** 0.210*** 0.314** 0.807*** 
(0.037) (0.074) (0.075) (0.070) (0.140) (0.171) 
age -0.044*** -0.055*** -0.016 -0.014 -0.089*** -0.010 
(0.011) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.033) (0.037) 
age2 0.000*** 0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White 0.064 0.161 0.001 0.210 0.300 0.270 
(0.075) (0.145) (0.140) (0.167) (0.293) (0.345) 
Black 0.056 0.398** 0.227 0.110 0.623* 0.406 
(0.094) (0.179) (0.173) (0.208) (0.349) (0.427) 
(lag) Blue Collar 0.634*** 1.195*** 1.585*** 0.7 13*** 1.337*** 1.583*** 
(0.045) (0.070) (0.072) (0.088) (0.144) (0.156) 
(lag) Service sect. -0.644*** -0.950*** -1.032*** -0.531 *** -1.312*** -1.232* ** 
(0.077) (0.150) (0.157) (0.133) (0.270) (0.220) 
ln(household size) 0.071 *** 0.028 0.010 0.024 0.095 -0.002 
(0.019) (0.033) (0.035) (0.030) (0.071) (0.071) 
Sorne college -0.009 -0.035 -0.047 0.086** -0.129 -0.0 Il 
(0.025) (0.045) (0.047) (0.043) (0.092) (0.086) 
University -0.376*** -0.459*** -0.403*** -0.373*** -0.505*** -0.355** 
(0.041) (0.074) (0.075) (0.082) (0.146) (0.145) 
House owner -0.959*** -1.317*** -1.350*** -0.871 *** -1.564*** -1.320*** 
(0.056) (0.115) (0.116) (0.113) (0.268) (0.221) 
num. hh Children -0.242*** -0.225 *** 0 .031 -0.326*** 0.023 -0.003 
(0.052) (0.087) (0.083) (0.090) (0.176) (0.162) 
State-level 8.986*** 10.620*** 14.419*** 7.875 *** 8.192*** 15.202*** 
unemp. rate (1 .046) (1.919) (2.057) (1.625) (3.073) (4.798) 
lag. hh Income dum. y y 
Region dumrnies y y 
Year dummies y y 
Month dummies y y 
Observations 501,116 116,929 
Pseudo R2 0.0794 0.0859 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<O.Ol , ** p<0.05, * p<O.l 
°Clustering at the individuallevel. 
Full sample includes private for profi t or government workers employed full ti me last year and are now either still employed in 
similar conditions, worked Jess than 35 hours last week for business-related reasons or are on on temporary layoff. 
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pr(Employed) 
pr(Hours loss) 
pr(Layoffrecal/) 
pr(Layoff6m) 
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TABLE A.4: Propensity score correlations 
pr(Employed) 
1 
-0.9469 
-0.956 
-0.9125 
pr(Hours loss) 
1 
0.8316 
0.7395 
pr(Layoffrecall) 
1 
0.9366 
pr(Layoff6m) 
1 
Note : Unmatched propensity scores estimates, the underlying multinomial logit estimation is shown in table 
A.3, columns l to 3. 
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TABLE A.5: Matching, alternative specifications 
Dep. Var: ôlog food expend.a ATTb 
Matching Matching on Only December 
Treatment Controls only on 2 nearest obs. for propens 
prop. scores neighbors scores estimates 
1 Layoff6m Employed -0.151 *** -0.151 *** -0.14*** (0.043) (0.053) (0.044) 
2 Layoffrecall Employed -0.048 -0.087 -0.051 (0.055) (0.062) (0.057) 
3 Hours loss Employed 0.001 -0.01 0.013 (0.03) (0.035) (0.029) 
4 Layoff6m Hours loss 
-0.141 ** -0.145** -0.138** 
(0.061) (0.063) (0.061) 
5 Layoffrecall Hours loss 
-0.075 -0.042 -0.033 
(0.068) (0.071) (0.073) 
6 Layoff6m Layoffrecall 
-0.149* -0.157** -0.054 
(0.078) (0.079) (0.082) 
Standard errors in parentheses, s.e. =*** p<O.Ol, ** p<0.05, * p<O.l. 
•Yearly change in weekly household spending at supermarkets, grocery stores, meat markets, produce stands, bakeries, 
restaurants, fas t food places, cafeterias and vending machines, etc. 
bMahalanobis di stance matching on propensity score of the treated, propensity score of the controls and sex, as described in 
Lechner(2002) BIB. The multinomiallogit estimates of the propensity scores is shown in table A.3 of the Appendix. 
cNote, 3 728 observations were initially excluded to ensure common support on ali propensity scores. 
Full sample includes private fo r profit or _government workers employed fu ll time last year and are now either still employed in 
similar conditions, worked Jess than 35 oours last week for business-related reasons or are on on temporary layoff. 
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Annexe B 
Employment protection and Work 
Hours Variability 
B.l Technical Appendix 
B.l.l Solving analytically the benchmark mode] when adjustment 
is instantaneous 
When adjustment is instantaneous, the number of choice variables is reduced to 
four : labor and hours when the priee is high or when priee is low : n, !J:, h, f1, and 
n- n =fln. Value fonctions 2.7 and 2.8 can be written as timeless state variables in 
which hiring and firi ng is done only fo llowing a shock. We can already substitute a (!ln) 
by ch(!ln) and CJ(fln), anticipating the fact that the firm will find it optimal to hire 
workers when the priee changes top and to fire workers when the priee changes top. 
1 
V (n, p) = TI (n, p) dt+ 
1 
+ rdt { ( 1 - qdt) V (n, p) + qdt [V (!1, p_) - c 1 (tm) J } (B .1) 
1 
V (!1 ,p_) = I1 (!1 ,p_) dt+ 1 + rdt { (1- qdt) V (!1 , p_) + qdt [V (n , p) - ch (fln)]} (B.2) 
Solving for each value, 
(q+r)V(n ,p) =I1(n,p)+qdt [v (!1 ,p_) -c1 (~n)] 
(q + r) V (!1, p_) = I1 (!1, p_) + qdt [V (n, p) - ch (fln)] 
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When facing a priee increase or decrease, the firm's optimization problems are 
max,; 71V (n,p)- ch (L1n) ., 
max!l,f!: V (!!:., p_) -cf (Lln) 
B.l.l.l A 1.1 First order conditions 
The first order ·conditions for hours are 
av(n,p) = _1_an(n,p) =O 
h q+r h (B.3) 
a v (!!:. , p_) = _1_ an (!!:. , p_) = 0 b: q+r b: (B.4) 
And the first order conditions for labor are 
av(n,p)_ 1 [an(n,/5) _,(A)] '( )-o 
_ -=---- _ - qc1 tin -c11 Lln-n q+r n 
(B.5) 
av(!!:.,!?__) = _1_ [an (!!:. ,P) + qc~ (L1n)] + cj (L1n) = O 
!!:. q+r !!:. - 1 (B.6) 
Note that the second order conditions for a maximum are satisfied for convex or 
concave adjustment costs, as long as they are not jointly too concave. 1 
B.1.1.2 A 1.2 Optimal hours and labor 
Combining equations first order conditions B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and the first order 
derivative of the profit functions n (n, p) and n (!!:. , p_)' we see how optimal adjustment 
costs affect the optimality conditions for firms. 
1. Second order conditions require for a maximum that 
(q + r)c~ (ilil ) + qc'J ( t..n) + T? [ n(_) - _ ~- )]-! > 0 
w" h py" nh 
and 
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Optimal hours are now different for different priee levels. 
hw' (h) = w (h) + ( q + r) c~7 (tm) + q cj (fln) 
h.w' (h.) = w (h.) - q_c~1 (fln ) - (q_ + r) cj (fln ) 
139 
(B.7) 
(B.8) 
The reason is that the marginal cost of increasing work hours h, hw' (h) , has to equal 
the wage tag of an extra worker, w (h) , plus its immediate hiring cost (q + r) c~ (fln) and 
its future discounted fi ring cost qcj (fln). On the countrary, wh en the priee falls to f!_, 
keeping an extra worker is 'cheaper' since doing so saves on immediate firing costs 
(q_ + r) cj ( !!.n) and fu ture rehiring cos ts q_c~ (fln ). 
The optimallabor force now salves 
phy' (nh) = w (h) + (q + r) c;t (fln)+ qcj (fln) 
E.hY' (nh) = w (h.)- q_c~1 (fln)- (q_ + r) cj (fln) 
(B.9) 
(B. lü) 
which is the equivalent of the optimallabor condition (8) in Bertola (1990) equating 
the marginal return of a worker's output toits marginal cost. 
A 1.3 Comparative statics for firing costs 
To discuss the impact of changes tq fi ring costs, let us redefi ne the function cf (fln) -
c JO (fln) + L x fln, where L is simply a linear component of cf th at will be allowed to 
vary. Taking the total derivative of B.7, B.8, B.9, B.10 with respect ton, !J:, h, h. and L , 
we find that the impact of an increase in linear firing costs on hours are 
dh 
dL 1 [- 1 [ n 1 l (- ) " l hw"(h)IJI q- h2 w"(h) - py"(nh) q+q_+r rch(fln) 
dh. 1 [ 1 [ !!: 1 l (- ) If l dL = - h.w"(h.)IJI q_+r+ h.2 w"(h.)- p_y"(nh) q+q_+r rch(fln) 
, where Ill = 1 + h w' (h) py' (nh) f is the deter-dr [ ,n-- ,1 1 [(q+r)c~(f1n)+qc"(fln)] 
+ ~2 [ w'~ft) - EY''(nh) [ q_c~ (fln) + (q_ + r) cj (fln) J 
minant of the Jacobian. Hence, ~Z should be positive, as long as ch is not too convex, 
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and ~2 should be negative as long as ch is not too concave (and III is positive, which 
requires that both costs functions not be too concave at ~n) . Renee, linear firing costs 
increase the gap between h and f1. 
Note that the magnitude of these effects depend on q, q_ and r, which hasan intuitive 
interpretation. A firm is less inclined to adjust its workforee if shocks are short-lived or 
if the future is discounted more. 
Priee variation CJ5- p) increase both hours and employment ft uctuations, a gain pro-
vided that the second order derivatives of adjustment costs are not too large. Similarly, 
shock probabilities q and q_ and interest rates decrease employment variation and in-
crease hours variations, provided modest second order effects of adjustment costs. 
B.1.1.3 A 1.4 No labor adjustment 
If priees vary little, if adjustment costs are important or if shocks are too frequent, 
the marginal productive gain to ad just the work force may not justify the cost of hiring 
and firing workers. In this case, the best option for the finn is to keep a constant staff 
n = !1 = n, within a certain band of n such that the frm does not hire when the priee is p 
or p. This is the equivalent of the inaction condition in Bertola (1990) or the 'no-action-
zone' in Chen and Funke (2002). In that regime, hours vary according to equation 2.6 
with a = 1. Obviously, hours are not affected by additional adjustment costs. 
B.1.1.4 Minimum hours 
Adding minimum hours hmin adds two constraints to the optimization problem. , 
71 2:: hmin and 11.2:: hmin· The interesting case is when 11. 2:: hmin is binding and 71 2:: hmin is 
not. Considering this case, conditions B.7 and B.9 are the same, B.8 becomes 11 = hmin 
and B.l 0 becomes p_hminY1 (!1hmin) = w ( hmin) - q_c~ ( ~n) - (q_ + r) cj ( ~n). 
The impact of hmin differs whether the firm adjusts or not its labor force to shocks. If 
it does, hmin only has a first order impact on !1 : that should be negative, again, provided 
that adjustment costs are not too concave. 
dn -m [p_y' (!1hmin) - w' (hmin) + hmin!1l!_y'' (!1hmin )] 
x [vy' (n71) 712 w" (71) + [ (q + r) c~ u~n) + qc'} (~n)] [py' (n71) n- w" (71)]] 
where 
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hw" (lï) h~inPY11 (!lhmin) 
-hw" (fi) [qc% (~n)~ (q+r) cj(~n)] 
[ 
ÎÏ w'' (fi) ] [ (- ) Il ( A ) - Il ( A ) ] h2 Il ( h ) h+ hpy''(nh) q+r ch LJ.n +qcf LJ.n minPY !1 min 
III= 
The only direct effect of minimum hours hmin on firm's decisions when priees are 
high depends on the concavity or convexity of adjustment costs. 
As can be seen clearly on figure 2.2, a direct impact of hmin is to force the firm to 
ad just labor on a range of adjustment costs larger than it would have otherwise. At these 
values, the impact of hmin is to lower labor n and increase h. 
B.1.2 Microfoundations for a convex wage fonction 
Since many key conclusions of the model rely on a smooth convex wage function 
w ( h) with w' ( h) > 0 and w" ( h) > 0, this assumption should not go without support. 1 
provide three justifications for this assumption. 
B.1.2.1 A natural trade-off between consomption and leisure 
Under very general assumptions, a convex wage function should be the natural 
outcome of an unregulated labor market. Assume a representative worker who enjoys 
consumption C and leisure L with utility function 
U = U (C ,L). 
He enjoys both consumption and leisure, but with decreasing returns, and consump-
tion and leisure are complements : U1 > 0, U2 > 0, U11 < 0, U22 < 0 and U12 > O. His 
consumption depends on his real wage w : C = w and his leisure depends on his total 
time endowment H minus his work hours h : L = H - h. Substituting both : 
U = U(w,H - h) 
Suppose a firm employing him wishes to increase his work hours, how much should 
his wage be increased in order to keep him indifferent ? 
dU= U1 (w,H-h)dw-U2(w,H -h)dh=O 
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dw U2 (w,H- h) 
dh U1 (w,H- h) 
And the wage rate increases with the length of hours : 
B.1.2.2 Decreasing returns to hours: an alternative to a convex wage fonction 
Instead of a convex wage fonction, the same conclusions could be reached with a 
constant wage rate, simply assuming a declining marginal productivity of hours. 
To see this, consider the production fonction with decreasing returns to hours 
y=y(nf(h*)) 
where h* are real hours and f (h*) are effective hours, with f' > 0 and f" < 0, capturing 
worker fatigue from long shifts. The profits would be 
rr = py(nf(h*)) - nwh* 
where w is now a fixed wage rate. 
To see that the mode! is equivalent, simply rewrite the profits in terms of effective 
hours with h = f (h*) and j - 1 (h) = h* : 
rr = py(nh)- nwf-1 (h) 
The problem is the same as the benchmark version if the wage rate fonction has the 
same properties as the original one. N oting th at f - 1' ( h) > 0 and f - 1" (h) > 0, we see 
that it is indeed the case : 
Of course, assuming both an increasing wage rate and a decreasing marginal pro-
ductivity would yield similar results since they both work in the same way. 
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B.1.2.3 A 'standard' wage fonction with overtime premium and uncertainty 
In reality, standard wage agreements are usually made of two parts : every hour 
worked under a threshold, say Ho, is paid the standard wage w- and every hour worked 
after Ho is paid w+ (this section will use capital letters to define the wage function 
avoiding any confusion with previous sections). In this context, the overtime prernium 
is w+ - w-. Although this function is a common assumption in the working time 
literature, it is difficult to include it in the present mode! because hours and labor are 
perfect productive substitutes (y= y(nh)). From the first order conditions 2.2, we see 
that the maximization problem would result in corner solutions, the optimal hours being 
either zero, Ho, or infinitely many. 
The trick will be to add uncertainty. If the exact number of hours are uncertain, so 
will be the wage bill. Denote H and W as the effective hours worked and wage paid. 
Assuming the firm is risk neutral, hours h and wage w(h) will be 
h=E(H) 
w(h) =E(W) 
For simplicity, assume a firm with a single employee with an uncertain hourly pro-
ductivity lJI. The manager chooses its optimal and mandatory level of output for the day 
Q, which should be produced in -$hours. Q is an intermediary variable relating hours 
and wage, it must not be confused with the general output level y (nh). The productivity 
level lJI is uncertain, and can vary between 0 and oo, however unlikely are these extreme 
values. The probability density function is f ( lJI ) and the cumulative function is F ( lJI ). 
Work hours are expected to be 
(A.l2) 
Since hours are uncertain, sois the total wage bill at the end of the day. First, note 
th at we must assume a fixed wage W f paid regardless of the work time. Otherwise, 
without fixed cost per worker, the optimal solution is an infinite work force working for 
infinitely short hours. This too is a direct consequence of the perfect substitutability of 
both inputs in production. 
If the productivity level is high, all the work can be completed before Ho and the 
total wage bill is W = W f + ~w- . But if the daily productivity is low, the time needed 
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to complete Q will exceed Ho and the wage bill will include an overtime premium for 
overtime hours : W = W f +w- Ho+ ( ~ -Ho) w +. The expected wage bill is thus 
E(W) ~t'' [ wt +w- Ho+ (e -Ho) w+ l dF(l[l) + 1: [ wt + ew-] dF(l[l) 
Ho 
(A.13) 
We now have a function relating the expected wage bill, E (W) to the expected 
number of hours E (H). All that is needed is to verify that it is concave, that is to say 
1 (h) - dE(W) 0 d Il (h) - d2E(W ) 0 Th" . . d d h . w - dE (H) > an w - (dE(H) )2 > . IS IS m ee t e case . 
dE(W) 
dE(H) 
and 
Q 
JE (w) JQ = w - + (w+- w - ) faRO ~dF (lfl) > o 
JQ JE(H ) fooo ~dF(lfl) 
() (dE (W) ) dE(il) JQ 
JQ JE (H) 
(w+- w - )f (Ho) 
Q (Jooo ~dF (lfl)) 2 > O. 
(A14) 
(A.15) 
Note from A14 that the wage rate is bounded between w- and w +. Are corner 
solutions possible ? If w- was too high, the optimal work hours would be zero and 
there would be no labor market. Thus, the market wage would have to decrease. As 
for the upper bound, the marginal value of an extra hour could in principle always 
be superior to w +, which would lead to an infinite number of hours. But in reality, 
other factors such as extra overtime premiums, workers fatigue or labor law effectively 
prevent this from happening. Thus, an interior solution can be safely assumed. 
B.2 Two-step estimation procedure 
For strategy 1, the procedure is the following. Stage one aggregates the data at the 
province x sec tor lev el assuming a linear probability model : 2 
p (Overtimei 1 p , s, t, ind. controlsi) = dps + y<f>ind. controlsi +FE,+ ei 
2. As described in Wooldridge (200 1 ), p. 455, the mode! is first estimated by ordinary !east squares to 
produce unbiased estimates of Va r (Overtime; 1 p ,s,ind. controls; ) = &? = Overtime;* ( 1- Overtime;), 
where values of Overtime; larger than 0.99 are set to 0.99 and values lower than 0.01 are set to 0.01 to 
main tain predicted probabilities within the unit interval and avoid probabilities of zero or one. Then, we 
use &? to produce feasible GLS estima tes to re-es ti mate p ( Overtime; 1 p, s, ind. con trois;) by weighted 
!east squares. 
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Stage two, estimate by feasable GLS : 
f3tlnd. not.p x Layoff rates+ f3zColl . not.pf x Layoff rates 
dps = 
FEp+FEs + Vp + T/ps 
where Ind. Not.p and Coll. Not.p are province levels of notice requirement, Layoff rates 
is the sectorallayoff rate, ind controlsi is a vector of individuallevel controls, v P is a 
province specifie error component and Ei is a individual specifie eiTOr component. each 
observation is weighted by the number of observations in each province x sector cell 
used used to compute stage 1 (again, see Donald and Lang (2001) or Wooldridge 2003 
for details and justifications). Note that sin ce this estimation is at the province x sector 
level, the firm size dimension is lost and we must use province average values of col-
lective notice requirements. 
To implement strategy 2, we must first di scretize the variable 
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B.3 The data 
co 
0 
_ç 
ëi5 """ Co Q) . 
0 
N q 
0 
0 1 0 20 30 40 50 
Unemployment duration (weeks) 
FIGURE B.1: Unemployment Durations Distribution. Only permanent layoffs due to 
business conditions (categories 12 and 13 of table B.S) from a private sector job with 
permanent contract. 
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TABLE B.l: Sample Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Dummy for "is working overtime" 0,10 0,30 
Number of overtime hours worked if > 0 8,33 7,31 
Unemployment rate by province*sector 0,06 0,04 
Dummy for Newfoundland 0,02 0,15 
Dummy for Prince Edward Island 0,02 0,14 
Dummy for Nova Scotia 0,05 0,22 
Dummy for New Brunswick 0,05 0,22 
Dummy for Québec 0,18 0,39 
Dummy for Ontario 0,34 0,47 
Dummy for Manitoba 0,07 0,26 
Dummy for Saskatchewan 0,06 0,25 
Dummy for Alberta 0,10 0,30 
Dummy for British Columbia 0,09 0,29 
Job tenure in months 81 ,73 80,06 
Firm of less than 20 employees 0,39 0,49 
Firm of 20 to 99 employees 0,32 0,47 
Firm of 100 to 500 employees 0,20 0,40 
Firm of More than 500 employees 0,09 0,28 
Age 15 to 19 0,07 0,25 
Age 20 to 24 0,11 0,31 
Age 25 to 29 0,12 0,32 
Age 30 to 34 0,12 0,33 
Age 35 to 39 0,14 0,35 
Age 40 to 44 0,14 0,35 
Age 45 to 49 0,12 0,33 
Age 50 to 54 0,09 0,29 
Age 55 to 59 0,06 0,23 
Age 60 to 64 0,03 0,16 
Age 65 to 69 0,01 0,08 
Age 70 and over 0,00 0,05 
Uni on member 0,19 0,39 
Not member of a union but covered by collee- 0,02 0,13 
tive agreement 
Neither union member nor covered by collee- 0,79 0,41 
tive agreement 
Nb of obs. 3 297 825 
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TABLE B.2: Notice requirements for individual and collective dismissal, various Cana-
dian jurisdictions, 1995 
Individual Mass 
Jurisdiction Tenure Notice Number Notice 
(wks) laid off (wks) 
Federal 3 months + 2 50+ 16 
Alberta 3 mos- 2 yrs 1 No special provision 
2 yrs - 4 yrs 2 
4 yrs- 6 yrs 4 
6 yrs- 8 yrs 5 
8yrs-10yrs 6 
10 yrs + 8 
British 6 mos- 3 yrs 2 No special provision 
Columbia 3 yrs 3 
+1 wk/yr up 8 
to 8 wks 
Manitoba 1 month + 1 pay 50- 100 10 
period 101 - 300 14 
300 + 18 
New 6 mos - 5 yrs 2 10 +,if they 6 
Brunswick 5 yrs + 4 repr. 25% of 
the workforce 
Newfoundland 1 mo- 2 yrs 1 50 - 199 8 
2 yrs + 2 200 -499 12 
500+ 16 
Nova Scotia < 2 yrs 1 10- 99 8 
2 yrs- 5 yrs 2 100- 299 12 
5 yrs- 10 yrs 4 300 + 16 
10 yrs + 8 
Ontario 3 mos- 1 yr 1 50- 199 8 
1 yr-3yrs 2 200 - 499 12 
3 yrs- 4 yrs 3 500 + 16 
4 yrs - S yrs 4 
5 yrs- 6 yrs 5 
6 yrs - 7 yrs 6 
7 yrs - 8 yrs 7 
8 yrs + 8 
Prince Edward 6 mos - 5 yrs 2 no special provision 
Island 5 yrs+ 4 
Que bec 3 mos- 1 yr 1 10 - 99 2mths 
1 yr-5yrs 2 100 - 299 3 mths 
5 yrs-10 yrs 4 300 + 4 mths 
10 yrs + 8 
Saskatchewan 3 mos- 1 yr 1 10-49 4 
1 yr- 3 yrs 2 50 - 99 8 
3 yrs - 5 yrs 4 100 + 12 
5 yrs -10 yrs 6 
10 yrs + 8 
Source: labor Canada, Employment Standards Leg1 slatJOn m Canada. 
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TABLE B.3: Construction of regional indices of employment protection 
Individual dismissal 
senior. A lb BC Man NB NF NS Ont PEI QC Sask % 
layoffs 
0,083 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3,8 
0,25 1 0 2 0 0 12,3 
0,5 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 14,5 
1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 15,4 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 15,0 
3 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 8,7 
4 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 5,9 
5 4 5 2 4 2 4 5 4 4 6 3,9 
6 5 6 2 4 2 4 6 4 4 6 2,8 
7 5 7 2 4 2 4 7 4 4 6 2,2 
8 6 8 2 4 2 4 8 4 4 6 1,7 
9 6 8 2 4 2 4 8 4 4 6 1,6 
10+ 8 8 2 4 2 8 8 4 8 8 12,2 
w. 2,71 3,20 2,00 2,17 1,54 2,52 3,10 2,17 2,63 3,17 
mean 
Collective dismissal 
SIZe Alb BC Man NB NF NS Ont PEI QC Sask 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 6 0 8 0 0 8 4 
25 0 0 0 6 0 8 0 0 8 4 
50 0 0 10 6 8 8 8 0 8 8 
100 0 0 14 6 8 12 8 0 12 12 
200 0 0 14 6 12 12 12 0 12 12 
300 0 0 14 6 12 16 12 0 16 12 
500 0 0 18 6 16 16 16 0 16 12 
1000 0 0 18 6 16 16 16 0 16 12 
Source: Wasmer (2006) and author's own calculations. 
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TABLE BA: Reasons for Leaving the Job 
Reason for leaving job, (Jess th an one year ago) Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 Le ft job, Other reasons 29105 2,9% 2,9% 
2 Left job, Own ill ness or disability 49415 5,0% 7,9% 
3 Left job, caring for own children 12687 1,3% 9,1 % 
4 Left job, pregnancy 14468 1,4% 10,6% 
5 Le ft job, other persona! or family responsibilities 18966 1,9% 12,5% 
6 Le ft job, going to school 203928 20,4% 32,9% 
7 Left job, dissati sfied 62514 6,3 % 39,2% 
8 Left job, retired 69742 7,0% 46,2% 
9 Left job, business sold or closed down (self-emp1oyed) 37757 3,8% 50,0% 
10 Lost job, end of seasonal job (employee) 153271 15,4% 65 ,3% 
11 Lostjob, end of temporary or casual (employee) 159409 16,0% 81,3% 
12* Lost job, company moved or out of business (employee) 22245 2,2% 83,5% 
13* Lostjob, business conditions (employee) 139114 13,9% 97,5% 
14 Lost job, dismissa1 or other reasons 25253 2,5% 100,0% 
Total 997874 100,0% 
*Categories used in computing layoff rates 
T
A
B
LE
 B
.5
: M
ea
n 
W
ee
kl
y 
H
ou
rs
 b
y 
Pr
ov
in
ce
s 
N
F 
PE
I 
N
S 
N
B
 
Qc
 
O
nt
 
M
an
 
R
eg
ul
ar
 
34
.6
4 
34
.3
0 
34
.3
3 
34
.8
5 
32
.9
6 
34
.0
8 
33
.7
6 
H
ou
rs
 
(16
.28
) 
(15
.28
) 
(15
.88
) 
(15
.02
) 
(14
.59
) 
(15
.10
) 
(15
.29
) 
O
ve
rti
m
e 
8.
98
 
8.
23
 
8.
33
 
8.
10
 
7.
44
 
8 .
36
 
7.
62
 
H
ou
rs
 (>
0) 
(8
.
10
) 
(6.
93
) 
(7.
49
) 
(7
.
00
) 
(6.
54
) 
(6.
42
) 
(6.
94
) 
R
at
io
 W
or
là
ng
 
0.
08
 
0.
07
 
0.
09
 
0.
08
 
0.
09
 
0.
11
 
0.
11
 
O
ve
rti
m
e 
(0
.
27
) 
(0.
25
) 
(0
.
28
) 
(0
.
27
) 
(0
.
29
) 
(0.
31
) 
(0.
31
) 
N
b 
o
fo
bs
. 
77
 9
06
 
67
 9
86
 
17
3 
62
2 
16
9 
09
2 
60
1 
03
7 
11
17
17
5 
23
4 
92
2 
n
o
le
 : 
s
ta
n
da
rd
 d
e
v
ia
tio
n
s
 i
n
 p
ar
e
n
th
e
s
is
 
Sa
s 
A
lb
 
33
.3
6 
35
.5
2 
(16
.16
) 
(16
.57
) 
8.
93
 
9.
98
 
(8.
39
) 
(9.
48
) 
0.
10
 
0.
13
 
(0.
30
) 
(0.
34
) 
21
2 
45
9 
33
0 
89
0 
B
C
 
32
.6
0 
(15
.35
) 
7.
61
 
(7.
38
) 
0.
09
 
(0.
29
) 
31
2 
73
6 
;J:.
. 
:g g 0..
 
s.·
 
tl:
) f ~ i3 (1) :::;. -a (b (') g· êi 0.. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~- >!. t:c '< -U1 -
B.4 Data Source 
- Labor Force Survey (LFS) of 1997 to 2005, Survey number 71M0001. More 
information available at http ://www40.statcan.gc.ca/101/cst01/other/lfsllfsintro-
eng.htm (active the 02/04/2009) 
Annexe C 
Employment Protection Laws and 
Work Stress 
C.l Data Appendix, cross-country data 
C.l.l Controls 
C.l.l.l The cross country controls 
Regarding country controls, many authors including Lazear (1990), Layard and Ja-
ckman (1991) or Blanchard and Wolfers (1999), report links between EPL and other 
labor market institutions. To dampen the risk of spurious correlations from omitted va-
riable bias, we include control variables at the country level. We add : Unemployment 
level s (specifie for age and sex). Apart of purely self selection risk previously di scus-
sed, the cheer prospect of losing a job could be a permanent ource of stress especially 
if the unemployment rate is high ; Union density (the portion of workers members of a 
trade union); Bargaining coverage 1 ; Unemployment insurance benefits : Various au-
thors note that they tend to be negatively related with EPL. Their possible effect on 
stress is obvious; Wage coordination (the level (plant/industry/national) at which bar-
gaining takes place); Wage centralization (the degree of coordination between negotia-
ting members); GDP per capita. Sources are provided in the Online Appendix. 
1. Gürtzgen (2005) finds that higher collective bargaining (the portion of workers affected by coiJec-
tive negotiations) tends to nullify the link between local market conditions and wage settings. This could 
also affect employers responses to shocks. 
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C.1.1.2 Individual controls 
The available individual controls that could be harmonized between the EWCS and 
Eurobarometer panels are the sex, age, number of children in the household, total hou-
sebald size, finn size, activity sector (12), job title (10), having to respect deadlines, 
to work at high speed, having enough skill for the job, weekly hours, working in hard 
positions, with noise, on repetitive work, with dangerous substances, at extreme tem-
peratures, with fumes, having to carry heavy abjects, feeling that the work impairs the 
health by affecting breathing, hearing, sight or the skin, having to work at night, to 
change methods or speed of work, getting help from colleagues, being a supervisor and 
being the family main earner. 
Many controls are most likely independent to the labor market and will be included 
in all regressions. But many others are related to the work environment itself. Since 
stress is suppose to capture the general work climate, we should be careful before in-
troducing too many controls. For example, if demanding workers to change methods 
or speed of work is a way in which EPL induces work stress, it should stay out of the 
equation. 
C.1.2 Summary statistics 
TABLE C.l: 'Frictionless' Job destruction rates 
Activity Sector 
Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Financial Intermediation 
Real estate and business activities 
Electricity, gas and water supply 
Transportation and communication 
Construction 
Other services 
Hotels and restaurants 
Wholesale and retail trade repairs 
Agriculture/hunting/forestry/fishing 
'Frictionless' Job destruction rates 
0,064 
0,057 
0,050 
0,048 
0,040 
0,037 
0,037 
0,034 
0,032 
0,032 
0,030 
~----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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TABLE C.2: Cross-country descriptive statistics, EWCS 2000,2001,2005 and Eurobarometer 
1996 
Variable Mean SD 
Job affects health : stress 0.267 0.443 
health consequence 0.264 0.441 
Job affects health : anxiety 0.064 0.245 
Job affects health : headache 0.155 0.362 
Job affects health : heart 0.015 0.12 
Job affects health : irritability 0.108 0.31 
Job affects health : sleeping 0.08 0.271 
Job affects health : stomach 0.052 0.221 
Subjected at work to bullying 1 harassment ? 0.072 0.258 
Job involves learning 0.719 0.449 
Skills match demands 0.762 0.426 
Able to change methods 0.744 0.436 
Repetitive tasks 0.475 0.499 
Carry heavy loads (1-Never to 7- Always) 2.41 1.77 
Can get help from colleagues 0.905 0.294 
Satisfied with job (1 to 4) 3.086 0.722 
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TABLE C.3: Cross-country descriptive statistics, EWCS 2000, 2001, 2005 and Eurobar. 1996 
Variable Mean SD Variable Mean SD 
Sex: is a man 0.58 0.49 Elementary occupations 0. 11 0.31 
Aged 20 to 25 0.11 0.3 1 Armed forces 0.00 0.03 
Aged 25 to 30 0.1 5 0.36 16 - 20 weekly hours 0.05 0.21 
Aged 30 to 40 0.32 0.47 21 - 25 weekly hours 0.03 0.17 
Aged 40 to 50 0.27 0.44 26 - 30 weekly hours 0.04 0.21 
Aged 50 to 60 0. 16 0.37 31- 35 weekly hours 0.07 0.25 
No children 0.53 0.50 36 - 40 weekly hours 0.54 0.50 
1 child 0.24 0.42 41 - 45 weekly hours 0. 11 0.3 1 
2 children 0.17 0.37 46 - 50 weekly hours 0.09 0.29 
3 children 0.05 0.23 51 - 55 weekly hours 0.02 0.13 
4+ children 0.01 0.11 56- 60 weekly hours 0.03 0.18 
household of 1 persan 0.15 0.35 61 - 65 weekly hours 0.00 0.07 
household of 2 people 0.25 0.43 66 weekly hours + 0.02 0.15 
household of 3 people 0.24 0.42 Au stria 0.07 0.25 
household of 4 people 0.25 0.43 Belgium 0.06 0.24 
household of 5 people 0.09 0.28 Czech Rep. 0.04 0.20 
household of 6 people 0.03 0.16 Den mark 0.06 0.23 
household of 7 or more people 0.01 0.08 Fin land 0.05 0.23 
2-9 employees in finn 0.30 0.46 France 0.06 0.24 
10-49 employees in finn 0.29 0.46 Gennany 0.09 0.29 
50-99 employees in finn 0.10 0.30 Gree ce 0.04 0.20 
100-499 employees in finn 0.16 0.37 Hungary 0.04 0.20 
500+ employees in fim1 0.14 0.35 lreland 0.05 0.22 
Agri., hunting, forestry and fi shing 0.03 0.16 Ital y 0.05 0.22 
Mining and quarrying 0.00 0.06 Netherlands 0.07 0.25 
Manufacturing 0.28 0.45 Norway 0.01 0.12 
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.02 0.12 Po1and 0.03 0.17 
Construction 0.09 0.29 Portugal 0.05 0.22 
Wholesale and retail tracte repairs 0.19 0.39 Slovak Republic 0.04 0.20 
Hotels and restaurants 0.05 0.21 Spain 0.04 0.20 
Transportation and communication 0.07 0.26 Sweden 0.05 0.22 
Financia1 intermediation 0.05 0.22 Switzer1and 0.02 0.13 
Real estate and business activities 0.07 0.26 Turkey 0.01 0.10 
Public administration 0.01 0.12 United Kingdom 0.05 0.22 
Other services 0.15 0.35 1996 0.22 0.4 1 
Legislators and senior off. 0.04 0.19 2000/2001 0.46 0.50 
Professionals 0.08 0.27 2005 0.33 0.47 
Technicians and associate prof. 0.14 0.35 Clerks 0.16 0.37 
Craft and related trades workers 0.21 0.40 Operators and assemblers 0.10 0.30 
Serv. and sales workers 0.15 0.36 Agricultural and fi shery 0.0 1 0.12 
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TABLE C.4: Descriptive statistics, Canadian NPHS 
Variable Mean SD Variable Mean SD 
Male 49.7 Depression (score, 0-8) 0.38 1.44 
Immigrants 19.6 Depression (pro ba, 0-1) 0.058 0.22 
Urban area 81.4 Blood pressure 0.095 0.29 
Age (}1 ) 43.3 10.9 Stress Overall (0-48) 10.42 4 .33 
Household size (}1) 3.06 1.39 Stress, skill requirement (0-12) 4.78 2.20 
Primary education 17.8 Stress, decision latitude (0-8) 2.53 1.64 
Secondary education 15.5 Stress, psychological (0-8) 4.52 1.71 
Sorne post secondary educ. 26.6 Stress, physical exertion (0-4) 1. 84 1.22 
Tertiary 40.7 Stress, job insecurity (0-4) 1.24 0 .96 
Trauma (0-7) 1.06 1.23 Stress, coworkers (0-12) 4.12 1.29 
No medical insurance 0.23 Stress, job strain (0.2-5) 0.95 0 .3 1 
Psychotropic drugs EPL_ind (lmputed) 4.18 2 .88 
1. Tranquilizer 0.030 0.947 EPL_co ll (lmputed) 6.14 4 .60 
2.Anti-depressant 0.047 0.930 EPL_inda (Imputed) 4.06 2 .96 
3.Sleeping pill 0.034 0.943 EPL_cona (Imputed) 5.80 4 .65 
Yes to one psychotropic drug 0.085 
a accounting for the information on whether the employed individual was under a temporary contract and anribu ring no advance 
notice in this case . 
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TABLE C. 8: Cross-country descriptive statistics, ISSP 1997, 2005 and Eurobarometer 2001 
Variable Mean SD 
How often -do you fi nd your work stressful ? 1-Never to 5-always 3.193 0.964 
Management -employees relations at workplace 1-Very bad to 5-Very good 3.815 0.933 
Freedom in planing hours 1-No freedom to 3-Complete freedom 1.572 0.628 
Physical work 1 :Never to 5-Always 2.443 1.274 
Management-employees relations at workplace 1-Very bad to 5-Very good 3.815 0.933 
Job satisfaction 1-Completely dissatisfied to 7-Completely satisfied 5.086 1.283 
Easy fi nd other acceptable job? 1-Very difficult 5-Very easy 2.59 1.18 
Likely to fi nd job ? (Unemployed) 1-Very likely to 4-Very unlike1y 2.562 1.077 
Worry about losing your job ? 1-Don't worry at all to 4-Worry a great deal 1.893 0.937 
My job is secure 1-Disagrees to 4-Strongly agree 2.745 0.978 
My job is interesting 1-Disagrees to 4 Strongly agree 2.884 0.915 
Experience 1 skills match job requirements 0.681 0.466 
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TABLE C.9: Cross-country descriptive statistics, ISSP 1997, 2005 and Eurobarometer 2001 
Variable Mean SD Variable Mean 
Sex: is a man 0.46 0.498 16- 20 weekly hours 0.041 
Aged 20 to 25 0.127 0.333 21 - 25 weekly hours 0.033 
Aged 25 to 30 0.136 0.343 26 - 30 weekly hours 0.044 
Aged 30 to 40 0.272 0.445 31 - 35 weekly hours 0.068 
Aged 40 to 50 0.243 0.429 36 - 40 weekly hours 0.454 
Aged 50 to 60 0.223 0.416 41 - 45 weekly hours 0.16 
Age end educ. : still studying 0.027 0.161 46 - 50 weekly hours 0.109 
Age end educ. : Jess than 10 0.027 0.163 51 - 55 weekly hours 0.025 
Age end educ. : 10 to 15 0.197 0.398 56 - 60 weekly hours 0.039 
Age end educ. : 16 to 17 0.206 0.405 61 - 65 weekly hours 0.005 
Age end educ. : 18 0.238 0.426 66+ weekly hours 0.021 
Age end educ. : 19 to 20 0.154 0.361 1997 0325 
Age end educ. : 21 to 25 0.141 0.348 2001 0.333 
Age end educ. : 26 to 30 0.008 0.088 2005 0.342 
Age end educ. : 31 to 76 0.002 0.047 Legisl. , senior officiais, managers 0.085 
Married or living as married 0.629 0.483 Professionals 0.114 
Widowed 0.024 0.153 Technicians, associate profes. 0.174 
Divorced 0.073 0.261 Clerks 0.138 
Separated 0.024 0.153 Service, shop and sales workers 0.135 
Single, not married 0.247 0.431 Skilled agricultura1, fishery workers 0.015 
Other marital arrangement 0.002 0.047 Craft and related trades workers 0.163 
Urban region 0.305 0.46 Plant/machine op. and assemblers 0.101 
Suburbs, city-town region 0.366 0.482 Elementary occupations 0.075 
Rural region 0.33 0.47 
C.2 OECD employment protection index 
The three main components of employment protection are protection against indi-
vidual layoff, against collective layoff and restrictions of use of temporary contracts 
(:fixed term contracts (FTC), and ternporary work agencies (TWA)). 
SD 
0.198 
0.178 
0.205 
0.251 
0.498 
0.367 
0.312 
0.156 
0.194 
0.073 
0.142 
0.468 
0.471 
0.474 
0.279 
0.318 
0.379 
0.345 
0.342 
0.12 
0.37 
0.302 
0.263 
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The individual protection index is based on the difficulty of dismissal (the condi-
tions to be met for a dismissal to be considered as "fair" considering the professional 
and persona! situation of the employee), the procedural burden of the dismissal for the 
employer (the legal possibilities for the worker to challenge the decision and third party 
involvement in the process) and finally the notice and severance pay for no-fault dis-
missal (mandatory notification period before the end of the contract and the length of 
the pay after). 
The collective protection index corresponds to additional provisions applicable to 
mass layoffs. It is the sum of severa! indicators : Strictness of the definition of collective 
dismissal (thershold of 10, 20 or 50 dismissals or no provision), Additional notification 
requirements, Additional delays involved before notice can start, Other special costs to 
employers. The most recent version of the index takes these rules into account. 
Fin ally, restrictions of use of temporary con tracts are the sum of six indicators : Va-
lid cases for use of fixed-term contracts (FTC), Maximum number of successive FTC, 
Maximum cumulated duration of successive FTC, Types of work for which tempo-
rary work agency (TWA) employment is legal, Restrictions on number of renewals and 
Maximum cumulated duration of TWA contracts. 
The final OECD EPL index also measures the cost of these additional burdens on 
firms. The summary EPL indicator is EPL= 5/ 12*EPLindividual + 5/ 12*EPLremporary+ 
2/ 12 * EPLco/lective· 
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TABLE C.lO: Total EPL indices in OECD countries 
Country Mean EPL Country MeanEPL 
United States 0,66 Belgium 2,50 
New Zealand 1,04 Netherlands 2,52 
United Kingdom 1,05 Slovak Republic 2,53 
Canada 1,14 Norway 2,67 
Ire land 1,25 Sweden 2,68 
Australia 1,47 German y 2,80 
Switzerland 1,60 France 2,85 
Hungary 1,61 Spain 3,04 
Denmark 1,83 Turkey 3,36 
Po land 1,92 Ital y 3,38 
Czech Republic 1,94 Greece 3,50 
Finland 2,15 Portugal 3,66 
A us tria 2,39 
C.3 Cross-country datasets 
C.3.1 The micro data 
The source of the micro data sets used to build our two OECD panels are the 
- International Social Survey Program 1989 : Work Orientations I (ISSP 1989). 
Identification number: ZA1840 at http :1/zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp 
- International Social Survey Program 1997 : Work Orientations II (ISSP 1997). 
Identification number: ZA3090 at http :1/zacat. gesis.org/webview/index.jsp 
- Eurobarometer 35.A Working Conditions March-April 1991. Identification num-
ber: ZA 2033 at http :1/zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp 
- Eurobarometer 44.2 Working Conditions in the European Union November 1995 
-January 1996. Identification number: ZA2789 at http :1/zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.j sp 
- Eurobarometer 56.1 Social Exclusion and Modernization of Pension Systems. 
Identification number: ZA3626 at http :1/zacat.gesis .org/webview/i ndex.j sp 
----------- -----------------------------------
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- Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.1 Identification Number: ZA4153 at 
http :1 /zac at. ge sis. org/webview lindex.j sp 
- EQLS (2003) European Quality of Life Survey. 
http ://www.eurofound.eu.int/living/qual_lifelindex.htm 
- Fourth European Working Conditions Survey (2005). 
http ://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/surveys/EWCS2005/index.htm 
C.3.2 NHPS sample 
The target population includes all 1994 residents of Canada, excluding th ose on In-
dian Reserves and Crown Lands, in health institutions, Canadian Forces bases and sorne 
remote areas in Ontario and Quebec. Northern regions (the Yukon, Nunavut and the 
Northwest Territories), where population density is low, were excluded from the analy-
sis. The number of longitudinal panel members is 17,276; Number of panel members 
who have died by 2007: 1,279; Number of panel members who have been institutiona-
lized: 161 ; Number of respondent panel members: 12,484; Number of non-respondent 
panel members : 3,352. A full description of the survey can be found on the website 2 . 
C.3.3 Employment protection in Canadian provinces 
For most dimensions of EPL in Canada, no systernatic documentation exists at the 
provinciallevel because they are often a matter of jurisprudence. The one exception are 
advance notice requirernents for which no provision existed imrnediately after World 
War II were progressively incorporated in regional law, following courts decisions in 
specifie cases. 
Advance notice requirements are an important area of EPL : they reduce employer 
discretion regarding dismissals ; they are often an irnplicit severance payment in cases 
where workers are asked to stay at horne during the period, and finally they have well-
known effects on hiring decisions and labor markets dynarnics. 3 Differences across 
2. http ://www.statcan.ca/cgi-binlimdb/p2SV.pl ?Function=getSurvey&SDDS= 
3225&lang=en&db=IMDB&dbg=f&adm=8&dis=2 
3. See e.g. Garibaldi (1999) for theory and sorne data analysis for OECD countries. For Canada, 
Friesen (1997) has used the same variations to study the impact of advance notice regional differences 
on employment duration and found that longer advance notice both raises the fraction of job-to-job 
moves and reduces the hazard rate. 
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provinces can be seen in a table in Fliesen and Kuhn (1997) and Human Resources and 
Social Development Canada (the Federallabor agency). Advance notice requirements 
initially reftected the dedsions of local courts before being integrated into provincial 
law. Local judges decided that, for a worker with n years of seniolity, a p month's 
notice period was to be imposed on the firm. Differences across provinces therefore 
reftect the latter's differing philosophies regarding economie layoffs : it is quite likely 
that other areas of EPL are correlated with the length of advance notice. This will be 
our working hypothesis. Details of the construction of EPL indices and ex-post checks 
of the consistency with other employment regulation indices are provided in Wasmer 
(2006b). 
C.4 Model Appendix 
The model summarized in the paper is developed here. It is designed to illustrate the 
various adjustment mechanisms in a firm facing restrictions on its ability to fire wor-
kers. It illustrates the fact that a worker's utility may actually decrease with employment 
protection if employers react to EPL in a way affecting their working conditions. 
The setup is as follows. Workers live two periods only and then die. The firrn is 
indefinitely lived. The model focuses on two relevant time periods where the firm and 
the worker are matched. In the fi rst period, the worker is already employed in the firm : 
we do not focus on hiring decisions, although this would be a straightforward exten-
sion. Productivity and idiosyncratic utility of the worker are revealed only at the end 
of the first period. Revelation of this information Jeads to either a quit, a Jayoff or the 
continuation of the employment relationship in second period. Layoff costs affect the 
separation decision, and thus the first-period effort strategy of the worker and the mo-
nitoring by the firm. 
--------------------------------, 
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C.4.1 Worker and quits 
Each period, the worker chooses an effort level e on the job, and receives a wage w. 
The wage is assumed to be exogenous. 4 Overall, the flow utility of a worker is 
%' = W + ( -[c(e) +qm] + qw + y ) , 
wage disutility from eff<Jrt and of monitoring firm 's effort to affect o/6 random ut1hty of match 
non-pecuniary component of the job 
(C.l) 
where the utility of the worker is reduced by c( e) + qm, where qm 2:: 0 is the intensity 
of monitoring, and c( e) is increasing convex in effort. The quantity qw is a variable 
chosen by the firm to affect the utility of the worker. It is interpreted as the quality of 
the working environment. This quantity can be either positive or negative. In addition, 
v is a random variable reftecting unknown factors ex-ante, such as the quality of the 
relationship of the worker with his/her colleagues or with the management. The mode-
ling choices imply that monitoring and working conditions are perfect substitutes and 
thus, in this case, are formally the same "object". The quantity q111 - qw + v reftects the 
general environment of the firm, which is both random through v and chosen by the 
firm through the q's. 
The worker can obtain a level of utility %' outside the firm. This level of utility 
depends a priory on search frictions and is lower in a more sclerotic labor market, 
although we do not explicit this link in the paper. Th us, if not fi red, the worker will quit 
the firm at the end of period 1 if utility on the job in period 2 is lower than %'. 
C.4.2 Fi and layoff 
Monitoring and affecting working conditions is not costless. Let C( qm , qw) be the 
cast function with q111 2:: 0 and qw ~ O. The monitoring intensity qm is set each period. In 
contrast, working conditions are persistent through the two periods, and are decided in 
4. By this exogeneity assumption, we want to prevent employers to eut down the wage so that the 
worker would nece sarily quit at zero cost for the firm. This assumption is meant to capture the fact 
that such an explicit behavior by fi rms is limüed by nominal downwards wage rigidity. The fact is that a 
strong wage eut may be as efficient as bullying to make workers quit, but this can be detected by a judge 
much more ea il y and th us ex-p<Jst qui te cos tl y. We will come back on this point in the conclusion of this 
Section. 
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period 1. 5 So, by the cast of qw, we re fer here to the cast paid in period 1, which does 
not have to be repaid in period 2. The cast function is assumed increasing and convex in 
bath arguments. Further, the minimum cast is reached in C(O, 0) = O. This means that 
it costs sorne money to affect-either positively or negatively-the working conditions 
of the worker. Note that the cast of a negative qw can be interpreted as a reputation cast. 
The effort of the worker enters linearly in the revenue function, as a normalization. 
There is a random productivity component denoted byE. So, overall, the flow profit of 
the tirm is 
7r= e - w- C(q111 ,qw) + e 
worker's effort to affect n wage cost from monitoring and working conditions random productivity of match 
At the end of period 1, when E and v are revealed, the firm may decide to terminate 
the employment relation which has exogenous value 7t minus possible separation costs. 
Separation can be implemented in severa! ways. Most simply, the firm can tire the 
worker for economie reasons (that is, a no-fault layoff denoted hereafter by NF-layoff), 
which costs -r to the tirm. A fraction a-r accrues to the worker. This is a severance 
payment with 0 :::; a :::; 1. The case a = 0 conesponds to termination costs being a 
pure tiring tax : the worker receives no transfer. a = 1 conesponds to a pure severance 
payment. 6 The finn can also try to save on firing costs in two different ways : first, 
by attempting to layoff for fault or for cause (a F-layoff), which has no cast but has 
uncertain success ; second : by letting the worker quit. In the case of a quit, we assume 
that there is no cast of separation. 
Why would the tirm fire for economie reason if it can tire for cause at no cast? 
The answer is that a F-layoff is a random procedure, in the sense that, as commonly 
observed in several countries, the conflict between a firm and a worker is arbitrated 
by an outside party Uudge, semi-professional court) and the decision, based on severa! 
informai factors, cannat always be anticipated. We will denote by F the probability of 
success of this procedure, and F is a function of the various decisions made by the 
agents in period 1. How does this work here ? Denote by e the exogenous, common-
knowledge reference effort; the effort exerted by the worker e may differ from the 
5. This is not important : what matters is that the firm sets qw before the information on productivity 
and idiosyncratic utility is revealed. 
6. A strictly positive a makes sure the worker never quits in the NF-regime : she/he is strictly better 
off in waiting the layoff and receiving ar. 
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target e. When it is below e, the firm can try to prove a fault. The randomness of the 
F-procedure is due to the fact that e is not directly observable by a third party. This is 
a frequent assumption in the contract literature. Accordingly, the success probability F 
depends positively on e- e : the further away from the effort requirement, the easier 
to establish a fault. Second, we assume that F depends positively on the monitoring 
intensity : as the information set about the worker's activity is larger due to doser and 
more accurate control by the firm, it is easier for the firm to establish a fault. Finally, 
although this is not essential here, we further assume a complementarity between mo-
nitoring intensity qm and the effort gap e- e , as the marginal impact of shirking should 
be larger, the more intense the monitoring. 
Assumption 1. The success of the layoff procedure for fault F positively depends 
onqm(e-e): 
F = F[qm (e - e)] 
where F' > O. 
Finally, being subject to a procedure for fault may generate additional disutility to 
the worker, denoted by -I.. Fixing L, = 0 has however no implication for the results 
of the model, but a positive L, helps to understand why in practice, workers under the 
threat of a procedure for fault may prefer to quit more frequently instead of starting a 
conftict with the management. 
C.4.3 Timi g of eve ts 
The timing of events is as follows. 
- First period starts. The firm and the worker only know the distributions of ê and 
v. 
- Bothjointly determine their levels of e, qm and qw in a Nash equilibrium. Recall 
that the value of qw is fixed for the two periods of the match. 
- The idiosyncratic components of productivity ê and utility v are revealed. 
- Knowing this and correctly anticipating future events, the worker then decides 
whether or not. 
l 
i 
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- If (s)he does not quit, the firm may continue the employment relationship or 
instead lay off the worker, in picking up one of the two available procedures (F 
or NF). 
- Second period starts with predetermined value of qw, and known values of ë and 
v. 
C.S Solution of the model 
We proceed backward. First, we solve for optimal separation strategies-layoff and 
then quits in considering e, qm and qw as given. Second, we determine the choices on 
e, qm and qw, when agents correctly anticipate the separation strategies. 
C.S.l Optimal separation strategies of the firm 
When the worker has not resigned at the end of period 1, the firm needs to decide 
whether or not to keep the worker or to start a dismissal procedure. In period 2, the 
firm will face a continuation value re' ( ë) with the current worker (remember that ë and 
v are now known from the firm) , and an outside profit value n with another worker. 
As the second period is terminal for a worker, we will set e' = g_ the minimum level of 
effort; and the firm does not need to reinvest in qw since it was fixed in period 1. Thus, 
re'(ë) =ë +g_-w -C(O,O) = ë+g_-w. 
We thus need to compare the relative values of the various strategies. 
- NF (no-fault) has value n- -r 
- F (fault) has value nF+ ( 1 - F) re' ( ë) 
- C (continuation) has value re' ( ë ) = ë + g_- w 
These three values for the firm are functions of ë, with a slope respectively of 0, 1- F 
and 1, leading to two reservation rules in ë , denoted byE and ê: 
C rv F:"E = n+w -g_ 
NF rv F : ê = E- '! / ( 1 - F) < "E. 
(C.2) 
(C.3) 
Note that Eisa function of parameters only and notably exogenous to both effort e and 
firm 's controls qw and qm. 
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Proposition 1. i) If c > E, the firm wants tore tain the worker; ii) ~l c < Ê, it wants 
to initiate a no-fault dismissal procedure; iii) if c is in between these two quantifies, it 
starts a procedure for fault. 
The proof is in Wasmer (2006b). Its intuition is straightforward. When productivity 
is high, the firms wants to retain the worker. If productivity is very low, since the F-
layoff strategy is risky, the firm is ready to pay the full layoff cost -r. In between, the 
firm hopes to save on layoff costs with a F-layoff strategy that has a limited downside 
risk if it fails . 
Corollary 1. Let G be the cumulative density function of c. The fra ction of workers 
facing a procedure for fault is G( w - ~) - G( w - ~ - -r / ( 1 - F) ). This is increasing in 
the cast of a no-fault dismissal -r and the success rate of the procedure f or professional 
fault F. With a uniform density function, w - ~ has no impact on that fraction. 
Proof : simple calculations. 
The corollary states that the higher -r / ( 1- F), that is, the easier to use the F-strategy 
and the higher the NF-layoff costs, the more likely to observe workers under a layoff 
for cause. 
C.5.2 Optimal quit strategies of the worker 
Moving one step backward, one can now investigate the optimal quit strategy of 
workers. Either the worker quits-and obtain %'- or (s)he remains in the firm. In the 
latter case, the worker correctly anticipates the strategy of the finn (C, NF, F) in the 
next stage and correctly evaluates utility in each case, as follows : 
- Q (quit) bas value %' 
- NF (no-fault) bas value %' +a-r 
- F (fault) bas value F%' + (1- F)(w+ v+ qw- c(~)) - 1: 
- C (continuation) bas value w+ v+ qw- c (.~) 
We can show that the worker 's strategy depends on the revealed random component of 
utility v and is also described by two reservation rules v and v : 
Q "" C : V=%'- w- qw + c(~) , 
Q "" F :v = v+1:/(1 - F) . 
(C.4) 
(C.S) 
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At this stage of period 1, the worker knows the revealed value of E, hence : 
Proposition 2. i) If the match has low productivity ( E < Ê), the worker never quits 
because (s)he expects a no-fault layoff and thus to obtain severance payment œr > 0; 
ii) if the match has high productivity, that is, if E > €, the worker expects to be retained 
by the finn but would quit anyhow if and only if its utility in the match is low (v < 
v); iii) for intermediate values of productivity, i.e. if ê < E < €, the worker expects a 
procedure for fault. (S)he then quits if and only if v < v. 
Corollary 2 (mismatch) The conditional mean of v in surviving matches is de-
creased by a lower leve[ of higher of ~ . To the extent that EPL affects negatively ~ 
in general equilibrium, EPL increases utility mismatch (in the sense of more matches 
associated with a low idiosyncratic utility ). 
Most of the effects of the corollaries above are easy to understand. We can now 
summarize the various mechanisms. 
C.5.3 Separation decisions 
Figure 1 in the text conveniently summarizes the partition of the plane (E, v) into 
different separation 1 no separation outcomes. The distance between ê and € is given 
by -r / (1 - F) : as said above, employment protection as well as successful F proce-
dures raise the inter-frontier space in which firms wish to layoff for fault. The distance 
between v and vis given by :E/ (1- F) : workers quit when the idiosyncratic corn-
panent of utility is too low, but there is an extra-quit incentive to quit if workers anti-
cipate stress :E from the F-layoff procedure. Overall, the surface of the F-layoff area is 
[Vmax - U +w+qw -:E/ (1-F)- ~] * -r/ (1 - F), thus at given e, qm and qw, F-layoff 
is more likely with higher frictions (discouraging workers to quit), with higher wages 
(workers take a chance to win the case with probability 1-F) and with increased by 
higher fi ring cost -r. 
To sum up the impact of EPL derived so far, we have that : 
1. The no-fault firing costs -r raise the likelihood of a procedure for fault and thus 
the associated stress (see corollary 1); 
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2. To the extent that -r discourages hiring in general equilibrium, that is, reduces 
outside options of workers Cff, a higher -r increases the degree of mismatch of 
employed workers. 
C.5.4 Optimal effort e, monitoring qm, and working conditions qw 
We now investigate the role of employment protection on the optimallevel of e, qw 
and qm. We assume a Nash equilibrium between the firm and the worker in the choice 
of these quantities. Recall that the level of effort is chosen before the realization of v 
and E, but after knowing their distribution , and in taking qw and qm as given. 
The worker knows exactly how effort e reduces the success of the fault procedure 
and thus the separation strategy of the firm, as well as her/his own propensity to quit. 
Symmetrically, the firm knows how its decisions qw and qm affect quits, its own sepa-
ration margins and F. To fix. ideas, we assume that the density of E and v are uniform, 
with g( E) = go and g( v) = ho, but this is not essential. A similar convenient assump-
tion is when costs functions are quadratic with unit scale parame ter : c( e) = e2 and 
C(qm ,qw) = (qm) 2 + (qw) 2. Finally, a more demanding assumption is that F' / (1- Ff 
is constant (see Appendix C.5.5 for the implied F) . We however make this assumption 
only in the next subsection in arder to obtain closed-form solutions. 
C.S.S Special case : density of worker's utility v is a mass point 
(no q ï) 
Before solving for the full program of both the agent and the firm, one may study 
the simpler case in which the density of v is collapsed to a mass point higher than 
v : in other words, the worker will never quit the firm, which reduces the problem to 
studying firms ' separation decisions. In this case, the programs of the worker and the 
firm lead to conveniently simpler first arder conditions. Ali intermediate derivations are 
in Appendix, as weil as a proof of the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium 
for general costs functions. In the special case is when F' / (1 - F)2 = <I> where <I> is a 
constant, we can further greatly simplify the solutions and illustrate the role of -r quite 
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simply. In this case, solutions to the problem are : 
~ - m T2 go_ w 
e = 1 + ~ e, q = 1 + ~ 2 e, q = 0 
where ~ = -r3 (œr+I.)gÔ<1>2 . 
(C.6) 
(C.7) 
Proposition 3. The various effect of EPL are : i) equilibrium effort is increasing 
in T with a local exponent 3 when T is small and in severance payment a-r. As T goes 
to injinity, effort converges to the maximum e; ii) equilibrium monitoring intensity is 
increasing in T for low values of T, reaches a maximum and then gradually goes down 
to zero when T -7 =. 
Most intuitions are easy to get. The elasticity of effort e to layoff costs T is initially -
for low values of T- of arder 3 or even 4 if I, was small, because several effects reinforce 
each other : as T is higher, firms use F -layoffs and for low values of T, this rai ses q111 • 
Workers counteract in raising effort, and so on and so forth. When T becomes large, 
the effort of the worker approaches its limit e and so after a while, the firm reduces its 
monitoring, hence the negative slope of q111 when T is large. 
In equilibrium, the welfare effect of employment protection of a worker in his job 
can also be calculated. The impact of Ton instantaneous utility is equal to ( -c' ( e )de/ d-r)+( -dq111 / d-r) : 
the first term is always negative, while the second one is negative for low values of T. 
Intertemporal utility is dU / dT= dU jdq111 .dq111 j d-r and signs as - dq111 j d-r, i.e. first 
negative, then positive as T grows. In other words, the effect of Ton workers' utility is 
ambiguous : one the one hand, it reduces the firing probability which is positive on the 
present discounted value (PDV) of utility evaluated in period 1. On the other hand, T 
raises monitoring q111 and in reaction, raises efforts. This reduces worker's flow utility 
and may also reduce the PDV of utility if the second effect dominates over the first one. 
C.5.6 General case 
In the general case, it is impossible to derive closed form solution fore, q111 and qw, 
and not even to prove uniqueness. The reason is that the madel contains both tenden-
cies towards multiple equilibria-as e and q111 are strategie complements through F-
and towards corner solutions, as shawn in the simple cases above-as q111 and qw are 
--- -- ---------------------------------------
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substitute controls variables for the firm. Nevertheless, the first arder conditions of the 
firm and the worker can be derived easily and are fairly intuitive. Thanks to assumption 
<D = F' 1 (1- F)2 we can further simplify these first order conditions but thi s is not nee-
ded here. See the Appendix for detail s. Worker 's effort is determined by a first arder 
condition: 
(C.8) 
where H is the c.d.f. of random variable v. The left-hand side is the marginal cost of 
effort, equalized to the marginal return, which is the sum of two terms. The first one is 
due to the effect of a lower layoff-rate (Ji 1 Je and the second one is due to the effect 
of a higher quit rate -Jv 1 ëJe to avoid the stress cost I, when the worker quits (v > v ) 
he nee the coefficient ( 1 - H (v). The equation shows that the marginal return on effort 
is always strictly positive, and is increasing in qm and -r. 
Firm's first arder conditions in an interior solution for qm and qw imply 
Ill 2 ( ) ( 1- H (v) ) -rho( (~))( ( ) ) -- o q = g0-r e- e <D 1- 2 - 2 1 - G E I, e- e <D ::>= (C.9) 
w -r ho ( - -r ) ho ( (-) ( - ) ~ 0 q = 2 2(1 - F) + l 1- GE Emax - E :::> (C.10) 
The left-hand side in the first line is the marginal cost of monitoring fo r the firm. It 
is equal to the marginal return on the right-hand side. The marginal return is itself the 
sum of two terms : the first implies that raising monitoring intensity qm will increase 
the success ofF -procedures and th us increase profits because thi s saves on Jayoff costs 
-r. This effect is mitigated by the second term which is negative : a higher qm raises 
the quit rate by workers even in the case in which the firm would make profits, which 
occurs with probability 1 - G(Ê) . In an in teri or solution, qm is increasing in e- e and in 
-r, at a fix <P. When the second term dominates (high profits), the firm reaches a corner 
solution qm = 0 : it does not monitor the worker to reduce its quit rate, as monitoring 
reduces utility. The second line has a sim il ar interpretation. When the first negative term 
in the right-hand side dominates, the firm expects to makes ]osses and thus, by setting 
qw to a negative value, it can induce more quits and save -r. When the second positive 
term dorninates instead, the firm makes profits and can reduce turnover by raising qm 
above O. 
These equations point out a key mechanism : the impact of -r on firm 's attitude 
towards the worker depends on its perception of future profits. If, in period 1, the firm 
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expects jobs to be profitable, that is for large values of e, it prefers to retain the worker, 
decrease qm and raise qw. In nonviable jobs instead, the firm will make negative profits. 
It may want to save on layoff costs -r, and raises qm to establish a fault. Sumrnarizing, 
we have: 
Proposition 4. ln viable jobs, firms have to maintain positive working conditions, 
all the more than current profits are high relative to outside profits. To reduce turnover, 
firms do not monitor workers. 
Proposition 5. ('placardisation') ln nonviable jobs, working conditions have to be 
negative, all the more than -r is large. 
Unreported numerical resolutions provide additional insights. In the first case, we 
investigate the role of layoff costs -r in the context of a relatively viable job. When -r 
increases, the firm raises monitoring intensity, so asto induce effort and have an option 
to fire for fault, but at the same time raises working conditions, in order to retain the 
worker. The net effects on worker's welfare are ambiguous : the instantaneous utility 
decreases slowly with -r, while the PDV of utility of the worker increases at low -r but 
then decreases at higher -r. In contrast, when jobs are nonviable, the firm anticipates 
that it will have to fire at the end of the period. So, when -r increases, the finn rapidly 
raises its monitoring intensity so as to induce effort, but, contrary to the previous case, 
the finn worsens working conditions to increase the quit propensity of the worker. Per-
period utility of the worker decreases very fast, and the PDV of utility is also strongly 
reduced. 
C.5.7 Summary and further discussion of the model 
Precisely, co ming back to equation (C.l ), we can identify three components which 
may match the data in the subsequent empirical analysis : c(e), qm and L. will all enter 
additively and negatively into flow utili ty. There is in addition a fourth component, 
qw which can affect utility both ways. Hereafter, by 'stress', we will have in mind 
c(e) +qm- qw + L 
The first effect of EPL identified cornes from the fact that firing is a monitoring 
deviee (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984b ). As it becomes more ex pensive or more difficult 
to lay off, managers raise monitoring intensity and psychological pressures, thereby 
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raising stress. We can group these mechanisms under the label "intense monitoring 
effect". It generates a positive link between individual EPL (as opposed to collective 
EPL, applying in the event of mass layoffs) and stress. A second set of mechanisms 
arises when jobs are nonv:iable, i.e. in recessions or when a task becomes obsolete. 
In such cases, an efficient labor market would require firing for economie reasons (no-
fault layoff). As this becomes more costly, the firrn wants its worker to leave and affects 
negatively working conditions qw. The firm can also try to establish a professional 
fault by raising monitoring intensity qmand obtain a dismissal at a lower cost, which 
potentially generates further stress. We call this the "harassment effect". 
Through these two partial equilibrium effects, employment protection raises "ins-
tantaneous" stress and disutility of work, with some possible adverse effects on the 
present discounted value of being employed. General equilibrium would reinforce the 
adverse effects of EPL, if we take as granted that EPL raises frictions and lengthen 
unemployment spells. Greater frictions indeed reduce the opportunities for workers to 
quit when they don't like their job, colleagues and manager: in a sclerotic labor market, 
employees must deal with low idiosyncratic utility seemingly forever. This is referred 
to as the "mismatch effect". Our madel has neglected other potentially relevant and 
positive channels of EPL : with risk-averse workers, longer-running jobs generate a 
partial equilibrium positive impact on utility. Further, EPL protects and thus induces 
specifie capital investments, an implication of standard contract theory applied to the 
labor market, see e.g. Wasmer (2006b). 
Two additional issues need to be addressed at this stage. The first one is : why 
does the firm maintain the wage constant when a wage eut could efficient! y induce the 
worker to quit? The answer is : both actions (wage eut and harassment) are considered 
as unfair (often referred to as "constructive disrnissals"). If a third party, say a judge, 
is called to arbitrate, (s)he could command a large fine or a large compensation to the 
worker. The difference between the two actions is however that psychological pressures 
are hard to prove, while wage cuts are fairly easy to detect. Raising stress by raising qm 
and reducing qw may be a more effective way of inducing a quit. 
A second and related issue is why, if workers anticipate bullying in second period, 
they do not negotiate a small compensation with the firm and quit, instead of suffering 
from bullies ? There is no easy answer to this question, but the previous argument still 
applies : to the extent that moral harassment will make the worker quit, the compen-
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sation should indeed be very small : from the amount of compensation, a court would 
infer that there are unfair practices at the workplace. 
Appendix C - Employment Protection Laws and Work Stress 
C.6 Construction and verification of regional EPL 
indices in Canada 
C.6.1 Construction 
179 
To create a single index for individual protection and another one for collective 
protection against dismissals, we created two grids, cornrnon to all provinces : one for 
seniority (12 categories) and one for firm size (8 categories). We then calculate from 
Table B an average across all lines of the grid of the notice period. Table C provides 
the averages per province. We thus obtain two indicators of absolute individual and 
collective EPL. It is interesting to notice that the correlation across regions of the two 
indicators is not very strong : it is even negative ( -0.24 ). Alternatively, one can build 
relative indicators of individual and collective EPL, based on the position of each pro-
vince in the distribution of EPL. They appear to be highly correlated with absolute 
measures, with a correlation coefficient of 0.92. Hereafter, we focus only on absolute 
indicators. 
C.6.2 Comparison 
We investigate the impact of these variables on EPL indicators. A crucial ques-
tion is how to identify the EPL effects, both individual and collective. We can now 
show a number of correlation indicating that our indicators capture sorne important 
dimension of regionallabor market conditions. A business report from the Fraser Ins-
titute provides indicators of provincial "labor market regulations", including EPL but 
also various other dimensions of labor relations . 7 Provinces are scored from 0 to 10 
on each indicator. A score of 10 indicates an optimallabor law in terms of providing 
labor market flexibility. To ease the comparability with our EPL indices. We take a li-
near transf<Jrmation of the Fraser Institute indicator, in applying x ---t 10 - x : a positive 
7. "The hldex of la bor Market Regulation assesses severa! indicators of the provinciallabor relations 
laws. Specifically, the following aspects of the relation laws are examined : (1) processes of certi fica ti on 
and decerti fica tion; (2) arbitration process; (3) union security; (4) successor rights; (5) treatment of 
technology; (6) replacement workers; (7) third-party picketing; and (8) openness of the provinciallabor 
Relations Boards." Details in Clemens et al. (2003b), a report of the Fraser Institute. The website of the 
institute is presented as follows : "Established in 1974, The Fraser lnstitute is an independent public 
policy organ ization with offices in Vancouver, Calgary, and Toronto." 
180 Essays on Employment Protection and its Impacts on Workers Wel/-Being 
correlation coefficient between our EPL index and the Fraser Institute index will thus 
indicate that two indices are sirnilar. The report of Fraser institute in addition reports 
the ranking of regions ( 1 for the most flexible to 10 fo r the Jess flexible) . 
We display the conelation matrix between our EPL indices, where EPL_both is 
the sum of the two EPL indicators and LMR is the index of labor market regulation 
from Fraser Institute (rk stands for the ranking index and sc for the score). It appears 
that collective EPL is pretty well correlated with both indicators of the Fraser institute. 
Individual EPL is positive! y conelated too but to a lesser extent. Figure C 1 confirms 
that the conelation with the sum of the two indicators is pretty good, especially if 
British Columbia is excluded from the calculation. 
TABLE F.l: EPL dimensions, Canada 
EPL_both EPL_ind EPL_coll LMR(rk) LMR(sc) 
EPL_both 
EPL_ind 0.1782 
EPL_coll 0.913 -0.2387 1 
FI-LMR(rk) 0.515 0.2716 0.3956 1 
FI-LMR(sc) 0.4285 0.1083 0.378 0.9257 
Note : correlation coefficients between vari ous indicators of EPL 
Another check is to conelate EPL indicators with the duration of unemployment 
spells. Indeed, most existing theory points out that employer will be more reluctant to 
create jobs and take risks when EPL is more important. We fi nd that the correlation bet-
ween collective EPL and unemployment duration is positive and relatively large, while 
the correlation between individual EPL and unemployment duration is pretty small and 
actually negative. The correlation with the sum of the two indicators (EPL_both) is 
however fairly positive, which is reassuring. Finally, one can simply calculate the cor-
relation between EPL and union density. Again, there is a clear pattern of positive cor-
relation between collective EPL and union density : the conelation is 0.46 and reaches 
0.61 if one outlier is taken away. See also Figure C2. 
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FIGURE F.l: Ex-post check of the EPL variables. EPL_ind+EPL_coll vs. Employment 
Regulation Index 
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C. 7 Data sources 
The sources for country controls are 
- Unemployment: Data extracted from OECD.StatExtracts. 
http :1/stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx 
- Union density : Jelle Visser (2006). Union membership statistics in 24 countries, 
Monthly Labor Review, January 
- Bargaining coverage: OECD Figure A outlook 1997, chapter 5, COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING: LEVELS AND COVERAGE, July 
- Unemployment benefits : OECD, 2004, Benefits and Wages 2004 (latest update 
march 2006) 
- Wage coordination and wage centralization : OECD Employment Outlook 2004, 
Chapter 3, Wage-setting Institutions and Outcomes. 
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